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He mentions the phrase “identification problem,”
which, though no one knows quite what he means, is
said with such authority that it is totally convincing.
— Edward E. Leamer (1983)
“Let’s Take the Con Out of Econometrics”
The importance of econometrics to economics is hard to overstate. In fact, the first re-
cipients of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences were two founders of the
field—Ragnar Frisch and Jan Tinbergen—“for having developed and applied dynamic
models for the analysis of economic processes.” It’s what separates theory from evi-
dence; presumption from fact. It allows economists to test hypotheses, identify causal
effects, measure structural parameters.
As a field, econometrics, and applied microeconomics along with it, has changed
remarkably since the days of Frisch and Tinbergen. It has also faced its fair share of
critiques and moments of existential crisis. Leamer (1983), in his oft-referenced com-
mentary on the field of econometrics, disparaged the “sad and decidedly unscientific
state of affairs we find ourselves in.” His primary criticism was the false sense of objec-
tivity many practitioners projected: that there was a “truth” to be found in the functional
form, set of variables, or model specification. Econometricians often ignored or were ig-
norant of the sometimes subconscious influence of their own assumptions and priors.
He suggested the need for sensitivity analyses, what applied economists now usually
refer to as robustness checks, to test whether different modelling assumptions change
the inferences being made. The set of different assumptions would stem in part from the
researcher, and from “anticipat[ing] the opinions of his consuming public.”
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Five years after Leamer levied his critique LaLonde (1986) followed with his influ-
ential remarks. He was troubled by the realization that the standard econometric tech-
niques used to estimate the impact of an employment program with observational data
were unable to replicate experimental results. He concluded that results derived from
econometric methods should be compared to experimental ones to verify their validity.
Given the infeasibility of applying experiments to all questions of economic interest—
on account of the potential costs, ethical concerns, and practical limitations—this left
applied econometricians questioning the potential contributions of their methods.
Fortunately for the field, and for economics in general, econometrics has made great
strides since the critiques of Leamer and LaLonde. More thought has been turned to
the quality of the research method being used and the assumptions specific economet-
ric models impose. A standard toolkit of methods is now well-established in applied
microeconomics: difference-in-differences, instrumental variables, regression disconti-
nuity design, and experimental methods, for example. This “credibility revolution,” as
documented by Angrist and Pischke (2010), has re-focused researchers’ questions to-
wards issues of design: do I have exogenous variation in the treatment of interest? Can
I disentangle what channels the effect works through? Are there institutional quirks
that may allow me to identify the impacts of certain policies? Only after the design
has been settled on does the researcher choose the econometric method best suited to
measure the effect she is after.
As LaLonde suggested, experiments, either in the lab or field, where the source
of randomization is controlled by the researcher, have been a key part of this revo-
lution. But arguably the biggest shift has come from practitioners seeking out quasi-
experimental sources of variation: differences in some variable of interest on account
of geography, history, politics, policy, or some combination thereof. This has, both out
of necessity and curiosity, expanded the set of questions and fields in which economists
apply their methods. To paraphrase John Maynard Keynes, the applied microeconomist
must be legal scholar, sociologist, psychologist, historian—in some degree.
These trends have now been coupled with an increase in the number of sources and
size of data, and with improvements in computing power. This has created new oppor-
tunities for economists to address difficult to answer economic questions, both old and
new. At the same time, the tools required to fully utilize these advances has evolved. Ma-
chine learning techniques are now gaining application in economics. They complement
the econometric toolkit by aiding in prediction problems (measuring economic growth
through satellite data) and identifying hidden patterns and clusters (defining product
and customer market segments). The approach taken by these methods, as explained
by Mullainathan and Spiess (2017), is inductive: given the large amount of data at hand,
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what rules best explain their distribution and pattern?
But machine learning need not be separate from causal inference. Indeed, ml tech-
niques can be used to investigate heterogeneity in treatment effects in subsets of the
variable space that would be infeasible to conduct manually. This is not to say that ml
can replace well-thought out and well-designed research studies; only that there are
often dimensions of interest (which students benefit the most from a school lunch pro-
gram?) that can now be tackled from different perspective. And much more is possible.
As remarked by Athey (2018), “it is perhaps easier than one might think to make predic-
tions about the impact of ml on economics, sincemany of themost profound changes are
well underway.” It seems the applied microeconomist must also be—in part—computer
scientist.
This dissertation comprises three chapters that are grounded in this evolution of
econometrics. They are meant to be self-contained, with their own appendices where
appropriate, though the second chapter builds off the results from the first. A consoli-
dated bibliography for all three papers is provided at the end.
The first chapter concerns land use and zoning regulations. It aims to answer the
following question: how exactly do land use regulations impact urban development,
specifically housing development? These seemingly-innocuous rules turn out to have
large impacts on development and urban form. To arrive at this conclusion, I employ a
by-now-established tool from the current econometric toolkit: regression discontinuity.
By exploiting the discrete change in the level of regulation when crossing municipal
borders in Massachusetts, I can compare how development differs between locations
that are separated by less than 200m, subject only to different rules on building. As there
is a dearth in widespreadmeasures of the level of land use regulation, I derive my own by
applyingmachine learning techniques—or natural language processing techniques more
specifically—on the text from the zoning bylaws across the state. I take the approach of
exploring for hidden “clusters” of towns, defined as having similar distribution of words
in their zoning bylaws. Using existing measures of regulation that cover a subset of
my data, I then determine which of these clusters captures highly-regulated towns. I
find that stringent zoning codes strongly decrease the stock of housing, and that this is
due to larger lot sizes (land consumption per house). Other potential explanations for
the reduced housing stock, such as towns building fewer new houses or restricting the
supply of developable land, are not supported by the data. For policy makers whose goal
is to increase the supply of housing in high-growth regions, regulations that encourage
higher consumption of land, such asminimum lot sizes and arduous shape requirements,
should be scrutinized.
The second chapter is a descriptive paper, and an extension of the first. It has two
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goals: to investigate the suitability of off-the-shelf ml methods in measuring the level
of regulation and documenting the characteristics of high-regulated jurisdictions. The
measurement aspect should inform researchers who want to use text-based methods on
other legal texts (sections of bylaws or state laws) to derive a fuzzymeasure of regulation
stringency. In this particular setting, decomposition methods (such as principal compo-
nents analysis and the latent Dirichlet allocationmodel) and ridge regression outperform
decision tree-based methods (such as random forest). By documenting what towns en-
act burdensome land use regulations I seek to shed light on the causes of regulations. As
this is still a poorly understood issue, I hope to help future researchers by establishing
some facts in this regard. I find that historical density and land use patterns are the best
predictors of current day regulation. Surprisingly, given some theories on the origins
of land use regulations, historical demographic characteristics are weak predictors of
present zoning. Lastly, I chart how town-level demographics have evolved since the
implementation of widespread local-level zoning. The most striking has been the diver-
gence of towns in the lowest quintile of regulation stringency in the share of non-white
residents. This, and other results, provide some new stylized facts that can be useful in
understanding the origins of such regulations.
The third and last chapter employs the experimental method to address an economi-
cally important question: can entrepreneurship be taught? We partner with a non-profit
organization operating in Uganda and conduct a field experiment by randomizing admit-
tance to entrepreneurship academies run at local universities. Though self-employment
is widespread in Uganda, and in other sub-Saharan African countries, they are not of the
sort that drives economic growth. The key issue here—in addition to efficacy—is whether
training university students to become entrepreneurs creates new high-growth busi-
nesses, or simply diverts talented youths away from well-paying, formal sector employ-
ment. The chapter is based on a registered pre-results review written in June 2020 for
ongoing field work. It discusses the research design and hypotheses being tested before
post-treatment data is collected. Baseline data before participation in the academies for
both control and treatment groups are available. Of three planned waves of academies,
two have already taken place and a third is scheduled for later in the year, conditional on
Covid-19 developments. The trajectory of the disease may also influence the scheduled
data collection (described in the chapter) should there be further cancellations of uni-
versity courses. However, current data collection efforts are promising. For example, to
date we have been able to conduct the midline survey with over 92% of wave I treatment
and control individuals through phone surveys, even as some individuals have return to
their home villages during university closures.
ChapteR1
Land Use Regulations and
Housing Development
Evidence from Tax Parcels and Zoning Bylaws in Massachusetts
Abstract: Land use regulations come in a wide variety of forms and govern
how development occurs. They restrict housing development resulting in housing
supply being less responsive to demand shocks. Yet little is known on what facets
of residential development are most impacted, hindered by lack of comprehensive
data on land use regulation stringency. I address this shortcoming by compiling
a novel measure of land use regulation based on applying natural language pro-
cessing techniques to over 40,000 pages of zoning bylaw texts. Utilizing a spatial
regression discontinuity design around municipal borders, I find that stringent land
use regulations reduce housing supply primarily through increasing the land usage
per house. Strongly regulated localities do not compensate by developingmore land
overall. These results highlight how regulations like minimum lot sizes and setback
requirements pose barriers to housing development in high-growth regions.
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1.1 Introduction
Land use regulations (luR) have been in place across us cities from the early 20th cen-
tury, but did not take off until the 1970s (Gyourko et al., 2013). They dictate how land
can be used, govern what can be built, where and how, and determine the role of local
residents in the decision making process.1 They are generally set at a local level, such as
a township or municipality. These regulations are meant to address externalities from
potential market failures: separating polluting sources from residential areas, reducing
urban sprawl, coordinating development with transportation, amongst others. Recent
work suggests, however, that the costs of restricting development outweigh the benefits
(Turner et al., 2014; Hsieh and Moretti, 2019). These costs include reduced aggregate
housing supply (Saiz, 2010; Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016) and housing markets that are
less elastic to labour (Diamond, 2016) and immigration shocks (Saiz, 2007). However,
there is a lack of evidence on how luR impact housing development and therefore lessen
supply. This is important for policy makers looking to understand the implications of
luR. Knowledge of these effects can also provide clues for what sorts of regulations are
most consequential.
Moreover, it is infeasible to consider every potential regulation individually. First,
the set of all possible regulations to choose from is large. Second, local stakeholders
often have influence on the development process. Third, many regulations may seem
different, but restrict development similarly. For example, restrictions on lot shape and
lot width both serve to increase land usage per house. A common way to mitigate these
issues is to create indices of luR stringency meant to capture the overall regulatory
burden. The most well-known of these indices is the Wharton Residential Land Use
Regulation Index (wRluRi, Gyourko et al., 2008), derived from survey responses of 2649
us localities in 2005. Yet to answer questions on the impact of luR that require measures
of regulation stringency in out-of-sample jurisdictions, or in different years, there is no
obvious solution.
This paper presents a novel measure of land use regulatory intensity derived from ap-
plying a machine learning method called the Latent Dirichlet Allocation model on over
40,000 pages of zoning bylaw texts from close to all municipalities in Massachusetts.2
This paper focuses on the current regulatory environment in the state, but the tech-
nique can be applied in other jurisdictions on bylaws from different time periods. With
this new index I then investigate how stringent luR are manifested in housing devel-
opment. First, I ask whether stringent luR reduce the density of the housing stock at
1Some examples of luR are minimum lot sizes, mandating a certain number of parking lots based on
a building’s size, establishing buffer zones around wetlands, and zoning (sorting usages across space).
2My measure has a coverage rate of 97.2% in Massachusetts compared to the 22.5% from the wRluRi.
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the municipal level. Next, I ask how restrictive regulations are reflected in the housing
market, in housing attributes, and in land use. This allows me to provide evidence on
what sets of rules are most likely to be the most restrictive. Finally, I investigate whether
these restrictions are reflected in local house prices.
To answer these questions, I apply several natural language processing (nlp) tech-
niques to municipal zoning bylaws in Massachusetts.3 To benchmark the resulting reg-
ulatory measures obtained from these text-based methods, I compare the nlp-derived
results with the wRluRi, which is often used in the literature, as well as an index created
from the Pioneer/Rappaport Housing Regulation Database (pRhRd). I find that an index
created from a Latent Dirichlet Allocation (lda) model (a latent finite-mixture machine
learning model) best captures the variation in the land use regulatory environment. My
lda-based measure has a correlation coefficient with the other indices of around 0.6.
This index is a natural complement to the existing measures: the current survey-based
indices aid in interpreting the uncovered latent factors while the lda method allows for
expanding spatial and temporal coverage. Furthermore, it only requires the text from
municipal zoning bylaws. I call this standardized measure the Natural Language Pro-
cessing Zoning Stringency Index (nalpz).
I then employ the nalpz index in a spatial regression discontinuity design with mu-
nicipal borders as cut-offs to evaluate the impact of stringent luR on the pattern of
housing development. This strategy exploits variation in the regulatory environment
at 727 borders across 271 towns and controls for local housing demand, amenities, and
tastes by comparing spatially close houses, only subjected to different luR. Three main
sources of data are utilized: i) housing characteristics from tax parcel data for all of
Massachusetts, ii) Lidar data to calculate building heights,4 and iii) land use data.
As there are various facets of housing development that can be affected by luR, I
group my outcomes into three main categories to add structure. The first group of out-
comes are related to the housing market: building age and the year a house was last
sold. They capture the rate of new housing development and turnover in the housing
market. The second group of outcomes reflect housing attributes: building (livable) area,
lot size, and building height. This group addresses how the shape and size of the houses
themselves are influenced by stringent luR. The final group of outcomes concern land
use: the rate of conversion of undeveloped land to residential usage as well as the share
of residential land of all developed land. These outcomes speak to how luR shape the
spatial pattern of residential development.
3Massachusetts is an ideal location for this analysis as it has previous measures of luR to aid in
benchmarking and interpretation.
4Lidar (light detection and ranging) is a remote sensing method for measuring distances, often used
to derive high-resolution maps.
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Though I lack exogenous variation in specific luR, by evaluating the impact of the
overall restrictiveness of luR on different features of housing development, I can speak
to what types of regulations are most likely binding. For example, regulations that cap
the overall rate of development, such as growth controls, are more likely to impact the
housing market rather than the attributes of the houses themselves. On the other hand,
parcel-specific regulations, such as floor-area-ratios, are more likely to manifest them-
selves in the shape and appearance of houses.
This paper also speaks to the effect of luR on local housing prices. Though luR
increase housing prices when considering average prices across municipalities in a re-
gions (Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016), their effect at local levels depends on the degree
of substitutability between nearby houses in different towns. From the tax parcel data,
I observe the price the house was last sold for, as well as the most recent tax assessed
value, broken down into building and land components. I use these outcomes in the
spatial Rdd to test how luR impact house prices at the local level.
The results reveal several interesting findings. First, at the aggregate level, luR
strongly restrict development. The density of residential houses at town borders is lower
in more restrictive municipalities. A standard deviation increase in nalpz reduces hous-
ing density by 20% of the mean. Second, when considering the different groups of out-
comes, I find that housing attributes react most strongly to restrictive regulations. For
example, stringent luR leads to significantly larger lot sizes (27% larger for each stan-
dard deviation increase in the regulatory index).5 House sizes and heights are essentially
not impacted by these regulations. Third, though the housing market and land use re-
spond to luR, the effects are economically small compared with housing characteristics.
Houses are slightly older and a marginally higher fraction of developed land is allocated
to residential use in more regulated towns. The rate of land conversion (undeveloped to
residential) is not influenced by luR. Fourth, house prices, after controlling for building
and lot sizes, are about 5–6% higher for every standard deviation increase in the index.
However, this is mostly explained by school district quality. This provides evidence for
nearby houses across municipal borders being substitutes for one another.
I show that controlling for school quality measures, such as per pupil spending and
graduation rates, school district fixed effects, or municipal property tax rates does not
change the interpretation of my results. Several tests confirm that the results are not
being driven by unobserved amenities or pre-existing differences in demographic char-
acteristics. To test for the role of unobserved amenities, I estimate local amenity values
with a canonical urban general equilibrium model (Ahlfeldt et al., 2015) and examine
whether these vary differentially across municipal borders. Highly regulated towns do
5The average difference in the nalpz across borders in Massachusetts is 0.74.
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have higher amenity levels on average, but this relationship disappears when compar-
ing neighbouring census block groups across borders, as my identification strategy does.
Further, the demographic composition of census blocks at town borders pre-widespread
luR does not vary with current regulatory stringency.6
Taken together these results suggest that regulations that increase land usage per
house are primarily responsible for constraining housing density and supply. For policy
makers whose aims include increasing the availability of housing, regulations such as
shape restrictions, setback requirements, and minimum lot sizes should be scrutinized.
This paper contributes to two strands of literature. The first strand of literature deals
with the measurement of land use regulations.7 I contribute to this literature by us-
ing natural language processing techniques on zoning bylaws to measure regulatory
stringency. The novel use of a machine learning algorithm to measure luR builds on
previous work. The two most relevant works for this paper are the Massachusetts Reg-
ulation Database compiled by the Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research and Rap-
paport Institute for Greater Boston (piRi, 2005) and Gyourko et al. (2008). luR are high-
dimensional, coming in various guises, making it difficult to summarize the regulatory
environment with a comprehensive measure.8 This has made fully mapping the impact
of more restrictive zoning on the pattern of housing development challenging. Remark-
able attempts have been made to create measures of regulatory intensity. Researchers
at the piRi (2005) have compiled an extensive database of municipal land use regulations
for towns around Boston (pRhRd). Gyourko et al. (2008) sent surveys to 6,896 jurisdic-
tions across the us to establish the wRluRi. The thoroughness of these endeavours has
resulted in a very detailed picture of their respective regulatory environments.
Though these have been necessary undertakings in helping our understanding of
luR, they are not without their disadvantages. First, the survey based methods suffer
from nonresponse (Gyourko et al. (2008) had a 38% response rate). Even if the pattern of
nonresponse is random, we lack measures of overall luR stringency for many jurisdic-
tion. Second, they are very resource intensive. Compiling the pRhRd required a research
team consisting of a project manager, senior researcher, and twelve research assistants.
This makes it difficult to administer in other localities in different time periods. Third,
they are limited in the time dimension, usually depicting the regulatory environment at
6A census block corresponds roughly to a city block. A census block group contains 31.6 blocks on
average.
7A broader overview of this literature is given in Section 1.3.
8An illustration of the numerous sorts of restrictions posed by luR can be found in the piRi (2005)
database. They gather data on the regulatory environment around Boston through bylaws and surveys,
and generate 119 variables meant to describe it. As many of these regulations affect development in
similar ways, for example by reducing density, focusing on just a small subset of all regulations can lead
to incorrect conclusions.
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one point in time.9
I extend this previous work by creating an index of regulatory restrictiveness (nalpz)
that covers the vast majority of municipalities in Massachusetts (341 of 351, compared
to 187 from the pRhRd and 79 covered by the wRluRi). Existing measures of luR aid in
the interpretation of the estimated latent categories, making my measure a complement
to the previously established luR measures.
As measures of land use restrictiveness are vital to many studies that require esti-
mates of city-level housing supply elasticities, this technique provides a viable method to
increase both the geographic coverage and time frequency of a luR index. Researchers
estimating Rosen-Roback style models (Diamond, 2016; Hsieh and Moretti, 2019) re-
quire measures of the responsiveness of local housing markets. Other papers use luR
measures to study their direct effects on welfare (Turner et al., 2014). A large body of re-
search is interested in related questions that require measures of luR or housing-supply
elasticities derived from luR measures (Dettling and Kearney, 2014; Hilber and Turner,
2014; Albouy, 2016; Aladangady, 2017; Stroebel and Vavra, 2019). Virtually all these
papers use either the wRluRi as a measure of regulatory intensity, or housing supply
elasticities from Saiz (2010), who in turn uses wRluRi to separate the contribution of
geographic and regulatory restrictions on housing supply.
The second strand is concernedwith the consequences of stringent land use or zoning
regulations.10 This paper contributes to this literature in two dimensions. First, it identi-
fies how restrictive luR manifest themselves in housing development. Second, it speaks
to the substitutability of nearby houses across municipal borders. Previous work has es-
tablished a credible link between the implementation of stringent luR and the reduction
in aggregate housing supply and the increase in low-density developments (Mayer and
Somerville, 2000; Saks, 2008; Glaeser andWard, 2009; Turner et al., 2014; Diamond, 2016;
Jackson, 2016; Hsieh and Moretti, 2019), and increasing house prices (Ihlanfeldt, 2007;
Turner et al., 2014; Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016; Severen and Plantinga, 2018). Other
research has found that luR result in additional negative externalities: they exacerbate
geographic sorting and inequality (Saks, 2008; Diamond, 2016; Ganong and Shoag, 2017;
Hsieh and Moretti, 2019), increase price volatility (Glaeser et al., 2008; Jackson, 2018),
as well as encourage land use conversion (Irwin and Bockstael, 2004; Sims and Schuetz,
2009; Shertzer et al., 2018).11 This paper makes an important contribution by consider-
9It is possible to ask local officials about when regulations were implemented, as the piRi (2005) do.
But it is more challenging to gather the data repeatedly over several years.
10Though often used interchangeably, land use regulations subsume zoning regulations. luR also in-
clude environmental regulations, for example.
11In an address to the Urban Institute in 2015, Jason Furman, chair of then President Barack Obama’s
Council of Economic Advisers, claimed that “excessive or unnecessary land use or zoning regulations
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ing how stringent luR are reflected in the pattern of housing development. The results
on the substitutability of neighbouring houses subjugated to differing levels of land use
restrictiveness are consistent with the model of Helsley and Strange (1995), where house
price differences are insignificant between closely substitutable towns.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Background on land use regu-
lations in Massachusetts is given in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 outlines the construction of
the regulation index. Section 1.4 describes the data, Section 1.5 the empirical strategy,
and Section 1.6 the main results. Section 1.7 discusses balancing, specification, and ro-
bustness checks. The last section offers conclusions. Specifics on the natural language
processing techniques, model used to estimate local amenities, and additional details can
be found in the Appendix.
1.2 Institutional Setting
Thoughmunicipalities in Massachusetts have utilized luR since the 1930s, this was more
the exception than the norm, as they needed to get approval from the state if theywanted
to deviate from the state-level development guidelines. This changed with the introduc-
tion of the Massachusetts Zoning Act in 1975. The goal of this act was to “facilitate, en-
courage and foster the adoption andmodernization of zoning ordinances and by-laws by
municipal governments.” Effectively, it made it easier for municipalities to implement
their own zoning bylaws without significant state interference. There is corroborating
evidence that luR were not restricting house construction nationwide until the 1970s
(Gyourko et al., 2013).
After the Act was passed, municipalities began implementing their own luR almost
immediately and in quick succession. Survey data collected by the piRi (2005), and plot-
ted in Figure A.16, show the cumulative share of towns that have implemented a specific
category of luR by each year. Before 1975, only regulations regarding subdivisions (di-
viding a parcel of land into smaller parcels) were common. Afterwards, various types of
luR were introduced in different municipalities in quick succession.
Comparing zoning districts across municipalities is difficult, as there is no standard-
ized classification of the district types. Furthermore, as municipalities set their own
zoning regulations, land that is zoned for single-family residential in one town may be
subjugated to a completely different regulatory environment than similarly zoned land
in another town.
have consequences that go beyond the housing market to impede mobility and thus contribute to rising
inequality and declining productivity growth.” (Furman, 2015)
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Figure A.16 also provides some examples of different categories of luR.12 For ex-
ample, subdivision regulations are concerned with the division of a parcel of land into
smaller units (eg a developer buying a parcel of land and building more than one house
on the parcel with the intention of selling them as individual units) while wetland reg-
ulations deal with issues surrounding development around stagnate bodies of water (eg
how close buildings can be to wetlands). Zoning bylaws generally cover some of the
categories of luR, but others (such as septic regulations) are often their own section in
the municipal bylaw code.
1.3 Measuring Land Use Regulations
luR are notoriously difficult to measure. This is primarily because they operate in a
high-dimensional space; luR are written in a variety of different ways, which are often
not consistent across municipalities, making direct comparison of bylaws across towns
a challenging task.
Numerous strategies have been employed to measure the regulatory environment
for land use or zoning. One strategy has been to focus on the implementation of or
amendment to a single law (Zhou et al., 2008; Kahn et al., 2010; Severen and Plantinga,
2018). Other research has addressed this issue by calculating the share of luR policies
employed from a set of possible categories, and using this as a proxy for luR intensity
(Mayer and Somerville, 2000; Quigley and Raphael, 2005; Geshkov and DeSalvo, 2012).
Another approach is based on the assumption that the construction market is rela-
tively competitive. These papers then use hedonic regressions or calculate price-to-cost
ratios to infer the extent that luR are impacting the housing market (Glaeser and Gy-
ourko, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2005). Utilizing the same data source as I, other researchers
gather information on luR directly from zoning bylaws, normally by hand (Evenson and
Wheaton, 2003; piRi, 2005; Brooks and Lutz, 2019). Yet another more recent approach
from Brueckner et al. (2017) combines data on prices for parcels of land in China with
floor-area-ratio limits in an Alonso-Muth-Mills model to infer the stringency of regula-
tion.
The most informative method—in terms of quantity and quality of information—has
been to conduct surveys with local officials who are responsible for setting land use
policy, often in combination with gathering data from primary sources (Levine, 1999;
piRi, 2005; Gyourko et al., 2008). These efforts to establish a unified database on luR
have been substantial undertakings; research teams had to either scour town websites
12There are various other categories that luR can belong to, and Figure A.16 is in no way exclusive.
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and digitize the information or interview town officials in order to gather the necessary
data to compile these resources, sometimes both.
Though these previous undertakings in measuring luR provide an important and
necessary starting point, the spatial regression discontinuity design described in Sec-
tion 1.5 benefits from a measure of regulatory stringency that has close to universal
coverage over a large region. I address this need by creating a regulatory index that
is based on the text from zoning bylaw documents from nearly all the towns in Mas-
sachusetts.
Specifically, I compile a corpus of municipal bylaws by gathering the documents
directly from the various municipalities’ websites. I then consider several different nat-
ural language processing (nlp) techniques and compare their results with the survey
responses from the Pioneer/Rappaport Housing Regulation Database (pRhRd) and Gy-
ourko et al. (2008).13 nlp are a natural fit in this particular setting, as they are primarily
used on unstructured text data. Importantly, the set of nlp techniques considered can
all be classified as “unsupervised” methods, as they use no information from the survey
data used to assess fit. This is to avoid over-fitting any derived measure to the limited
number of towns available for benchmarking.
As there is no ex ante best technique to measure the level of regulation, I consider
several different nlp methods. The first method considered is the simplest: the number
of meaningful14 words the zoning section of a bylaw contains. I refer to this as the
“document length” measure. In addition to being the simplest, it also allows for testing
the somewhat intuitive hypothesis: that the longer the zoning bylaw of a town is, the
more stringent its luR.
The second method employs a group of nlp techniques called either “dictionary
methods” or “sentiment analysis”. These methods utilize pre-defined dictionaries of
terms that belong to a specific category (eg the category “land” would contain words
such as “valley”). The more words in a document that belong to a specific category, the
more that category represents the document. The implicit hypothesis being tested here
is that words from one (or more) of these dictionaries are found more often in more (or
less) regulated towns’ bylaws.
The final method involves estimating a Latent Dirichlet Allocation (lda) mixture-
model, an unsupervised machining learning technique (Blei et al., 2003) that assumes
that the distribution of observed words derives from latent, unobserved categories (nor-
13Themeasure of regulatory stringency (wRluRi) constructed by Gyourko et al. (2008) covers 79 towns
in Massachusetts. Since the piRi (2005) does not have a summary measure of the regulatory environment,
I use their detailed data on the regulatory environment for 187 towns around Boston to create a measure
of regulatory intensity.
14ie not “filler” words such as conjunctions or pronouns.
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mally called “topics”). Given a pre-defined number of latent categories, it estimates the
probability a specific word was drawn from a specific category and assigns probabilities
to each document over the distribution of the latent categories. Under the assumption
that one (or more) of these latent categories determines regulatory stringency, I test
whether the derived probabilities correlate with the survey based measures.
Of the nlpmeasures considered, I find the topic probabilities from the ldamodel best
capture the regulatory environment in Massachusetts, as judged by its high correlation
to the two luR existing indices. I call this the Natural Language Processing Zoning
Stringency Index, or nalpz.
This section is broken down as follows. First, I describe the data I need to employ the
nlp techniques I use, as well as the data I later use to benchmark the measures I derive.
Second, I characterize in greater detail the nlp methods I introduced above. Finally, I
investigate how well the measures derived from nlp techniques are able to explain the
variation in regulatory intensity found in the survey data.
Measurement Data
Zoning Bylaws
I compile a corpus of municipal bylaws by gathering zoning bylaw documents directly
from the various municipalities’ websites. These documents are either in pdf or word
format. Generally, the text is semi-machine readable, but in a few cases, the pdfs are
scans of a paper version of the zoning bylaws. To extract the text from these documents
I apply Optical Character Recognition software to the pdfs to extract the text. It is
important to note that though the ordering of the text is not necessarily maintained, the
methods I use do not utilize the ordering of the words, only their (relative) frequency. Of
the 351 towns inMassachusetts, I am able to get bylaw documents for 341 of them, which
are either up-to-date or only up to a couple of years old. The ten towns where zoning
bylaw data is missing are smaller on average and have more rudimentary websites and
digital services, and represent only 0.49% of the population of Massachusetts (2010 US
Census).
Once the text is extracted, it needs to be preprocessed before it can be used. This
involves, among other things, tokenizing the text (separating the text on whitespace and
other characters into tokens), filtering (language-specific commonwords and stopwords
are removed, such as “the”, “or”, “that”), and lemmatization (all words are reduced to their
base form, “measurement” and “measured” become “measure”).15
15The individual words are referred to as “tokens” in keeping with the literature. This highlights the
fact that they may have been altered (ie through lemmatization) and filtered, and thus do not correspond
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Additionally, I filter out some custom, context-specific stopwords. This includesweb-
site specific stems from downloaded documents (e.g. “http”, “com”) as well as legal-
text specific words (e.g. “doc”, “sec”), which do not provide much valuable informa-
tion,. Then, I filter out tokens that are either mentioned in almost every document (e.g.
“month”, “equipment”, “waste”), or mentioned in just a couple (usually the names of
towns). Finally, I weight the tokens using the term frequency-inverse document fre-
quency method, which gives more weight to tokens that appear in fewer documents.16
Then I count the occurrences of each token (raw and weighted) in each document.
This results in a document-term matrix, where each row is a document (here: town
zoning bylaw) and each column a token. The cells refer to the number of times a word
appears in a specific document (raw or weighted).
The top raw and weighted words are shown in Figure A.1.
Dictionaries
With the processed documents, I apply various text analysis methods, investigating
whether they map into the wRluRi or the pRhRd data. One common method is the
“dictionary-based method” or “sentiment analysis”. Essentially, using predefined dictio-
naries consisting of words belonging to a specific topic, one counts the occurrences of
the dictionary words appearing in each document (raw or weighted).
I use dictionaries from the Harvard IV-4 Categories to perform sentiment analy-
sis on the zoning bylaw documents. I use nine dictionaries labelled “active”, “aquatic”,
“building”, “land”, “legal”, “nature”, “object”, “place”, and “region”. Examples of words
belonging to each of these categories are given in Appendix A1.
Pioneer/Rappaport Housing Regulation Database
Though previous data on the regulatory environment for land use across Massachusetts,
indeed across the us, has been scant, there have been a couple of notable undertakings.
One such project was carried out through a joint project by the Pioneer Institute and
the Rappaport Institute in Massachusetts.
They collected data on luR for most of the towns in a 50 mile radius around Boston
(187 of 351 towns in Massachusetts). To built their database, they gathered data in 2004
from municipal websites, through Ordinance.com, and through phone calls if necessary.
The data they gathered belonged to one of four categories: i) Zoning, ii) Subdivision,
directly to the words in the original text.
16Details on the weighting scheme are described in Appendix A1
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iii) Wetlands, or iv) Sewage Disposal. The end result is the Pioneer/Rappaport Housing
Regulation Database (pRhRd)
Besides being a thorough description of the regulatory around Boston, it also al-
lows me to test the external validity of the nlp-derived measures and to explore how
the results I find later in the empirical section vary when using a different measure of
regulatory stringency. As the piRi (2005) do not create an index themselves, I use their
data to construct a regulation index through principal component analysis.
Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index
Though the database compiled by the piRi (2005) is very thorough for the area around
Boston, it is not the most commonly used measure of land use regulatory restrictiveness,
mainly due to its limited geographic coverage and the fact that it does not come with
a uni-dimensional measure of luR. Gyourko et al. (2008) address these two issues by
focusing on breadth rather than depth.17
They sent surveys to 6,896 municipalities (with 2,649 responses) across the us to
gather information on the state and local regulatory environment. Applying factor
analysis to these responses, they create an index, the Wharton Residential Land Use
Regulation Index (wRluRi), that is meant to capture the stringency of land use control.
The wRluRi is also a measure of regulation intensity that is often used in the urban
economics literature18 (See Saks, 2008; Glaeser and Kahn, 2010; Saiz, 2010; Turner et
al., 2014; Diamond, 2016; Ganong and Shoag, 2017; Hsieh and Moretti, 2019, for exam-
ple), making it a particularly useful index to compare with. Gyourko et al. (2008) have
provided their data along with this index for other researchers to use.
Thoughmore commonly used than the pRhRd, only 79municipalities inMassachusetts
have a wRluRi value. Therefore, it is important to note that while a comparison with
this index can be worthwhile, it is based on a (probably) non-random subsample of all
towns in Massachusetts. Should the effect of more stringent luR be heterogeneous, re-
sults using the wRluRi and any nlp-derived measure could differ without indicating a
problem with the identification strategy.
Amap of the data coverage of both the pRhRd andwRluRi coverage inMassachusetts
can be seen in Figure 1.1, where the yellow (light) municipalities indicate data available
17These issues do not imply any major shortcomings of the work of the piRi (2005) or Gyourko et
al. (2008), but rather refer to a fundamental trade-off between scope and detail with limited resources,
where the former focus on detail and the latter on scope. See Gyourko and Molloy (2015, pp. 1298) for a
discussion on this point.
18It is also used in other fields, notably in labour and public economics, whenmodelling housing supply
response is vital.
MEASURING LAND USE REGULATIONS 17
from the pRhRd and purple (dark) wRluRi measures from Gyourko et al. (2008). Brown
(grey) shaded towns are covered by both datasets, of which there are 47.


















Notes: Data come from Gyourko et al. (2008) and the piRi (2005). wRluRi is the Wharton Res-
idential Land Use Regulation Index from 2005. pRhRd is the Housing Regulation Database of
Massachusetts compiled by the Pioneer Institute and the Rappaport Institute in 2004. I create
an index from their data using Principal Component Analysis.
Natural Language Processing Methods
The following subsection will cover the various nlp techniques employed, and the mea-
sures derived from them that will be compared to the indices from the survey data men-
tioned in Section 1.3. In what follows, d will refer to a document (ie a town’s zoning
bylaw text), v a unique token (processed and meaningful words), xvd the count of tokens
v in document d, and tf-idfvd the term frequency-inverse document frequency weighted
version.
Document Length
The first nlp technique consists of simply counting the number of tokens in each docu-
ment. This is done for both the raw and tf-idf weighted tokens. It is conceivable that a
longer bylaw document (iemore tokens) could be an indication of stricter luR. Formally,
18 LAND USE REGULATIONS AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT










where V refers to the set of all unique tokens in the corpus.
As can be seen in the left panel of Figure A.2, there is a large variance in the length of
these bylaw documents. Unsurprisingly, the largest municipality in the dataset, Boston,
has the longest zoning bylaw. The distribution of theweighted counts also varies, though
the normalization results in the distribution becoming closer to normal.
These two measures, raw token counts and tf-idf weighted token counts, are the first
two nlp-derived candidate measures.
Dictionary Methods
The second technique involves tallying the number of tokens (raw or tf-idf weighted)
that belong to a specific category (dictionary) for each document. For example, a dic-
tionary labelled “Legal” contains tokens such as “advocate”, “prison”, and “ordinance”.











where c indexes the chosen dictionary, and Dc represents the tokens in the dictionary.
The distributions of the measures for the various dictionaries are shown in Fig-
ure A.3. In the left panel the raw counts are divided by the document length, so the
values can be interpreted as the share of tokens in the document that belong to the re-
spective category. The more tokens a document has in a particular category, the more
that category represents the document. Though the scale changes, the results vary lit-
tle between the raw and unweighted categories. Words from topics such as “object” or
“land” appear little in the bylaws, whereas words belonging to “active” and “place” ap-
pear regularly. These topics with high occurrences are also the topics that display the
most variation.
These category-specific token counts are the second group of nlp-derived measures
I consider.
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Latent Dirichlet Allocation
The next nlp method I consider is a multinomial mixed-membership model with la-
tent topics, called the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (lda) model, first described by Blei
et al. (2003). This estimator assumes that each document is a mixture over K topics
(document-topic distribution), and the topics in turn have a probability distribution over
each word v (topic-word distribution). The dispersion of the probabilities from these two
distributions are governed by priors. Concretely, the document-topic probabilities are
assumed to be distributed as:
θd ∼ Dirichlet(α) (1.3)
and the topic-word probabilities as:
βk ∼ Dirichlet(δ) (1.4)
We observe the words in a document d with Nd words overall, resulting in wd =
(w1, . . . , wNd). Furthermore, we assume that each word was generated from one of the
K latent topics. Conditional on the document-term and topic-word probabilities, we
can now describe the generating process of each word (i) for every document (d):
zid ∼ Multinomial(θd) (1.5)
wid ∼ Multinomial(βzid) (1.6)
In the simplest case of K = 2, a document d would belong to topics 1 and 2 with
probabilities θd1 and θd2, respectively. If one topic, k, is more indicative of more strin-
gent luR, then θdk would be a measure of this. A visual depiction of the assumed data
generating process is shown in Figure A.4. It is important to stress that this is a unsu-
pervised machine learning method, which means that there is no “outcome” variable.
The lda method finds patterns in the text in order to assign topic probabilities to each
document.
Conditional on K , I derive a measure of regulation intensity, SK , by choosing the
vector of document-topic probabilities that correlates the strongest with the wRluRi.
Specifically:
SK = arg max
x∈{θ1,...,θK}
corr(x̃,wRluRi) (1.7)
where x̃ represents the normalization of the variable x to have the same moments as the
standard normal distribution.19 I do this because the magnitude of the unstandardized
19This is done by ranking the vector x and then using the quantile function of the standard normal to
get a normalized score.
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measure is not very informative; rather, it is the relative rank of the SK ’s that have
meaning. Furthermore, though the ranking of the documents by topic probabilities is
invariant to choices on the priors, the distance between these probabilities is not. Note
that the vector θ is now index by k rather than d.
The ldamodel has several parameters that must be set by the researcher. The param-
eters on the two prior (Dirichlet) distributions control the dispersion of the document-
topic and topic-words probabilities. As I use the the θ’s to construct my regulation index,
the prior on the document-topic distribution is more relevant (α). However, though the
prior affects the dispersion of the topic probabilities, the relative topic probability rank-
ings are stable. And since I standardize the measure in the end, the priors do not affect
the creation of my index. Thus, for the parameter on the topic-word prior distribution
I use the standard in the literature, δ = 0.1 (Griffiths and Steyvers, 2004) and for the
prior on the document-topic distribution I choose a prior that results in a wide coverage
of probabilities.20 I find that setting the Dirichlet parameter α = 1/K works well in
practice.
The most important parameter to choose in my setup is the number of topics, K .
Since the lda is an unsupervised method, there is no outcome with which to mea-
sure goodness-of-fit. Thus I investigate how well the number of topics fits my data
through 5-fold cross-validation. I first look at a measure called “perplexity”, which can
be thought of as a likelihood of the estimated model given validation data not used in
the estimation, where a lower number indicates better fit. Then I look at how well
the document-topic probabilities correlate with the wRluRi; in other words, I calcu-
late ρ = maxx∈{θ1,...,θK} corr(x̃,wRluRi) for each fold of each K considered. I plot
the results from the cross-validation in Figure A.5. The first panel shows the perplexity
measure, with each point indicating a fold and the solid line passing through the aver-
age of the five folds. In the second panel, I plot the ρ from above. Though the model is
only estimated with the test data for each fold, I calculate the correlation for the entire
sample.
Going only off of the perplexity measure, using a model with K = 25 would seem to
be most appropriate. However, though introducing more topics may help with fit, the
results become more difficult to interpret. Thus I focus on the results from the second
panel to choose K . From it, an lda model with three topics seems the most preferred.
Not only is the average correlation with wRluRi the highest, but the variation among
the different folds is lower.
Using the lda model with three topics (i.e. K = 3), I obtain the distributions of
20ie not clustered around 0%, 100%, or 100/K%. The last would imply that a document is nearly equally
well described by any of the latent topics.
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the three topics (β1v, β2v, and β3v, where βkv is the probability that word v is drawn
from topic k) over all tokens. The tokens with the highest probability per topic are
shown in Figure A.6. It is important to note that though the model returns a distri-
bution of words for three separate topics, the labelling and interpretation of the topics
is left ambiguous. Though I refrain from attaching any labels to the topics, there are
still evident patterns to the word groupings. For example, Topic 2 has words that deal
with renewable energy sources (“photovoltaic” and “wind”) and deal with hedonic uses
(“marijuana” and “adult”). Topic 1 concerns itself more with vocabulary describing cities
(“urban” and “sidewalk”) as well as terms associated with development (“ratio” and “af-
fordable”). Topic 3 is more mixed and is concerned with amenities (“entertainment”) and
types of development (“mixed”, “cluster”). There is obviously lots of overlap, making it
difficult ex ante to assign meaning to the latent topics.
Turning to the ability of the document-topic probabilities to capture variation in
luR, I find that Topic 2 is most correlated with a high level of restrictiveness (higher
wRluRi) whereas Topics 1 and 3 are negatively correlated with regulatory stringency.
This suggests using θd2 as a nlp-derived measure of luR for comparison to both the
other derived measures and the pRhRd regulatory index.
To get at the words that best differentiate between the most “regulated” topic (2)
and the two less regulated “topics” 1 and 3, I plot the largest absolute logarithm differ-
ences between the the probability that a word belongs to Topic 2 against Topic 1 or 3
in Figure A.7.21 Words at the top in blue are more likely to appear in Topic 2 (stronger
regulations), whereas those at the bottom in red have a higher probability of being in
Topic 1 or 3 (weaker regulations). For example, the words “city” and “mixeduse” are
more descriptive of Topic 1 or 3, whereas “Annual Town Meeting” and “photovoltaic”
are more indicative of Topic 2.
Natural Language Processing Zoning Stringency Index
With several nlp-derived measures in hand, I now turn to comparing them with the
two regulatory indices described earlier. The results are shown in Table 1.1. It shows
the correlation between the nlp-derived measures discussed in this section, namely the
document length measures, the dictionary-based measures, as well as topic probabilities
from the lda model, and the regulatory indices wRluRi and the pca index from the
pRhRd data.
The top two rows correlate the length of the documents (based on the sum of raw or
weighted tokens per document) with the regulatory measures. Somewhat surprisingly,
21log2{β2v/(β1v + β3v)}
22 LAND USE REGULATIONS AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT






































Notes: Data come from Gyourko et al. (2008) and the piRi (2005). wRluRi is the
Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index from 2005. pRhRd is the Housing
Regulation Database ofMassachusetts compiled by the Pioneer Institute and the Rap-
paport Institute in 2004. I create an index from their data using Principal Component
Analysis.
the length of the bylaw documents does not seem to be strongly related to the regula-
tion indices, either raw or unweighted. In fact, in the raw case, shorter zoning bylaw
documents come from towns with more stringent luR.
Turning to the middle section of rows, I then show the correlation of the tf-idf
weighted counts of tokens belonging to one of the dictionaries with the regulatory mea-
sures.22 I find that none of the nine dictionaries used to score the documents results
in a measure that is strongly correlated with the regulation indices. Towns that use
words from the dictionaries “region”, “place”, and “building” appear to be somewhat less
regulated, with correlation coefficients between −0.28 and −0.41.
However, turning to the bottom row, it is apparent that the topic probabilities from
the lda model are strongly related to the two indices considered here. S2 is strongly
correlated with the aggregate luR indices. I name this measure the Natural Language
Processing Zoning Stringency Index (nalpz). It has a correlation coefficient of 0.66 with
the pca index from the pRhRd data and 0.58 with the wRluRi. The mixture-model es-
timates latent topics that are strong predictors of luR by finding patterns in the text
contained in the bylaw documents.
Given the ability of nalpz to capture the regulatory environment seemingly well, I
22The results using raw counts, unreported, are quite similar.
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further examine the relationship between it and the other indices of regulation. These
are shown in the scatter plots in Figure 1.2. Panel A and B display the relationship
between nalpz and the two survey-based indices. As can be seen, nalpz does a good
job of explaining these other two measures, especially given that it uses none of that
information in its creation. Moreover, nalpz is significantly easier to derive, requiring
only the raw text given in the bylaws. The last plot, C, gives a sense of how the wRluRi
measure varies with the pRhRd index.
Figure 1.2: Comparison of Natural Language Processing Zoning Stringency Index
















































Notes: wRluRi (Gyourko et al., 2008) is the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index
from 2005. pRhRd (piRi, 2005) is the Housing Regulation Database of Massachusetts compiled
by the Pioneer Institute and the Rappaport Institute in 2004. I create an index from their data
using Principal Component Analysis.
It is also worth briefly discussing the disadvantages of using nalpz as a measure
of the regulatory environment. The primary concern is that it is a “black box”; what
exactly results in a higher or lower index value is not entirely clear. A town may be reg-
ulated more stringently either through implementing more luR or making the current
luR more intensive. However, I am able to investigatewhichwords are more often found
in documents with a higher regulation index value, given the estimated topic-specific
word probabilities. Furthermore, the ease of implementation makes this measure a nice
compliment to the survey-based measures to help expand geographic coverage and po-
tentially add a time dimension to current regulation measures.
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A map of the spatial distribution of nalpz is shown in Figure 1.3. As has been found
already by Gyourko et al. (2008), larger (in terms of land) municipalities with lower
population densities tend to have a stricter regulatory environment than average, as can
be seen by the cluster of dark blue towns in westernMassachusetts. Larger metropolitan
areas, such as those around Boston, Worcester, and Springfield, are less regulated in
general.






















Notes: nalpz is an index of land use regulation stringency derived from a Latent Dirichlet Allocation
model applied to the zoning bylaw text of towns across Massachusetts.
This paper focuses on the impact of stringent luR on housing development. How-
ever, Appendix A2 further explores the related question of the causes of stringent reg-
ulation. It discusses the spatial pattern of luR in Massachusetts and what pre-existing
town characteristics best predict a town’s regulation restrictiveness.
1.4 Data
The nalpz from Section 1.3 is the main explanatory variable. It captures the relative
stringency of a town’s luR. To measure the impact of restrictive regulation, I compile
data on current housing characteristics, land use over several decades in Massachusetts.
Several additional data sources are included for the tests performed in Section 1.7. These
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include census data on demographics, bilateral travel times between areas, school district
quality measures, and property tax rates.
Massachusetts Standardized Assessors’ Parcels
To effectively employ the spatial Rdd design, the data I use need to have two vital
pieces of information. First, they need to contain information on the characteristics of
single-family houses across Massachusetts, and second, the houses need to be precisely
geocoded to compare units within close geographic proximity.
The Massachusetts Standardized Assessors’ Parcels database fulfills these two cri-
teria. It contains every parcel of taxable land in the state of Massachusetts, except for
Boston (whichmaintains its own records and database). The data are collected from each
municipalities’ tax assessors, under guidelines set forth by the Massachusetts Bureau of
Geographic Information (MassGIS), that are then compiled by MassGIS.
The database consists of several tables, two of which are used for this analysis. The
first is the Assessor Data Extract that contains all the information that tax assessors
gather on each taxable parcel in their respective municipality. Some data included in
this table are the assessed tax value of the structures (buildings) and the land, along
with some information about the characteristics of the structures (eg year built, number
of rooms, lot size). It also has information on the size of the parcels of land and of the
building itself. Importantly, the data also contain the “use code” for the parcel. This
code classifies each property based on its primary use such as residential, commercial,
agriculture, etc.
The second table is the Tax Parcel Attribute file. This file contains the polygon for
each parcel of land in the state of Massachusetts, each with an unique location identifier,
as well as a shapefile indicating its precise location within the state. The Assessor Data
Extract can be matched to the Tax Parcel Attribute file through the location identifier.
Though most of the matches between the two files are one-to-one, in some cases several
assessment units are matched to one tax parcel. For example, units in a condominium
may have different owners, and thus be taxed independently, but share the same geo-
graphic location.
For my analysis, I only consider single-family houses. This is primarily done to keep
in line with previous literature, and due to the fact that they represent the vast majority
of residential structures in Massachusetts (here: 73% of taxable residential parcels). I am
able to identify these parcels by the use code. I also filter out parcels that are located
in municipalities without a nalpz value, as well as parcels that are bordering a town
without a nalpz value (as they would have no comparison units).
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From the tax parcel data, I am also able to estimate whether it is owner occupied.
The data contain the address of both the property itself, as well as that of the owner.
From this, I compute the Levenshtein distance between them. Parcels where this value
is less than eight I code as owner-occupied.23
Of the 2,319,906 parcels overall, 951,971 remain after filtering. Summary statistics
on the tax parcels are given in Table 1.2.24 Last sale price is not reported for every tax
parcel, thus I do not exclude units from the baseline sample when this is the only detail
missing. Furthermore, in analyses using last sale price, I exclude parcels where this is
less than $5,000 to include only arm’s length transactions.
Building Heights
An important aspect of development is the height of buildings. This attribute is not
contained in the tax assessment data, unfortunately. I overcome this lack by calculating
building height from highly accurate lidar data in combination with a digital elevation
model for Massachusetts and a shapefile containing all buildings in the state.
Lidar refers to light detection and ranging, a remote sensing method using reflected
light to measure distances. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration pro-
vides large quantities of lidar data covering all of Massachusetts. The main attributes of
the data are its x, y, and z coordinates. This describes where the data point was mea-
sured in terms of longitude (x) and latitude (y), as well as its height above sea level (z).
Together with the building shapefiles I am able to assign the highest point above sea
level for each building. To derive elevation, I use the digital elevation model to get the
elevation of the base of the houses. The height is then simply the difference between
these two values.
I restrict the building height sample to buildings located on tax parcels that are coded
as single-family residential. This allows the results for the tax parcel level and building
level to comparable.
Land Use
Data on land use is provided by MassGIS, which classifies land into 37 different cate-
gories based on aerial images. There is data available for the years 1971, 1985, and 1999.
The change in the coverage of broad categories of land use from 1971 to 1999 can be
23Small differences arise between these two addresses even when they are identical. This is generally
due to abbreviating words such as “street” (str.) or “avenue” (ave.) in one of the addresses but not the
other.
24The number of observations varies by attribute because not all municipalities gather information on
every attribute.
DATA 27
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Mean SD Min Max N
Panel A: Tax Parcels
Tax Assessment Data
Building Value ($’000) 202.26 187.16 0.10 15,931.00 1,192,943
Land Value ($’000) 186.56 208.71 0.10 23,337.90 1,192,943
Other Value ($’000) 5.74 18.20 0.00 1,965.80 1,192,943
Total Value ($’000) 394.57 349.69 4.50 27,573.40 1,192,943
Other Parcel Characteristics
Lot Size (m2) 3,737.40 13,894.39 37.23 4,318,363.84 1,192,943
Year Built 1,955.96 38.31 1,800.00 2,018.00 1,192,943
Build Area (m2) 254.64 148.15 50.07 6,611.17 1,192,943
No. of Rooms 6.78 7.99 1.00 8,020.00 1,099,449
Owner Occupied 0.84 0.36 0.00 1.00 1,192,827
Last Sale Year 2,000.22 15.05 1,900.00 2,019.00 1,192,943
Last Sale Price ($’000, 2018 prices) 482.63 416.02 50.01 18,508.42 713,602
Geographic Characteristics
Dist. to Boston (km) 47.56 38.01 0.00 190.45 1,192,943
Dist. to Coast (km) 26.94 37.46 0.00 180.50 1,192,943
Dist. to Nearest Border (km) 1.45 1.31 0.00 13.52 1,192,943
Panel B: Buildings
Building Height (m) 11.53 5.17 3.00 25.00 1,302,984
Dist. to Nearest Border (km) 1.54 1.37 0.00 13.56 1,302,984
Panel C: Towns
Regulation Index
nalpz1 -0.03 0.91 -2.33 2.33 303
2010 Census Characteristics
Population (’000) 17.88 22.79 0.17 181.47 303
Housing Units (’000) 7.61 9.57 0.11 74.64 303
Housing Density (units/km2) 217.40 392.59 2.48 3,147.92 303
Rural (%) 32.43 37.61 0.00 100.00 303
Female (%) 51.70 2.07 39.81 60.17 303
Under 18 Years (%) 22.13 4.04 6.83 31.98 303
Over 64 Years (%) 15.00 4.44 7.89 39.80 303
Non-White (%) 7.43 9.06 0.45 56.87 303
Married (%) 68.59 7.12 26.16 83.27 303
SchoolQuality Characteristics
Expenditure Per Pupil ($’000) 15.90 4.85 9.52 59.81 296
Graduation Rate (%) 92.79 5.99 65.50 100.00 291
Municipal Taxes
Residential Property Tax Rate (%) 15.24 3.85 2.75 24.34 303
Notes: Last sale price data drops observations for which the price is under $50,000, as it is most likely reflects the
transfer of property rather than the true market price. Number of tax parcels and buildings differs as some properties
have multiple buildings and some buildings are missing height data.
1 Natural Language Processing Zoning Stringency Index
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seen in Figure A.17. It shows the change in land use within 1km of municipal borders.
Motivated by the fact that a significant amount of forest and agriculture land has been
converted to residential use from 1971 to 1999, I use the share of developed land as an
outcome of interest. This enables me to speak to the impact of luR on conversion of land
use and the spatial class of restrictions. I also calculate the share of developed land used
for residential purposes, to test whether luR influence the spatial pattern of housing
development.
US Census Data
Census Blocks: Demographic and housing attribute data is gathered from the US Cen-
sus Bureau at the block level—the smallest level of aggregation available—for the years
1970, 1990, 2000, and 2010. Data on demographics includes share of individuals under
18, over 64, non-white, married, female. Housing data consists of the average number of
rooms, average rent, and average house price. This data is used to test whether the de-
mographic composition of adjacent neighbourhoods in different towns are similar or not
(pre-Massachusetts Zoning Act and widespread luR). Thus, I only keep blocks that i) are
in a town with a nalpz measurement, ii) are neighbouring a town that also has a nalpz
value, and iii) are physically adjacent to a neighbouring town. This means that they
share a border with a neighbouring town. I do this as my main empirical strategy uses
houses in close to municipal borders. The assumptions regarding similar pre-treatment
demographics thus must also hold at this level.
Census Block Groups: Additional census data is gathered at the block group level,
which consists of a collection of blocks, which is used to create unobserved amenity
values in Section 1.7. From the 2010 census I get the block group population.
American Community Survey: More block group level data in 2010 comes the ACS.
This includes median household income and median housing prices.
Open Source Routing Machine/Open Street Maps
Bilateral travel times between all block group pairs is also required for the amenity esti-
mations. These are calculated from Open Source Routing Machine (osRm). Concretely,
I generate the population-weighted centroids for each block group and calculate the bi-




I estimate several specifications which control for one or more measures of school dis-
trict quality. The first comes from Niche.com. They are an organization that provides
information and rankings on neighbourhoods, schools, universities, and workplaces
across the us. Importantly for this paper, they rank each school district in Massachusetts
based on a variety of criteria, such as grades, parent/student surveys, and facility quality.
Additional measures of school (district) quality come from ClearGov.com. They aim
to provide clarity to citizens on how tax revenues are spent within different commu-
nities. Notably, they also publish statistics at the school district level. From here I get
measures of spending per pupil as well as graduations rates.
Since parents choosing a house based on school district quality will have access to
the same, publicly available information, I am able to condition on the same information
set as would be available these parents.
Finally, there are smaller towns which belong to a unified school district containing
several other towns. This allows me to compare towns within some school districts with
different degrees of regulatory intensities, by including school district fixed effects.25
This specification is quite demanding of the data as this reduces the sample size signifi-
cantly.
Municipal Property Tax Rates
In another specification, I also control for municipal property taxes. Should housing
characteristics change in response to higher or lower property taxes, which is in turn
systematically related to luR, controlling for the rate would rectify this.
This data is gathered from the Division of Local Services of the Massachusetts De-
partment of Revenue. I use the tax rate from 2018. This is the same year most of the tax
assessment data was gathered.
1.5 Empirical Strategy
My baseline empirical method is a spatial regression discontinuity design (Rdd). I use
this to estimate the effect of more stringent land use regulation on the development and
characteristics of single-family houses.
25It should be noted that because only smaller towns share school districts with neighbouring towns,
the sample that allows for the identification of the effect of luR in this specification is not representative
of all towns in Massachusetts.
30 LAND USE REGULATIONS AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
To implement this method, I need two key pieces of information: i) the nearest neigh-
bouring town for each house (and by extension the nearest border), and ii) the distance
to that town. As the tax parcels are all precisely geotagged, I am able to calculate this
information from the tax database when combined with the towns shapefile from Mass-
GIS.
With this information I create a “segment” identifier. This will be used in the spa-
tial Rdd framework to ensure that I am comparing tax parcels with other parcels in the
nearest neighbouring town. In other words, I am comparing parcels that share a munic-
ipal border and are arguably in the same neighbourhood (especially when considering
smaller bandwidths).
The baseline specification for the spatial Rdd is as follows:
yism = βnalpzm + f(geography)ism + πs + uism (1.8)
where yism is the outcome of interest for parcel i, bordering segment s, in municipality
m. nalpzm is the standardized Natural Language Processing Zoning Stringency Index,
πs are segment fixed effects, and f(geography)ism is a function of the geographic loca-
tion, the running variable. As the treatment—the level of regulation—varies at the town
level, I estimate cluster-robust standard errors at the town level.
The main coefficient of interest is β. This captures the effect of a one standard de-
viation increase in the nalpz on the considered outcome (yism). The main outcomes at
the tax parcel level are the year the house was build, year last sold, and the size of the
building and of the lot; from the building data the outcome of interest is the height of
the building.
Following Dell (2010) and Dell et al. (2018), I begin by modelling f(geography)ist
with the latitude and longitude of each parcel, additionally controlling for the distance
to Boston and to the nearest coast. As high-order polynomials have been shown to be
unstable in Rdd settings (Gelman and Imbens, 2018), I restrict my sample to a particular
bandwidth around each town border and run a kernel regression (with respect to the
running variable) with triangular weights. This involves modelling the running variable
flexibly, allowing the effect of the distance to the nearest border to vary differently to
each side of a border segment. Putting this all together results in:
f(geography)ism =αsmdistance to segmentism + δ1latism + δ2longism
+ δ3distance to bostonism + δ4distance to coastism
(1.9)
where αsm are the town-border segment specific coefficients on the running variable.
In practice, I find that after conditioning on the segment fixed effects (πs) and the town-
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border segment specific running variable, the additional geographic controls do not in-
fluence the results much. Thus, they are omitted from the reported results.
In the main results I show coefficient estimates with different bandwidths around
town borders. This highlights the sensitivity of the estimates to including or exclud-
ing more observations further way from these borders. An example of this empirical
strategy with a bandwidth of 500m is illustrated in Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.4: Parcel Spatial Rdd Example
Notes: Example of the spatial Rdd strategy with a bandwidth of 500m. Colours correspond
to the matched town border. Red lines indicate town borders. Colour intensity indicates
weight value. Uncoloured parcels are either not in the sample (eg not residential parcels)
or outside of the bandwidth.
The empirical strategy here is similar to the one used by Turner et al. (2014) and Sev-
eren and Plantinga (2018), though I allow the distance gradient of the outcome variable
to vary by town-border segment.
Aggregate Spatial Regressions
When investigating the impact of stringent luR on the density of housing supply or on
land use, where the unit of observation is a region or an aggregation of the tax parcel
data, I estimate a simpler spatial regression. Here, the specification controls for segment
fixed-effects to ensure comparisons are done between spatially near areas. Just as in the
baseline specification, various bandwidths are considered. This results in the following
estimating equation:
ysm = βnalpzm + πs + usm (1.10)
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where the indices are the same as the main specification. ysm is a summary measure for
some outcome in segment s, municipality m. This is an aggregate version of the baseline
empirical model. The unit of observation is now a town-segment area rather than tax
parcels within these geographical areas.
In the case where the outcome is housing supply, ysm corresponds to either i) the
number of single-family homes within the considered bandwidth, or ii) the density of
houses per square kilometre within the bandwidth. When the outcome is land use, ysm
corresponds to either i) the share of land developed for residential use from 1971–1999,
or ii) the fractional of developed land that is residential.
House Price Regressions
To test whether luR affect house prices as well, I estimate amodel similar to Equation 1.8,
but I additionally control for lot sizes, and in some specifications for building sizes, for
comparability. This results in the following specification:
yism =βnalpzm + αsmdistance to segmentism
+ γ1building sizeism + γ2lot sizeism + πs + uism
(1.11)
where γ1 and γ2 are the price effects for building size and lot size respectively. Here,
the outcomes of interest are the price the house was last sold for and the total tax as-
sessed value of the property (building and land together). I also present results where
the outcomes are the assessed value of the building per square meter of building and the
assessed value of the land per square meter of land.26
Identification Strategy
The empirical specifications above both exploit the same variation. Namely, the discrete
change in the regulatory environment at the border between two municipalities. The
primary assumption of this strategy is that no other observed or unobserved feature that
varies at municipal borders affects housing development pattern and is systematically
related to the stringency of luR.
The main specification addresses several potential issues by only considering units
that are geographically close. This controls for potential geographic confounders like
local housing demand, access to well paying jobs, and preferences for certain regions.
In Section 1.7 I address other potential issues as follows. First, I test whether there
existed differences in demographic characteristics in neighbouring blocks in different
26These two specifications do not add controls for the size of the building or lot as they are already
normalized.
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towns before the Massachusetts Zoning Act and widespread luR. I supplement this by
estimating amenity values by calibrating a standard urban spatial general equilibrium
model in the spirit of Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), and testing whether these vary discretely
at town borders systematically with the level of luR. Second, I investigate whether my
results are sensitive to alternative specifications of the running variable and weighting
method. Third, I directly control for municipal characteristics, like school quality and
property tax levels, that vary at town borders along with the regulatory environment.
Graphical Evidence
On account of there being multiple cut-offs (town border-segments) with a non-binary
treatment variable (nalpz index), it is not straightforward to graphically inspect the
discontinuity. To nonetheless present suggestive evidence I plot the primary outcome
variables residualized by border-segment fixed effects, binned into 100m intervals, by
whether the housing unit belongs to the less or more regulated side of its matched
border-segment.27 The results are shown in Figure A.20.
Two things stand out. First, there is a significant discontinuity for some outcomes,
such as for lot sizes and tax assessed land values. Second, the gradients for the outcome
variables are not uniform. For example, there is a discontinuity for year built, but the
distance to the border gradient appears quite similar. Looking at the house prices out-
comes on the other hand, the gradients are quite different and in fact go in different
directions. In less regulated towns the more expensive housing is located at the border
region of a town whereas in more regulated towns the housing becomes more expensive
as you approach the town centre. This fact highlights the importance of allowing the
outcome gradients to vary by town border-segment.
1.6 Results
The results are broken down as follows. First, I present evidence for how the aggregate
housing supply near the municipal borders is affected in towns with more restrictive de-
velopment policies. This speaks to whether restrictive land use policies result in lower
density housing overall. Second, I highlight results from my baseline spatial Rdd speci-
fication, looking at various housing development outcomes while considering different
bandwidths around the borders. This consists of two primary groups of outcomes: i)
housing market outcomes (the age of the structural as well as the year the house was
27As towns mostly have multiple neighbours, it may both be considered “less regulated” and “more
regulated” but each housing unit can only be in one category on account of it being matched exclusively
to one border-segment.
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last sold), and ii) housing characteristics (building size, building height, and lot size).
Third, I test for the role of luR in altering land use by showing results for the effect of
stringent regulations on the conversion of undeveloped land to residential use as well
as on the fraction of developed land used for residential purposes. Fourth, I investigate
whether stringent luR are capitalized into house prices at the local, neighbourhood level.
Overall Housing Supply
To get an overview of how stringent luR affect the housing supply, I plot the results of
estimating Equation 1.10, which captures the effect of these regulations on the number of
single-family homes. I consider two outcomemeasures for overall housing supply: i) the
density of houses per square kilometre, and ii) the raw count of houses within a specified
distance to the border. The results of these regressions are shown in Figure 1.5. I estimate
the model for bandwidths between 100m and 2km, at 100m intervals. The coefficients
are interpreted as the respective change in the outcome variable for a standard deviation
increase in the nalpz.
Figure 1.5: Spatial Regression of Housing Supply and Density on nalpz
Houses/bandwidth [mean = 404.54 ]
Houses/km2 [mean =  69.53]










Notes: β coefficient from Equation 1.10 for various bandwidths plotted. Respec-
tive outcome is regressed on Natural Language Processing Zoning Stringency Index
nalpz and border segment fixed effects. Point estimates and 95% confidence inter-
vals are given. Standard errors clustered at the town level. Mean outcome refers to
the average outcome value with a bandwidth of 100m.
As can be seen from the figure, the results are remarkably stable across the entire
range of bandwidth options. They indicate (at a bandwidth of 100m) that the housing
density is 14 houses per square kilometre lower and that the average number of houses
within 1km of the border is 67 units less for every s.d. increase of regulatory stringency.
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These estimates correspond to an effect size of about 20% and 17% of the mean outcome
level, respectively.
This provides evidence that these restrictive land use policies have led to a reduction
in the housing supply, at least at the peripheries of these towns, by reducing the density
of development.
Housing Market
I now turn to the results of the baseline spatial Rdd. I have plotted the results for each
outcome individually, considering various bandwidths for sample selection. The plots
are given in Figure 1.6. I show the results for bandwidths varying from 100m to 2km.
Each point represents the β estimate, along with its 95% confidence interval from clus-
tering the standard errors at the town level, from Equation 1.8 for the tax parcel and
building level regressions, and from Equation 1.10 for the land use regressions. nalpz
is standardized, so the coefficients correspond the change in the respective outcome
variable to a standard deviation increase in regulatory stringency.
The results in Figure 1.6a speak to the effect of luR on the housing market. The
rate of development of new housing within a neighbourhood should be similar if the
regulatory environment is the same. The results for this outcome, shown in the left
plot, indicate that houses in more regulated towns are older on average. At the smallest
bandwidth, it suggests that a one standard deviation increase in nalpz corresponds to
homes being two years older on average. As the average house age in sample is 57 years,
this represents 3.4% of the mean.
The right side of the panel shows results with the year the house was last sold as the
outcome. This speaks to a related question of whether luR reduce the efficiency of the
housing development and the real estate market (Mayer and Somerville, 2000; Glaeser et
al., 2008). For example, if luRmake the housing supply less elastic to changes in housing
demand, the selling and buying of the current housing stock may take place less often
as incumbent residents hold on to their homes. Overall, there is not a major difference
in the last time a home was sold with respect to luR. At the smallest bandwidth, the
results suggest a one standard deviation increase in nalpz corresponds to houses last
being sold about 0.8 years further in the past on average. This is an effect size of roughly
4.3% of the mean.
Taken together the results provide some evidence for luR resulting in a less respon-
sive housing market, though the effects are economically small.
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Figure 1.6: Main Results
(a) Housing Market Outcomes: Spatial Rdd of Respective Outcome on nalpz
Year Built [mean = 1961.25] Last Sale Year [mean = 2000.32]












(b) Housing Attributes Outcomes: Spatial Rdd of Respective Outcome on nalpz
Log(Build. Area) [mean = 5.44] Log(Lot Size) [mean = 7.64]












Building Height [mean = 11.54] Log(Build. Height) [mean = 2.34]











(c) Land Use Outcomes: Spatial Regression of Respective Outcome on nalpz
% Land Developed For Res. (1971–1999) [mean = 4.22] % Developed Land Res. (1999) [mean = 62.23]












Notes: Panel (a) and (b): plots the estimated β coefficient from Equation 1.8. Respective outcome is re-
gressed on the Natural Language Processing Zoning Stringency Index (nalpz), border segment fixed ef-
fects, and border segment-specific distance controls. Panel (c): plots the estimated β coefficient from
Equation 1.10. Respective outcome is regressed on the nalpz and border segment fixed effects. Both:
Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals are given. Standard errors clustered at the town level. Mean
outcome refers to the average outcome value with a bandwidth of 100m.
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House Attributes
The results for the housing attribute outcomes are shown in Figure 1.6b. As seen in
the upper-left plot, there is virtually no difference between the size of livable space in
houses in more or less strongly regulated municipalities in the same neighbourhood.
Regardless of the bandwidth considered, no coefficient is significantly different than
zero, with the point estimate very close to zero, relatively precisely estimated. Turning
to the upper-right plot, the lot sizes, on the hand, are strongly influenced by restrictive
zoning policies. Considering the most narrow bandwidth, a standard deviation increase
in land use restrictiveness results in lot sizes being roughly 27% larger.
This result provides evidence for a specific channel that leads to lower density de-
velopment overall: stringent luR increases the amount of land used per house, result-
ing in lower density and fewer houses. An important follow-up question, that will be
addressed when looking at how land use has changed with respect to regulatory strin-
gency, is whether municipalities compensate for the increase in land per lot by allocating
more land overall to residential use.
The bottom two plots presents results for building height as the outcome. As there
is no guidance from the literature on the functional relationship between land use reg-
ulation and building height, I present results with the height in level and logarithmic
terms. However, regardless of the specification there is no strong relationship between
the stringency of luR and building height. Though most specifications are significantly
different than zero, the results are precise enough to rule out a standard deviation in-
crease in nalpz increasing building height by 5% in the log-level specification. With an
average house height of 11.5m, this is an economically insignificant result.
Considering all the results together, development in towns with stricter luR tends to
be on larger parcels of land, without correspondingly larger or taller buildings.
Land Use
Finally, the results testing for land use regulations that spatially restrict development are
highlighted in Figure 1.6c. They plot the relationship between land use (development)
patterns and nalpz.
The left plot presents the effect of stringent luR on the conversion of undeveloped
land in 1971 to residential use in 1999. This tests whether restrictive development poli-
cies impact the rate of land being developed. Regardless of the bandwidth the estimated
coefficients are essentially zero with the 95% confidence intervals also bound very close
around null. This suggests that the rate of conversion of undeveloped land to residential
use was not differential between municipalities with varying degrees of luR intensity.
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The results in the right plot tell a similar story. The estimated effect of restrictive luR
on the share of residential land of all developed land is marginally significant for all but
the two smallest bandwidths, with effect sizes around 2.4% of the mean.
Two conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, stringent luR do not appear
to alter the amount of land allocated to residential purposes. Second, stringent munici-
palities do not developmore land for residential use to compensate for the lower housing
density due to larger lot sizes.
Spatial Rdd by Density Group
Motivated by the the large effects of luR on parcel lot sizes, I further investigate how the
distribution of lot sizes changes with respect to the different quartiles of the nalpz index,
shown in Figure A.18. As is evident, there is a significant degree of heterogeneity in the
distribution of lot sizes over the nalpz quartiles. To aid in interpreting the distribution
of lot sizes, the cut-offs between high, mid, and low density lot sizes are shown with the
dashed vertical lines, as defined by MassGIS.
To better understand how luR impact the lot sizes within the density groupings, I
re-estimate the baseline spatial Rdd empirical model for each density subsample with
lot size as the outcome. The results are shown in Figure A.19.
A word of caution interpreting these results. Most likely, luR result in more devel-
opment happening in one density category rather than another (eg more regulated mu-
nicipalities may encourage the building of more low-density homes). Therefore, these
should be considered descriptive rather than causal. What is immediately clear, how-
ever, is that conditional on density grouping, the effect of more stringent luR is strongest
amongst low-density housing. This suggests that the results are being driven by larger
lots becoming even larger.
House Prices
Figure 1.7 shows the results of the house price regressions. These results speak to the
question of whether more stringent regulation is reflected in the house prices, which
depends on the degree of substitutability between neighbouring houses.
The top panel (1.7a) displays the results when the outcome is the total tax assessed
value of the property or the last sale price of the house. The estimated effect of luR on
house prices is quite similar regardless of the metric used to measure house prices: a
standard deviation increase in the nalpz increases house prices roughly 5–6%.
However, these regressions do not identify the impact of luR separately for land and
building prices. Thus, I leverage the fact that the tax assessment values are broken down
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Figure 1.7: House Price Outcomes: Spatial Rdd of Respective Outcome on nalpz
(a) Logarithm of Total Assessed Value and of Last Sale Price (2018 prices)
Log(Total Value) [mean = 12.77] Log(Last Sale Price) [mean = 12.97]










(b) Assessed Value of Building per m2 and of Land per m2
Log(Build. Value) [mean = 12.09] Log(Land Value) [mean = 11.93]












Notes: Plots the estimated β coefficient from Equation 1.11. Respective outcome is regressed on the Nat-
ural Language Processing Zoning Stringency Index (nalpz), border segment fixed effects, and border
segment-specific distance controls. Panel (a) additionally controls for building size and lot size. Point
estimates and 95% confidence intervals are given. Standard errors clustered at the town level. Mean out-
come refers to the average outcome value with a bandwidth of 100m.
into building and land components. I then use these outcomes, normalized by the size
of the building and lot respectively, in place of the total house prices. The results for
these regressions are given in Figure 1.7b. Unlike with the total house prices, here the
evidence for stringent luR being capitalized into house values is weaker. The results for
both the building and lot values are not significantly different from zero across all the
bandwidths.
Together, these results provide evidence for houses in neighbouring towns being
substitutes for one another. Thus restrictive building policies in one town do not neces-
sarily lead to higher prices overall if there is sufficient housing in neighbouring towns.
In other words, population mobility may arbitrage away price differentials across mu-
nicipalities within a region, but increase the price level of the region as a whole.
1.7 Balancing, Specification, and Robustness Checks
Having established a strong relationship between land use regulations and lower density
development, primarily via larger lot sizes, I now turn to investigating whether these re-
sults could be driven by other factors. First, I present a pair of balancing checks, where
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I test whether the Natural Language Processing Zoning Stringency Index can predict
neighbourhood demographic characteristics in 1970, before luRwere commonplace, and
whether the nalpz is related to unobserved neighbourhood amenities. I recover these
unobserved neighbourhood amenities by calibrating an urban spatial general equilib-
rium model. Second, I conduct a series of specification and robustness checks to test
whether different sources of variation may partially explain the results.
Neighbourhood Demographic Characteristics Pre-Massachusetts
Zoning Act
One is typically concerned that the forcing variable in an Rdd design is manipulated by
the units of observation. As I am considering tax parcels of land, and the forcing variable
is the distance to the town border, this is not problematic in my setting. However, there
is still the concern that towns which implemented stronger/weaker regulations varied
significantly, even within a neighbourhood that belongs to two or more towns.
Since the tax assessors database is constantly updated, I am unable to obtain data be-
fore and after the introduction of municipal-level luR. Therefore, to investigate whether
there were any pre-existing differences before the Massachusetts Zoning Act, I compare
the demographic composition of us Census Blocks directly to either side of the bor-
ders (ie blocks touching the border). I test whether future regulatory intensity predicts
these demographic outcomes in the past. I use data from the 1970, 1990, 2000 and 2010
censuses and run a modified version of Equation 1.8:
ybsmt = β1nalpzm + β2nalpzm × {yeart > 1970} + πst + αswdistbsm + ubsmt (1.12)
where the outcomes are now indexed by time, πst are year-specific segment fixed effects,
and I no longer need to control for geographic distance (as the distance to the border is
zero by construction). However, I do control for how far the average cell of a block group
is away from the comparison border. This is the wdistbsm term. It refers to the block grid-
cell average distance to the border. I allow its effect to vary at the border-segment level
(αs). This controls for segment-specific gradients in demographics characteristics. For
example, larger block tend to cover space further away from a municipal border (thus
having higher wdistbsm values), making them less representative of the area immediately
surrounding municipal borders. The unit of observation, b, is now the census block. The
coefficient of interest is β1: if there are no pre-existing differences in demographics and
housing, it should be zero.
BALANCING, SPECIFICATION, AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 41
β2 may be non-zero if the implementation of luR changed the demographic com-
position through modified residential development and residential sorting. This is an
interesting outcome in and of itself. If, for example, existing residents lobbied for more
restrictive land use policies to stem the flow of in-migration to the municipality, barring
individuals from certain demographics disproportionately frommoving to the town, that
would be captured by β2.
The coefficients β1 and β2 are plotted in Figure 1.8. The purple circles represent
β1 and the green triangles β2. For comparability across the various outcomes, I report
standardized coefficients. As can be seen in the figure, the estimated β1 coefficients
are not statistically different from zero. None of the estimated effects have standardized
coefficient estimates over 0.05 in absolute terms. In addition the 95% confidence intervals
reject any absolute effect size above 0.15 standard deviations.






-0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1
Standardized Coefficient on NALPZ
Coef. in 1970
... in 1990, 2000, and 2010
Notes: Plots the estimated β1 and β2 values from estimating Equation 1.12. Respective demo-
graphic or housing characteristic is regressed on the nalpz interacted with 1970 and post-1970
dummies, and segment by year fixed effects. β1 captures the ability of the nalpz to predict
census block demographic characteristics in 1970. β2 captures the ability of the nalpz to pre-
dict census block demographic characteristics after 1970 (1990, 2000, 2010). Point estimates and
95% confidence intervals are given. Standard errors clustered at the town level.
Looking at the same demographic composition after the introduction of the Mas-
sachusetts Zoning Act, I find that the share of non-white residents is significantly lower
in highly regulated towns. Taken literally, it implies that a one standard deviation in-
crease in nalpz corresponds to roughly a 0.24 standard deviation decrease in the share
of the population that is non-white. This provides evidence for the theory that restric-
tive zoning policies have resulted in residential sorting, either deliberately or as a side
effect.
42 LAND USE REGULATIONS AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
Amenities
Given the observable data from the census pre-Massachusetts Zoning Act, I am able to
test for demographic differences across town borders that may confound my estimates.
However, there may still be unobservable differences in local amenities that may in-
duce sorting by preferences for housing with specific characteristics, or for low-density
neighbourhoods. Furthermore, as I am looking at small geographic regions, simply con-
trolling for some observable amenities (eg parks, waterfront locations, access to play-
grounds, etc.) does not varying the empirical estimates much.
To address this concern, I estimate local amenities as implied by the canonical quan-
titative spatial equilibriummodel of a city (Ahlfeldt et al., 2015) at the census block group
level (a small collection of city blocks). To calibrate the model, I use the parameter val-
ues from several recent papers that have structurally estimated the model: Ahlfeldt et
al. (2015), Tsivanidis (2018), and Heblich et al. (2020). I then test whether these amenity
values vary in adjacent census block groups to either side of municipal borders.
Model Intuition
For the purposes of estimating implied amenities, it is sufficient to discuss and param-
eterize the worker demand system. Details on the model are given in Appendix Sec-
tion A5. Intuitively, workers trade-off wages, commuting costs, housing costs, and local
amenities when choosing residence (i) and workplace (j) locations.28 Workers are het-
erogeneous with regards to residence-workplace location pairs.














where B∗i are residential block-specific amenities, Hi refers to block resident population,
qi is the price of housing, and CMAi =
∑S
j=1 (wj/eκτij )
ϵ is ameasure CommutingMarket
Access, which captures how closely in terms of commuting time (τij) a residential block




denotes the geographic mean
of the respective variables, which is included to remove terms that are invariant across
residential locations. I use B∗i /B̃∗i as my measure of local amenities. As this term has
no natural scale, I standardize it to ease interpretation of the results.
28Here I use the term “block” to refer to a location, as it corresponds nicely with the us Census geo-
graphic terminology as well as my empirical geographic unit.
29More details in Section A5
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Intuitively, if a residential block has a high population in spite of high housing costs
and poor access to well-paying employment opportunities, there must be high local
amenities to compensate the residents.
In addition to the observable data {Hi, qi, τij, wj}, I require estimates of the models
parameters {ϵ, β, κ} to back out implied amenities. I consider various parameter combi-
nations from recent contributions to the literature to obtain several different measures
of amenities. The exact parameter values are given in the Appendix, Table A.4.
Estimating Amenities
To estimate the amenity values I use data from the us Census Bureau at the block group
level and the Open Source Routing Machine as described in Section 1.4.
I restrict my sample to census block groups that are adjacent to onemunicipal border
(ie I drop block groups that border several towns or are in the interior). This is to ensure
that the census block groups I am comparing across borders are as similar to one another
as possible.
The estimation equation is similar to the one used to test for demographic balance in
census blocks in 1970 (Eq. 1.12), but without the time dimension (I am only considering
data from 2010):
ybsm = β1nalpzm + πs + αswdistbsm + ubsm (1.14)
where nalpzm and πs are defined the same as previously. ybsm refers to the standardized
measure of residential amenities (B∗i /B̃∗i ) as implied by the model under four different
parameter combinations (see Table A.4). The wdistbsm term is the same as used in Equa-
tion 1.12, but is calculated at the block group level. This controls for segment-specific
gradients in amenities.
Amenities and Land Use Regulation
I first show results only including nalpzm, to get an idea of the raw relationship between
residential amenities and land use regulation. Then, I subsequently include segment
fixed effects, and finally the segment-specific grid-cell average distances.
These are shown in Figure 1.9. The raw coefficients (green circles) show that there
is a very strong relationship between land use regulations and implied amenities on
average. This suggests that households are willing to pay higher housing costs and live
further away from well-paying employment opportunities to live in communities that
are more stringently regulated.
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Figure 1.9: Local Amenities and Land Use Regulation





Ahlfeldt et al. (2015)
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Standardized Coefficient on NALPZ
No Controls Segment FE + Mean Grid-cell Dist. X Segment
Notes: Plots the estimated β value from estimating Equation 1.14 under different sets of con-
trols. Unobserved amenity values, calculated from an Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) spatial model under
different parameter combinations, are regressed on the nalpz and the noted controls. Point
estimates and 95% confidence intervals are given. Standard errors clustered at the town level.
However, this is comparing block groups in Massachusetts that are located far from
one another. As highlighted in Figure 1.3, a large cluster of highly-regulated towns is
located in the North-West section ofMassachusetts, isolated from themajor employment
centres of Boston, Springfield, and Worcester, whereas the towns closer to these centres
are more relaxed on average. There are significant differences between the households,
and therefore the sort of housing demanded, that choose to live in these different regions.
Once I include segment fixed effects, and more so by additionally including segment-
specific mean grid cell distance linear gradients, the estimated relationship between luR
and implied amenities drops significantly. In two of the four sets of parameter combi-
nations (values for both high- and low-skilled workers from Tsivanidis (2018)), I cannot
reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between luR and amenities. The
standardized effect sizes for the other two parameter combinations are never larger than
0.15. This provides evidence that themain empirical strategy allowsme to compare units
(houses, parcels, buildings) that are in similar neighbourhoods and have similar levels
of local amenities.
Specification and Robustness Checks
To validate my main findings, I also consider alternative specifications and controls to
explore the robustness of my results. The first change made is to rerun the baseline
regression without the triangular weights (ie the weight given to units closer to and
farther from municipal borders is the same). Next, I model the function of geography as
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a quadratic in each term (but still allowing the effect of the running variable to differ by
border-segment, also as a quadratic).
Next, I control for the presence of school districts. As school district borders gener-
ally align with municipal borders, it is not directly possible to control for the districts
for every observation (parcel). To overcome this, I control for measures of school qual-
ity. These school quality measures are described in Section 1.4. I also estimate a model
controlling for school district fixed effects, which identifies the effect of luR in smaller
municipalities that share a school district. This specification is quite demanding as many
municipalities have their own school district, so the effective sample size reduces sig-
nificantly.
To the extent that property taxes systematically relate to luR as well as impact hous-
ing development, I control for the residential property tax rate in a further robustness
specification. I then include all of school district quality and rank measures together
with the property tax rate control.
There is also a concern that new development is mostly infill development: ie new
houses are built on the sites of demolished previous houses and that this is more im-
portant in determining lot sizes than luR.30 Thought of another way, there may be path
dependence when redeveloping land for new residential use. To address this issue, I
re-estimate my primary specification on the subsample of houses that were built on
previously undeveloped land, where a developer would only be restricted by luR and
geography. Specifically, I look at development taking place after 1971 on land that was
previously vegetation (eg forest, bush) or agricultural.
The results of these robustness checks for the housing market, attributes, and price
outcomes are shown in Figures 1.10a, 1.10b, and 1.11, respectively. The baseline specifi-
cation, along with all the robustness checks, are with a bandwidth of 100m.
Looking at the housing market outcomes, the estimates for the age of the house
are quite stable across the various specifications. The results change the most when
conditioning on only new development post-1971. The small, but statistically significant,
results confirm previous evidence that luR have amodest but persistent effect on the rate
of new development. The results for year last sold also do not vary much. The baseline
estimateswere already small, and become insignificant especiallywith the school district
controls.
Turing to the housing attributes outcomes, lot and building size, again there is little
change in the estimated coefficient on nalpz. The effect of stringent luR on lot sizes
remains large and statistically significant across the estimated equations, except when
30Of course, this process would have to vary with the overall restrictiveness of luR as well to be an
issue.
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Figure 1.10: Robustness Checks Baseline
(a) Housing Market Outcomes
Log(Build. Area) Year Last Sold











Coefficient on NALPZ (bandwidth 100m)
(b) Housing Attributes Outcomes
Log(Lot Size) Year Built











Coefficient on NALPZ (bandwidth 100m)
Notes: Plots the estimated β value from estimating different specifications of Equation 1.8. “No Weight-
ing” removes triangular weights and assigns uniform weights. “Quad. Geography” adds a square term of
the town border segment-specific distance controls, as well as quadratic controls for longitude, latitude,
distance to coast, and distance to Boston. “School Dist. Rank” adds a quadratic for school district rank
taken from Niche.com. “School Quality” adds per pupil expenditure and graduation rate controls from
ClearGov.com. “Prop. Tax” controls for municipal property tax rates. “All Controls” includes all school
district controls and the residential property tax rate. “School Distr. FE” controls for school district fixed
effects. “New Devel.” estimates the model on the subset of houses that were developed after 1971. Point
estimates and 95% confidence intervals are given. Standard errors clustered at the town level.
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Figure 1.11: Robustness Checks: House Prices
Log(Price Last Sold) Log(Total Value)











Coefficient on NALPZ (bandwidth 100m)
Notes: Plots the estimated β value from estimating different specifications of Equation 1.11. “No Weight-
ing” removes triangular weights and assigns uniform weights. “Quad. Geography” adds a square term of
the town border segment-specific distance controls, as well as quadratic controls for longitude, latitude,
distance to coast, and distance to Boston. “School Dist. Rank” adds a quadratic for school district rank
taken from Niche.com. “School Quality” adds per pupil expenditure and graduation rate controls from
ClearGov.com. “Prop. Tax” controls for municipal property tax rates. “All Controls” includes all school
district controls and the residential property tax rate. “School Distr. FE” controls for school district fixed
effects. “New Devel.” estimates the model on the subset of houses that were developed after 1971. Point
estimates and 95% confidence intervals are given. Standard errors clustered at the town level.
including school district fixed effects, which results in imprecise estimates. Nonetheless,
most of the 95% confidence interval lies above zero. The effects on building size remain
close to zero. Overall, these results confirm the role luR play in increasing the amount
of land used per house.
Finally, the robustness results for the housing price outcomes are shown. Here, the
estimated relationship between housing prices and luR shrinks when school quality
is controlled for. This suggests that the price differentials across municipalities with
different regulatory environments is due to access to better schools, rather than luR.
This all supports the view that houses that are nearby but in different towns (with similar
quality schools) are close substitutes.
1.8 Conclusion
Land use regulations are ubiquitous across the us, but their causes and impacts are not
fully understood. I create a new regulation index, called the Natural Language Pro-
cessing Zoning Stringency Index (nalpz), by applying a machine learning algorithm,
a Latent Dirichlet Allocation model, to over 40,000 pages of zoning bylaw documents.
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This method builds off previous work to greatly increase spatial coverage. This lets me
address the question of how stringent land use regulations are manifested in housing
development.
By exploiting the variation in the regulatory environment at municipal borders in
Massachusetts, I confirm previous studies showing that stringent land use regulations
reduce housing density. Moreover, I extent these findings by showing that lot sizes are
most responsive to luR, being considerably larger in more regulated jurisdictions. This
provides evidence for parcel-specific land use regulations—regulations that encourage
higher land usage per house—being most responsible for restricting housing supply.
These include regulations such as minimum lot sizes, setback requirements, strict floor-
area-ratios.
Furthermore, the results suggest that spatially close houses in differing towns are
highly substitutable. This provides evidence for restrictions in one locality leading to
price increases in neighbouring towns as well, if overall housing supply is not responsive
enough, as previous work has shown.
My findings suggest that land use regulations encourage less dense development on
larger parcels of land, without the compensation of allocating more land to residen-
tial use overall, effectively limiting the supply of housing available. For policy makers
looking to increase available housing in high-growth regions, scrutinizing these local
constraints to development is a promising avenue.
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Appendix A1 Natural Language Processing Details
Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency Weighting
tf-idf weighting assigns more weight to tokens that appear more often in fewer docu-
ments, under the presumption that these tokens are better able to discriminate between
different documents. Conversely, tokens that appear seldomly in almost all documents
do not tell us much. Formally, it is the product between a term frequency (tf) part, and
an inverse document frequency (idf) part. There are different ways to measure both of
them, and those used in this paper are described below.





where the term frequency for token v in document d depends on the count of that token
in the document (xvd) divided by the total length of the document for all tokens in V .
The expression for the inverse document frequency is as follows:
idfv = log(D/dfv) (A.2)
where D refers to the number of documents in the corpus. This term is term specific,
but is the same for every document.
The product of these two terms is the tf-idf weighted token count:
tf-idfvd = tfvd × idfv (A.3)
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Dictionary Methods




















































Notes: Each sub-table is a dictionary category used when investigating dictionary nlp
methods. The number in parentheses indicates the total number of words belonging to
that topic. Five words, chosen at random, are listed under the heading.
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tf-idf Weighted Counts
Notes: tf-idf weights are calculated corpus-wide rather than per document.
Figure A.2: Histogram of Raw and tf-idf Weighted Token Counts
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Figure A.3: Distributions of Raw and tf-idf Weighted Dictionary Scores
Raw Count tf-idf Weighted Count










Share of Words Beloning to Respective Dictionary
Notes: Raw counts are divided by their document length for comparability. The mea-
sures can be interpreted as the share of document tokens belonging to the respective
category.
Figure A.4: lda Data Generating Process
Document 1 Document N
Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 3
Word 1 Word V





Inspired By: Bandiera et al. (2020).
Notes: Example assumes three latent topics. θ are the parameters of the true posterior
distribution, while γ, as used in the text, are the parameters from the approximating
distribution.
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Figure A.5: LDA: Cross-Validation for Number of Latent Topics
Highest Correlation with WRLURI
Perplexity Measure







Notes: Lower is better in the first panel and higher is better in the second. Each point
is a fold.





























































Topic 1 ( ρ = -0.40) Topic 2 ( ρ = 0.58) Topic 3 ( ρ = -0.44)
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.000 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.09
Beta
Notes: Each value corresponds to the β value from the estimated lda model (ie the
estimated probability of a word being drawn from that specific topic).
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Notes: Tokens with a β value less than 0.03 are excluded. Each point represents the
base two logarithm of the ratio of β2v and β1v + β3v .
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Appendix A2 Characteristics of Highly Regulated
Towns
With a measure of land use regulatory intensity in hand, that covers almost the entirety
of one state, I now turn to discussing the geographic patterns of the Natural Language
Processing Zoning Stringency Index, as well as town-level predictors of stringent luR.
The near-universal coverage, at small geographic units, of the regulation measure
enables me to present, to the best of my knowledge, new stylized facts about the geo-
graphic distribution of luR. The first is that luR are highly correlated over space. This
has already been noted for larger geographic regions when looking at the Wharton Res-
idential Land Use Regulation Index (eg cities in California and New England are highly
regulated while those in the sunbelt are not). But even within these regions, there is a
high degree of geographic clustering.
Next, I show that though more regulated municipalities allocate less overall land to
development, of the land developed is given to residential purposes and less towards
commercial or industrial uses.
Geographic Clustering of Land Use Regulation
To get an idea of the geographic clustering of land use regulatory intensity, I plot the
relationship between a town’s own nalpz and the average of their direct neighbours.
This is shown in Figure A.8. The blue line indicates the linear fit between the two, while
the dashed grey line indicates 45º. It shows a clear pattern between the regulatory envi-
ronment of neighbouring towns. On average, towns with more strict zoning regulations
have neighbours with similarly strict land use policies. This aligns well with the geo-
graphic distribution of nalpz shown previously in Figure 1.3.
This fact, to the best of my knowledge, has not been shown at this geographic detail.
This has already been noted at the Metropolitan Statistical Area level using the wRluRi
measure, but not within these units. Figure A.8 uses nalpz for the entire sample in
Massachusetts, but the relationship remains when considering the subsample of towns
that surround Boston (specified as those that are part of the Pioneer/Rappaport Housing
Regulation Database) and those further from the state’s economy centre.
Though there is a high degree of geographic clustering of land use stringency, there
also exists a great deal of heterogeneity with respect to the differential zoning poli-
cies between neighbouring towns. Figure A.9 highlights this distribution. The average
differential of nalpz between any two neighbouring town pairs is 0.74 of a standard
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deviation (median is 0.58 of a s.d.). This is the key variation that my empirical strategy
exploits to estimate the impact of more restrictive zoning.
Predictors of Restrictive Land Use Regulation
I now explore what town-level characteristics in 1970, pre Massachusetts Zoning Act,
best predict future nalpz levels. Specifically, I look at 1970 town-level census data and
1971 land use data from MassGIS to investigate the sorts of towns that implement strin-
gent luR.
The two strongest predictors of nalpz are shown in Figure A.10: the percentage of
land covered in forests (in the first panel) and the natural logarithm of housing units per
square kilometre (in the second). Both of these variables correlate very strongly with
nalpz, with coefficients of correlation of -0.81 and 0.74 respectively. These results align
with those found by Glaeser and Ward (2009), who consider minimum lot sizes (one
aspect of zoning regulations). Remarkably, these patterns persist well into the future;
corresponding relationships for 2010 are shown in Figure A.11. This fact may point to
restrictive land use policies being used to preserve the contemporaneous city shape,
makeup, and characteristics, once individual towns were given the legislative ability to
implement their own zoning policies.
Two other interesting features of Massachusetts towns in 1970 that relate to regula-
tory intensity are shown in Figures A.12 and A.13. In the first panel of Figure A.12, the
fraction of land being used for residential purposes is plotted against nalpz, while in
the second, the fraction of developed land being used for residential purposes is plotted
instead. This highlights that, on average, towns that are more strictly regulated have less
land overall for residential use, but of the land they already developed, slightly more is
residential. This reversal pattern when considering all land compared with only devel-
oped land is not apparent when considering the share of land allocated to commercial or
industrial uses as shown in Figure A.13. Unlike with residential land coverage, the im-
plication does not vary if one considers all land, or only already-developed land. Towns
with stricter zoning regulations allocate less absolute and relative land to industrial pur-
poses.
The trends shown in the last two figures are also virtually unchangedwhen one looks
at the data in 2010, as shown in Figures A.14 and A.15.
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Average NALPZ of Neighbours
Notes: Each observation is a Massachusetts town. Size of dot corresponds to number
of neighbours.
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Absolute Difference in NALPZ Measure
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Notes: Each observation is a shared border between two Massachusetts Towns.
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Figure A.10: 1970 Town Predictors of nalpz
Forest Share (ρ = 0.738) Log(Housing Units km2) (ρ = −0.814)










Notes: Each observation is a Massachusetts town in 1970. Size of dot corresponds to
population.
Figure A.11: 2010 Town Predictors of nalpz
Forest Share (ρ = 0.752) Log(Housing Units km2) (ρ = −0.82)










Notes: Each observation is a Massachusetts town in 2010. Size of dot corresponds to
population.
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Figure A.12: 1970 Town Residential Development and nalpz
Residential Share (ρ = −0.698) Residential-to-Development Ratio (ρ = 0.274)







Notes: Each observation is a Massachusetts town in 1970. Size of dot corresponds to
population.
Figure A.13: 1970 Town Industry Development and nalpz
Industrial Share (ρ = −0.533) Industrial-to-Development Ratio (ρ = −0.526)
Commercial Share (ρ = −0.672) Commercial-to-Development Ratio (ρ = −0.558)












Notes: Each observation is a Massachusetts town in 1970. Size of dot corresponds to
population.
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Figure A.14: 2010 Town Residential Development and nalpz
Residential Share (ρ = −0.694) Residential-to-Development Ratio (ρ = 0.425)







Notes: Each observation is a Massachusetts town in 2010. Size of dot corresponds to
population.
Figure A.15: 2010 Town Industry Development and nalpz
Industrial Share (ρ = −0.564) Industrial-to-Development Ratio (ρ = −0.521)
Commercial Share (ρ = −0.679) Commercial-to-Development Ratio (ρ = −0.578)












Notes: Each observation is a Massachusetts town in 2010. Size of dot corresponds to
population.
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Appendix A3 Additional Figures














1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Notes: Some luR enable development and others inhibit it. Data comes
from the Pioneer Institute/Rappaport Institute (piRi, 2005) Housing Regu-
lation Database for Massachusetts.
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Notes: Each bar indicates the change in area in km2 for the respective land
use category from 1971 to 1999. Data from MassGIS
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Notes: Each line represents a density polygon plotted for each quartile of the nalpz. The
dashed lines separate the density classes according to the land use categories from Mass-
GIS.
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Bandwidth (km)
Res. Density Group Low Density Mid Density High Density
Notes: Plots the estimated β value from estimating Equation 1.8 separately for each group
of parcels according their density grouping. Respective outcome is regressed on the Nat-
ural Language Processing Zoning Stringency Index (nalpz), border segment fixed effects,
and border segment-specific distance controls. Density groupings are defined by Mass-
GIS. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals are given. Standard errors clustered at
the town level.
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Figure A.20: Residualized Outcomes by Less/More Regulated Town for Every Town
Border
(a) Housing Market Outcomes
Year Built Last Sale Year








Less Regulated Town           ←        Distance to Border (km)         →           More Regulated Town
(b) Housing Attributes Outcomes
Log(Build Area) Log(Lot Size)






Less Regulated Town           ←        Distance to Border (km)         →           More Regulated Town
(c) House Price Outcomes
Log(Total Value) Log(Last Sale Price)






Less Regulated Town           ←        Distance to Border (km)         →           More Regulated Town
Log(Build Value) Log(Land Value)




Less Regulated Town           ←        Distance to Border (km)         →           More Regulated Town
Notes: Each panel plots the respective outcome residualized by border-segment fixed effects. Residuals
are binned by every 100m. Mean and the respective standard error plotted for each bin. Towns may
have housing units in both the “less regulated” and “more regulated” categories, due to having multiple
neighbours, but as each unit is matched to a unique border an observation can only belong to one category.
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Table A.2: Spatial Rdd: Main Results
Log(Lot Size) Year Built Log(Building Size) Year Last Sold Build. Height Log(Build. Height)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.1km 0.267∗∗∗ −1.950∗∗∗ −0.029 −0.776∗∗∗ 0.179 0.014
[0.217,0.317] [-3.248,-0.651] [-0.103,0.045] [-1.317,-0.235] [-0.084,0.442] [-0.011,0.038]
56,196/552/278 56,196/552/278 56,196/552/278 56,196/552/278 42,428/408/226 42,428/408/226
0.2km 0.267∗∗∗ −2.504∗∗∗ −0.025 −0.806∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗
[0.223,0.311] [-3.711,-1.297] [-0.102,0.051] [-1.320,-0.292] [0.078,0.490] [0.003,0.041]
105,726/632/290 105,726/632/290 105,726/632/290 105,726/632/290 94,422/537/250 94,422/537/250
0.3km 0.270∗∗∗ −2.514∗∗∗ −0.019 −0.788∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
[0.227,0.312] [-3.777,-1.251] [-0.095,0.058] [-1.280,-0.296] [0.181,0.539] [0.011,0.044]
158,384/676/293 158,384/676/293 158,384/676/293 158,384/676/293 149,965/598/259 149,965/598/259
0.4km 0.272∗∗∗ −2.607∗∗∗ −0.014 −0.823∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
[0.231,0.313] [-3.900,-1.314] [-0.090,0.062] [-1.310,-0.335] [0.204,0.534] [0.014,0.044]
212,819/708/295 212,819/708/295 212,819/708/295 212,819/708/295 208,260/629/264 208,260/629/264
0.5km 0.273∗∗∗ −2.576∗∗∗ −0.009 −0.851∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
[0.232,0.314] [-3.875,-1.277] [-0.084,0.067] [-1.330,-0.373] [0.196,0.529] [0.013,0.044]
266,765/722/297 266,765/722/297 266,765/722/297 266,765/722/297 266,388/647/268 266,388/647/268
0.6km 0.270∗∗∗ −2.528∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.845∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
[0.230,0.311] [-3.799,-1.257] [-0.080,0.071] [-1.317,-0.373] [0.196,0.534] [0.014,0.045]
319,649/737/297 319,649/737/297 319,649/737/297 319,649/737/297 323,052/661/269 323,052/661/269
0.7km 0.268∗∗∗ −2.437∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.826∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
[0.228,0.308] [-3.681,-1.192] [-0.077,0.075] [-1.298,-0.354] [0.191,0.526] [0.015,0.045]
372,480/751/298 372,480/751/298 372,480/751/298 372,480/751/298 379,757/680/270 379,757/680/270
0.8km 0.266∗∗∗ −2.310∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.788∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
[0.227,0.306] [-3.535,-1.085] [-0.075,0.076] [-1.263,-0.314] [0.181,0.510] [0.015,0.044]




























Log(Lot Size) Year Built Log(Building Size) Year Last Sold Build. Height Log(Build. Height)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.9km 0.264∗∗∗ −2.153∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.745∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
[0.225,0.303] [-3.370,-0.936] [-0.074,0.077] [-1.221,-0.270] [0.180,0.504] [0.015,0.043]
476,181/767/299 476,181/767/299 476,181/767/299 476,181/767/299 491,889/701/270 491,889/701/270
1km 0.263∗∗∗ −2.097∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.708∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
[0.224,0.302] [-3.309,-0.885] [-0.072,0.079] [-1.184,-0.232] [0.175,0.497] [0.015,0.042]
525,329/772/299 525,329/772/299 525,329/772/299 525,329/772/299 545,086/706/270 545,086/706/270
1.1km 0.262∗∗∗ −2.111∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.674∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
[0.223,0.302] [-3.320,-0.902] [-0.070,0.082] [-1.149,-0.200] [0.170,0.492] [0.015,0.042]
572,867/778/299 572,867/778/299 572,867/778/299 572,867/778/299 597,265/714/270 597,265/714/270
1.2km 0.262∗∗∗ −2.127∗∗∗ 0.008 −0.651∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
[0.223,0.301] [-3.336,-0.918] [-0.068,0.084] [-1.124,-0.179] [0.164,0.482] [0.015,0.042]
618,422/783/300 618,422/783/300 618,422/783/300 618,422/783/300 647,031/719/270 647,031/719/270
1.3km 0.262∗∗∗ −2.124∗∗∗ 0.010 −0.635∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
[0.223,0.301] [-3.337,-0.910] [-0.066,0.086] [-1.104,-0.165] [0.156,0.470] [0.014,0.041]
661,056/786/300 661,056/786/300 661,056/786/300 661,056/786/300 693,683/723/271 693,683/723/271
1.4km 0.262∗∗∗ −2.139∗∗∗ 0.011 −0.623∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
[0.223,0.301] [-3.364,-0.915] [-0.065,0.087] [-1.090,-0.157] [0.152,0.461] [0.014,0.040]
702,007/789/301 702,007/789/301 702,007/789/301 702,007/789/301 738,117/724/272 738,117/724/272
1.5km 0.262∗∗∗ −2.163∗∗∗ 0.012 −0.617∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
[0.223,0.301] [-3.399,-0.927] [-0.063,0.088] [-1.082,-0.153] [0.151,0.454] [0.014,0.040]
740,910/793/301 740,910/793/301 740,910/793/301 740,910/793/301 781,053/726/272 781,053/726/272
1.6km 0.263∗∗∗ −2.161∗∗∗ 0.013 −0.613∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
[0.223,0.302] [-3.408,-0.914] [-0.062,0.089] [-1.076,-0.150] [0.151,0.451] [0.014,0.040]














Log(Lot Size) Year Built Log(Building Size) Year Last Sold Build. Height Log(Build. Height)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1.7km 0.263∗∗∗ −2.123∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.611∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
[0.224,0.303] [-3.376,-0.869] [-0.061,0.089] [-1.073,-0.149] [0.150,0.448] [0.014,0.040]
811,506/799/301 811,506/799/301 811,506/799/301 811,506/799/301 858,107/734/272 858,107/734/272
1.8km 0.264∗∗∗ −2.075∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.612∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
[0.224,0.305] [-3.334,-0.816] [-0.061,0.089] [-1.073,-0.152] [0.147,0.443] [0.014,0.040]
843,251/800/301 843,251/800/301 843,251/800/301 843,251/800/301 892,419/736/272 892,419/736/272
1.9km 0.265∗∗∗ −2.037∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.613∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
[0.225,0.306] [-3.303,-0.770] [-0.060,0.088] [-1.073,-0.153] [0.143,0.439] [0.014,0.039]
872,953/801/301 872,953/801/301 872,953/801/301 872,953/801/301 924,831/738/272 924,831/738/272
2km 0.267∗∗∗ −1.993∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.614∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
[0.225,0.308] [-3.267,-0.720] [-0.060,0.088] [-1.074,-0.154] [0.140,0.436] [0.014,0.039]
900,484/801/301 900,484/801/301 900,484/801/301 900,484/801/301 955,040/738/272 955,040/738/272
Notes: Each cell is a separate regression of the outcome variable (column name) on the nalpz variable. The respective bandwidth is indicated in each row. 95% confidence intervals



























Table A.3: Spatial Rdd: Robustness and Specification Checks
Log(Total Value) Log(Lot Size) Year Built Log(Building Size) Year Last Sold Log(Last Sale Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline 0.049∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ −1.950∗∗∗ −0.029 −0.776∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
[0.007,0.092] [0.217,0.317] [-3.248,-0.651] [-0.103,0.045] [-1.317,-0.235] [0.020,0.098]
56,196/552/278 56,196/552/278 56,196/552/278 56,196/552/278 56,196/552/278 32,857/476/252
No Weigthing 0.052∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ −2.236∗∗∗ −0.026 −0.793∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
[0.007,0.097] [0.222,0.316] [-3.457,-1.016] [-0.102,0.050] [-1.325,-0.261] [0.015,0.095]
56,196/552/278 56,196/552/278 56,196/552/278 56,196/552/278 56,196/552/278 32,857/476/252
Quad. Geography 0.052∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ −1.526∗∗ 0.005 −0.881∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗
[0.001,0.103] [0.226,0.318] [-2.987,-0.064] [-0.081,0.091] [-1.435,-0.327] [0.013,0.095]
56,196/552/278 56,196/552/278 56,196/552/278 56,196/552/278 56,196/552/278 32,857/476/252
School Dist. Rank 0.044 0.242∗∗∗ −1.996∗∗ −0.087∗∗ −0.394 0.055∗∗∗
[-0.009,0.097] [0.174,0.309] [-3.621,-0.371] [-0.158,-0.015] [-1.118,0.331] [0.020,0.091]
47,395/479/214 47,395/479/214 47,395/479/214 47,395/479/214 47,395/479/214 28,099/419/204
School Quality 0.016 0.197∗∗∗ −2.070∗∗ −0.074∗ −0.400 0.027
[-0.039,0.070] [0.136,0.259] [-3.650,-0.491] [-0.152,0.003] [-1.228,0.429] [-0.018,0.072]
55,239/544/269 55,239/544/269 55,239/544/269 55,239/544/269 55,239/544/269 32,300/473/247
Rank & Quality 0.030 0.167∗∗∗ −1.433 −0.088∗∗ 0.050 0.038
[-0.034,0.093] [0.096,0.239] [-3.242,0.376] [-0.165,-0.011] [-0.845,0.945] [-0.010,0.087]
46,692/477/211 46,692/477/211 46,692/477/211 46,692/477/211 46,692/477/211 27,640/418/201
Prop. Tax 0.049∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ −1.967∗∗∗ −0.029 −0.791∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
[0.006,0.092] [0.222,0.321] [-3.271,-0.663] [-0.103,0.046] [-1.321,-0.261] [0.020,0.099]














Log(Total Value) Log(Lot Size) Year Built Log(Building Size) Year Last Sold Log(Last Sale Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Controls 0.028 0.176∗∗∗ −1.691∗ −0.085∗∗ 0.050 0.040
[-0.036,0.091] [0.106,0.247] [-3.508,0.126] [-0.161,-0.009] [-0.825,0.924] [-0.008,0.089]
46,692/477/211 46,692/477/211 46,692/477/211 46,692/477/211 46,692/477/211 27,640/418/201
School Distr. FE −0.010 0.122 −2.800 −0.047 0.272 0.011
[-0.096,0.077] [-0.066,0.311] [-6.663,1.063] [-0.166,0.073] [-1.346,1.891] [-0.097,0.119]
56,196/552/278 56,196/552/278 56,196/552/278 56,196/552/278 56,196/552/278 32,857/476/252
New Devel. 0.043∗ 0.292∗∗∗ −4.309∗∗∗ −0.079∗ −0.687∗ 0.078∗∗∗
[-0.002,0.088] [0.208,0.376] [-5.666,-2.951] [-0.166,0.008] [-1.426,0.052] [0.041,0.115]
21,093/440/247 21,093/440/247 21,093/440/247 21,093/440/247 21,093/440/247 12,264/329/208
Notes: Each cell is a separate regression of the outcome variable (column name) on the nalpz variable (except for the last two rows, where the outcome is regressed
on the variable in the first column). The type of robustness check is named in the respective row of the first column. 95% confidence intervals indicated in brackets.
Last row in each cell indicates the sample size (number of single-family tax parcels), the number of town borders (segments), and number of towns included in the
regression, respectively.
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Appendix A5 Spatial General EquilibriumModel and
Amenities
Model Setup
A city31 embedded in a larger economy is assumed to comprise of a set of discrete
locations (S = {1, . . . , S}), which differ in terms of housing supply, local amenities,
and access to workplaces. A Worker (o) chooses a residence-workplace pair (i, j) that
maximizes their utility. They derive utility from consuming a freely-traded numeraire
good (co), housing (hi), residential amenities (Bi), and dis-utility from commuting (eκτij )
that depends on travel time (τij). Workers are heterogeneous with respect to resident-












where β governs the share of income on the numeraire good. As is standard, the id-
iosyncratic shocks, zijo, are assumed to be Fréchet distributed:
F (zijo) = e−Tiz
−ϵ
ijo (A.5)
where Ti > 0 determines the average utility derived from living in block i, and ϵ > 1
governs the dispersion of the shock. Maximizing utility given workplace wage (wj),







The properties of the Fréchet distribution imply that the probability that a worker

























31Here I consider the “city” to be Massachusetts. As there is only one Combined Statistical Area as
defined by the US Census Bureau, this assumption is not unwarranted.
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denotes the Commuting Market Access of block i. Intuitively, this term is higher when
a block is located close to well paying jobs.
The population is assumed to have full mobility, implying that residents will move
until expected utility is equalized across residence-workplace pairs, as well as to the
reservation level of utility in the larger economy (U ):


















where γ = Γ( ϵ−1
ϵ
) is the Gamma function. Given the residential choice probabilities












where Hi is the population of block i and H is the population of the city. We can remove
the block-invariant components by dividing the equation by its geometric mean. This















where B∗i = BiT
1/ϵ




denotes the geometric mean of the respective variable over all residential locations. I
take parameter values of ϵ, β, and κ from recent literature (described more in the main
text). Then I calculate the normalized, composite residential amenity term. I use this in
my regressions to test differences in amenity values across municipal borders.
Parameter Values
The parameter values used to estimate the implied amenity values are given in the fol-
lowing table:
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Table A.4: Model Calibration: Parameters
Source ϵ ν = ϵκ 1 − β κ
Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) 6.6190 0.0951 0.25 0.01537
Tsivanidis (2018) [Low-skilled] 2.840 0.0336 0.24 0.012
Tsivanidis (2018) [High-skilled] 2.054 0.0242 0.24 0.012
Heblich et al. (2020) 5.25 0.05203 0.25 0.0099
ChapteR2
On the Measurement and
Causes of Land Use Regulation∗
Abstract:
Land use regulations are ubiquitous and are often the most significant impedi-
ment to new development. But our understanding of these regulations is hampered
by lack of data and the heterogeneity in the forms they take. Using zoning bylaw
text and data from Massachusetts, this paper contributes by providing descriptive
facts on the measurement and causes of land use regulations. First, I investigate the
performance of a set of easy-to-implement machine learning algorithms in predict-
ing survey-based measures of regulation stringency. Second, using several variable
selection procedures I test the town-level attributes that best predict zoning. Third,
I explore how the demographic composition of towns has varied over 40 decades
from 1970–2010 with respect to the regulation level, starting before locally imple-
mented zoning was possible. I find that the latent Dirichlet allocation model, a
latent-mixture model works best in deriving an index of regulation from zoning
text; current day zoning regulation is best predicted by historical land use patterns;
some demographic characteristics have changed substantially since the implemen-
tation of zoning, noticeably the share of the population that is non-white.
∗The “companion” paper referred to throughout this chapter is Chapter 1 in this dissertation.
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2.1 Introduction
The importance of land use regulations has been known for some time (eg Frieden, 1979).
They became widespread at the local level in the us during the 1970s, along with the
construction of the interstate highway system and expansion of suburban building. As
land use regulation is often the biggest constraint to new development, it is a somewhat
surprising that little is known on why some places are highly-regulated and others less
so. Moreover, as there is no federal standard, and generally no state-level standard, the
rules are highly heterogeneous, making them difficult to contrast and compare.
When studying land use regulation, there are generally two primary goals. The first
is to determine the causes of regulation: why are some towns highly regulated and
others not, even within the same metropolitan area? The second is to measure the con-
sequences: how do restrictive land use regulations impact the housing, development,
neighbourhood sorting, etc. Shared between these two goals is a need to accurately
measure land use restrictions. This paper is focused on the determinants of regulation,
as well as on how to better measure the level of restrictiveness.
At the same time, the tools available to the researcher to study these questions have
improved. Machine learning and natural language processing methods exist that can
find insights from non-standard data sources, such as from geospatial and legal docu-
ments. These methods can be combined with proven econometric techniques and eco-
nomic models to further our understanding of land use regulations.
This paper has three primary goals. The first is to test the ability of a set of widely
available machine learning methods to measure the restrictiveness of a locality’s land
use regulations using only the text from the zoning bylaws as predictors. These methods
may prove useful for expanding our knowledge of regulation in jurisdictions where we
lack survey responses. Second, using census and land use data from the 1970s, before
widespread zoning restrictions, this paper explores the predictive power of commonly
cited causes of regulation. As I have at my disposal several indices of regulation (includ-
ing one derived from a machine learning algorithm), I am able to test whether certain
local factors are generally good indicators of highly regulated towns, or if it depends
significantly on the index being considered. Third, I investigate how the characteristics
of weakly and strongly regulated towns has developed over time.
Among the machine learning methods considered, I find that the latent Dirichlet
allocation model, an unsupervised mixture model, derives the strongest predictor, out-
performing supervisedmethods.1 Turning to the predictors of regulation, the paper finds
1Supervised models incorporate the outcome in the estimation procedure while unsupervised models
use only the explanatory variables. Supervised models are generally concerned with prediction while
INTRODUCTION 75
that historical land use, especially the amount of undeveloped land, is the best predictor
of current day regulation. Finally, this paper shows that there has been a large diver-
gence between towns in the bottom quintile of regulation and the rest in terms of the
share of the population that is foreign, in poverty, and non-white.
The use of machine learning on with text, and using text as data more generally, is
relatively new to economics (Gentzkow et al., 2019). I have yet to find any applications
to land use or zoning specifically. Given the availability of accessible regulations online,
a naturally arising question is if these methods can be used on such texts to expand our
understanding of land use regulations. To explore this question I consider the ability of
an array of machine learning (ml) procedures to predict the level of land use regulation
as measured by existing survey data. The ml models can be classified into three broad
categories: i) penalized linear regressions (eg lasso), ii) decomposition methods (eg prin-
cipal components analysis), and iii) decision trees (eg random forest). I consider these
methods because they come with robust implementations in various standard statisti-
cal programming languages, making them relatively straightforward for researchers to
implement.
As outcome measures of regulation, I use three different indices. The first is the stan-
dard in the literature, the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index (Gyourko et
al., 2008). The second I derive via principal components analysis from a database on
housing regulations in Massachusetts compiled by researchers from the Pioneer and
Rappaport Institutes (piRi, 2005). The third is an index I have created in a compan-
ion paper, using a machine learning method called latent Dirichlet allocation with data
coming from the zoning bylaws. The index is called the Natural Language Processing
Zoning Index (nalpz).2 Of the 351 towns in Massachusetts, the first index covers 79,
the second 187, and the third 341. Because land use regulations are high dimensional
and heterogenous, these indices attempt to approximate the regulatory burden with a
unidimensional measure through different methods. Comparing and contrasting results
across the indices helps to determine whether particular methods are better suited for a
certain index or if they work more generally.
To investigate what community characteristics are best predictors of land use regu-
lation, I test the predictive power of town-level features prior to the 1975 Massachusetts
Zoning Act. The Act formally delegated the authority to implement zoning policies to
the local (town) level. Prior to this local jurisdictions required approval from the state be-
fore changes to local zoning could be implemented. I use demographic measures from
unsupervised methods search for hidden patterns or clusters.
2Both the method and the data are briefly described in later in this paper. More detailed explanations
can be found in the companion paper.
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the 1970 us census as well as land use coverage data from aerial photographs taken
in 1971. I use several standard feature selection methods from the statistical learning
toolkit to uncover the variables most able to discern between strongly and weakly reg-
ulated places.
The last part of the paper describes trends in demographic characteristics over a
period of 40 years, from 1970 to 2010. To ease graphical interpretation, I divide the
sample of towns in Massachusetts covered by the most extensive index, the nalpz, into
quintiles and explore how features of these groups vary over the decennial censuses.
I find that of the ml methods considered, the latent Dirichlet allocation model is best
at generating an index of regulation based on its correlation with the two survey-based
regulation outcomes. Given that it an unsupervised method (ie does not require a re-
sponse variable), it is rather surprising that this method performs better than supervised
models designed to predict a given outcome. This is most likely due to the supervised
models overfitting the relatively small sample sizes covered by the Wharton and Pio-
neer/Rappaport indices.
Turning to predictors of regulation, I find that historical development and density are
better than demographic characteristics (eg share of college graduates) and other land
use categories (eg water coverage) at explaining the amount of regulation, regardless
of the index considered or the selection method used. This supports previous work (eg
Glaeser and Ward, 2009) that found that historical density and forest cover are strong
predictors of land use regulation. I build on this line of work by considering a wider
array of demographic and land use variables, as well as using techniques designed to
find the best predictors among a set of candidates, as opposed to inferring from the
significance of some regressors in an ols framework.
Lastly, I show that a gap in the share of foreign-born, population in poverty, and non-
white residents has widened over time between towns in the bottom quintile of land use
regulation compared with the other quintiles, with the bottom quintile becoming more
foreign-born, poorer, and non-white. This has happened while overall population and
density has remained remarkably stable among the quintile groups. This suggests that
sorting between towns of varying levels of zoning has occurred, whether zoning was
the root cause or not. Future research on zoning will need to account for these facts
when theorizing on the causes of land use regulation.
There are several theories for why some jurisdictions are more or less regulated.3
Earlymodels of zoning specified land use regulation as a function of land prices (Wallace,
1988; McMillen and McDonald, 1991). In this framework, the level of zoning and land
values are determined simultaneously. Parcels of land that are zoned for higher density,
3See Gyourko and Molloy (2015) for a more thorough summary of the literature.
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for example, are done so because that is the use that will maximize the value of that
particular tract of land.
Fischel (2001) argues that local residents play an even bigger role in determining the
amount of regulation. He theorizes that residents lobby for policies meant to hamper
new development to preserve the value of their land (and by extension home), as it is
often their largest asset. This is done as homeowners do not have other alternatives to
insure against the value of their homes. By extension, homeowners should be more in
favour of stringent land use regulations than renters, who do not stand to benefit from
increases property values (see Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2013; Ortalo-Magné and Prat,
2014). However, empirical evidence for this theory is rather limited (Glaeser and Ward,
2009).
Another potential cause is the supply of land available for development, with both
geography and pre-existing land use and density patterns influencing this supply. Saiz
(2010) documents a strong relationship between geographical constraints to develop-
ment at the metropolitan area level (as measured by land lost to water and areas with
steep slopes) and land use regulation, suggesting that a dearth of buildable land may
lead local residents and politicians to playing a larger role in the development process.
Glaeser and Ward (2009) find that historical density and forest cover are strong predic-
tors of the current level of regulation. Specifically, towns in Massachusetts with low
historical density and more forest coverage are more regulated today. This suggests a
counter hypothesis: that land use regulation tends to conform to pre-existing patterns
of land use and development. A key difference between the two studies is the unit of
analysis. Saiz (2010) considers the metropolitan area while Glaeser and Ward (2009) use
a town. This suggests that conclusions on the causes of regulation may differ on account
of the analysis being done between or within regions.
Other work has highlighted the role of strategic interaction between communities
in determining zoning regulations. This comes in two primary forms. The first concerns
the externalities associated with one town’s zoning regulations on neighbouring towns.
And example of this is given theoretically by Helsley and Strange (1995) who show that
when one town restricts development that population may be displaced into nearby
communities, diverting traffic and congestion. Therefore one locality’s regulations will
depend in part on the regulations of neighbouring towns. The second form concerns
sorting into neighbourhoods with respect to tastes for consumption of public goods or
into neighbourhoods containing households with similar demographics. This can result
in neighbourhoods being stratified along income and demographic lines. Calabrese et
al. (2007) show that towns may specify a minimum housing quality and property tax to
ensure local public goods are sufficiently financed. This leads to income-based stratifi-
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cation. Intentional or not, this neighbourhood sorting mechanism often divides among
ethnic as well as socio-economic lines, which is why it is often referred to as “exclusion-
ary” zoning. However, as these two demographic characteristics are highly correlated it
is difficult to disentangle whether the fiscal or exclusionary motive is most responsible.
2.2 Data
The data come from three primary sources. I use us census data for demographic infor-
mation at the town-level in Massachusetts. I focus on the year 1970, the census imme-
diately prior to the implementation of the Massachusetts Zoning Act (1975), to describe
towns before they were delegated the authority to implement their own zoning regula-
tions, and at subsequent decades to chart the evolution of the demographic composition
over time. I complement this with data on land use across Massachusetts from 1971 (also
pre-Massachusetts Zoning Act). This data classifies every parcel of land in the state ac-
cording to its primary usage. The third source is the zoning bylaws from the individual
towns.
us Census Data
Data on town-level demographics is based on the us Census. The data itself comes from
ipums National Historical Geographic Information System. The primary unit of analysis
is the county subdivision, which corresponds directly to a town inMassachusetts. When
investigating the best predictors of regulation I focus on the year 1970, for reasons men-
tioned above. The density variables (for population and housing units) also incorporate
the town size and the amount of developed land (from the land use data). Summary
statistics on the census data are in the second group of Table 2.1.
Land Use Data
Land use data come from shapefiles provided by MassGIS. The data consists of polygons
covering the entire state indicating the primary use of each tract of land. The year of
data collection was 1971, four years prior to the Massachusetts Zoning Act. The land
use categories were derived from aerial photographs taken from aeroplane and latter
digitized. The category “undeveloped” includes pure undeveloped land (forests and open
space) as well as agricultural land. “Non-developed” further includes water and wetland
areas. Table 2.1 displays the summary statistics for the land use variables under the third
group.
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Massachusetts Bureau of Geographic Information
The geographic variables mainly come fromMassachusetts Bureau of Geographic Infor-
mation (MassGIS), the governmental portal for open-access data for the state. Distance
to Boston is calculated from town shapefiles. Distance to the coast additionally uses
shapefiles outlining the Atlantic coast. Share of aquifer coverage also comes from poly-
gons outlining their extent from MassGIS. These variables are summarized in the last
group of Table 2.1.
Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index
Thefirst external index of zoning regulations is theWharton Residential Land Use Regu-
lation Index (wRluRi) fromGyourko et al. (2008). This index is based on a survey of 2,649
local jurisdictions across the us (79 in Massachusetts). The authors created the index by
applying factor analysis on the responses to the survey. The survey asked questions on
the involvement of local and state actors in the development process, supply and density
restrictions, and on the project approval process.
Housing Regulation Database of Massachusetts Municipalities
Thesecond source of information on the land use regulatory environment inMassachusetts
comes from the Housing Regulation Database of Massachusetts Municipalities, a joint
project between the Pioneer and Rappaport Institutes (piRi, 2005). Based on data gath-
ered from municipal bylaws and telephone surveys, they compiled a dataset describing
the regulatory environment for 187 towns within a 150 mile radius of Boston.
As the dataset does not come with a measure of the overall regulation level, I derive
one through Principal Components Analysis on the coded responses. These are the
variables included in the pca, and by extension in the index4:
ZONEDIST No. of zoning districts
OVERLAY No. of overlay district
RESDIST No. of residential districts
ZONEWEB Indicator if zoning regulations on town’s website
MFALLOW Indicator if multifamily housing allowed
CLUSTER Indicator if cluster zoning allowed
INCLUDE Indicator if provisions for inclusionary zoning
GROWRATE Indicator if targeted growth rates (in permits issued)
4See the codebook for the full description of the variables and the data.
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MLAEXCLUD Indicator if undevelopable land excluded from minimum lot size calcu-
lations
MLACBA Indicator if portion of minimum lot size must be contiguous
SHAPRULE Indicator if constraint to shape of lots
FRONT150 Indicator if frontage requirements larger than 150 feet (in residential ar-
eas)
MAXFRONT Longest single-family frontage requirement in town
FRONTOUT Indicator if portion of front lot may be excluded from frontage require-
ment
The variables are all standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one before
conducting pca. The first component is then extracted and again standardized. I will
refer to this as the Pioneer/Rappaport Housing Regulation Database Index (pRhRdi).
The relationship between pRhRdi and wRluRi is shown in Figure 2.1.














Notes: Each point represents a town in Massachusetts that has data on both
the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index and an index derived via
principal components analysis on the Housing Regulation Database of Mas-
sachusetts Municipalities (n = 48).
Natural Language Processing Zoning Index
The last index used as an outcome is the Natural Language Processing Zoning Index
(nalpz). The the creation of the index is described in detail in the companion paper.
To summarize, the index is derived by estimating a latent Dirichlet allocation model
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(see methods section) on the text from the zoning bylaws. This method allows for the
creation of an index for every town with bylaw text available. This is the case for 341
towns in Massachusetts, out of a total of 351.
As the index is created from latent variables that have no inherent meaning, the
wRluRi and pRhRdi discussed above are used to select the latent variable best explaining
the level of regulation. Details on this point are also found in the companion paper.
Zoning Bylaws
The zoning bylaws come in variety of different formats (pdf, Word documents, web-
pages) and first needs to be transformed into a machine readable format. This is espe-
cially problematic when the bylaws are scanned pdfs and first need to be processed with
optical character recognition software. The general processing strategy is explained in
the companion paper. The result of the preprocessing is a document-term matrix (dtm)
where the columns refer to unique tokens (generally words) and the rows documents
(here the zoning bylaws for a town). The entries consist of either raw or normalized
counts.
How these counts are normalized plays as big a rule in the predictive power of an
estimator as does choosing an estimator itself. To get a better idea of how the text is
processed, I will demonstrate with two example sentences on landscaping taken directly
from the zoning bylaws of Lancaster.
i. District boundary planting is required on any premises along the full
length of any boundary abutting or extending into a Residential District
ii. Street planting is required for nonresidential premises abutting an
arterial street, as designated on the Zoning Map










































i. 0 1 1 0 2 0 2 · · · 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
ii. 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 · · · 1 1 1 1 0 2 1
5This primarily consists of removing stopwords (generally conjunctions) and punctuation, and reduc-
ing a word to its stem (“required” becomes “require”, “abutting” becomes “abut”)
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Table 2.1: Massachusetts Towns Summary Statistics
N Mean SD Min Max
Regulation Indices
nalpz1 341 0.00 0.94 −2.33 2.33
pRhRdi2 187 0.00 1.00 −2.45 2.45
wRluRi3 79 1.57 1.31 −0.74 4.80
Demographic Variables (1970 US Census)
Population (’000) 351 16.21 40.03 0.05 641.07
Housing Units (’000) 351 5.39 14.23 0.06 232.45
% Rural 351 57.01 41.66 0.00 100.00
% Female 351 50.91 2.35 31.72 58.41
% Under 18 351 35.27 4.91 17.10 46.82
% Over 64 351 10.42 3.94 1.88 25.85
% Non-white 351 1.42 4.24 0.00 68.64
% Married 351 79.48 4.62 41.72 94.23
% Foreign 350 5.47 3.02 0.00 18.02
% College 350 7.22 5.02 0.00 29.88
Labour Force Participation Rate 350 72.89 4.98 52.49 85.46
% Poverty 350 6.99 3.95 0.00 29.91
% Vacant 351 13.03 17.52 0.74 81.30
% Owner Occupied 350 65.11 17.08 15.52 94.44
Home Value ($’000) 351 114.71 50.09 14.22 319.50
Population Density (’000/km2) 351 0.45 0.94 0.00 8.29
Pop. Den. of Developed Land (’000/km2) 351 1.06 1.04 0.03 8.34
Housing Unit Density (’000/km2) 351 0.15 0.32 0.00 2.78
hu Den. of Developed Land (’000/km2) 351 0.35 0.35 0.04 2.79
Land Use Variables
% Water 351 3.00 3.30 −0.07 24.33
% Wetland 351 3.29 3.87 0.00 33.24
% Undeveloped 351 68.47 22.87 0.10 97.65
% Non-developed4 351 75.25 22.19 0.58 99.05
% Forest 351 57.74 21.63 0.00 94.16
% Agriculture 351 7.82 6.76 0.00 51.11
% Residential 351 16.87 14.77 0.74 70.37
% Commercial 351 1.29 1.92 0.00 12.80
% Industry 351 1.00 2.29 −0.06 21.24
% Transportation 351 1.24 1.90 −0.05 13.89
% Other Urban 351 4.97 5.39 0.04 32.21
Residential-to-All Developed Land 351 69.98 12.29 16.33 96.35
Commercial-to-All Developed Land 351 3.86 2.73 −0.09 16.50
Industry-to-All Developed Land 351 2.57 3.18 −0.38 21.46
Geographic Variables
Town Area (km2) 351 59.65 33.81 2.73 265.75
% Aquifer 351 10.99 16.34 0.00 97.36
Distance to Boston 351 76.21 51.02 0.00 197.61
Distance to Coast 351 52.51 55.29 0.07 180.85
1 Natural Language Processing Zoning Stringency Index
2 Pioneer/Rappaport Housing Regulation Database Index
3 Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index
4 Non-developed includes all undeveloped land plus water and wetlands.
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With all the pages of the bylaws included, the number tokens runs into the thousands.6
For this reason, standard regression techniques normally do not work as the number of
tokens (variables) far exceeds the number of documents (observations).
Once the basic dtm has been derived, there are several normalization procedures
that can be applied. Here is an overview of the most relevant.
Term Frequency The first aspect to consider is how the counts are handled. These
counts are referred to as the term frequency. Often some tokens appear significantly
more than others and therefore play an outsized role any predictions. To dampen this
effect, the counts can be scaled down by either dichotomizing them or applying a loga-
rithmic transformation. In the first case all counts that are zero remain zero, and all non-
zero counts are set to one. In the second, the term frequency becomes t̃fvd = 1+log(tfvd),
where the subscripts index the token (v) and the document (d).
Inverse Document Frequency Once it has been decided how to render the term fre-
quencies, further scaling can be applied by multiplying the tf terms by the inverse doc-
ument frequency. This is formally defined as:
idfv = log




where D indicates the total number of documents and dfv refers to the number of doc-
uments token v appears in (dfv =
∑
d 1(v ∈ Vd)). Then, the weighted matrix elements
are calculated by multiplying the tf with the idf:
tf-idfvd = tfvd × idfv
The purpose of this normalization is to give more weight to tokens that appear in fewer
documents, thus potentially having more predictive power than tokens that appear in
all documents.
6It is worth briefly discussing why “abut” and “abutting” are rendered as two different tokens in the
table above. To stem a word you must first designate its part of speech (eg verb, noun). In Python the
most common framework for this is nltk. This is not as trivial a task for a computer as it is for a human.
The more advanced taggers use a combination of word endings (eg “-ing”) and a statistical model of the
tags of the preceding words to determine a word’s part of speech. There exists no perfect algorithm for
this process. In this case “abutting” was tagged (incorrectly) as a noun in the first sentence and a verb in
the second.
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n-grams Instead of generating a dtmwith single-worded tokens, we can also group ad-
jacent words together as one token. Continuing with the two example sentences above,








































































i. 0 1 1 0 1 1 · · · 0 1 1 0 0 0
ii. 1 0 0 1 0 0 · · · 1 0 0 1 1 1
Nowneighbouringwords are combined into unique tokens. For example, “district bound-
ary planting” becomes “(district, boundary)” and “(boundary, planting)”. This helps al-
leviate some concerns with the standard method which ignores all context (words that
provide context such as adjectives are overlooked). However, this drastically increases
the size of the matrix (along the “term” direction).
Document Normalization In the above example the sentences are approximately the
same length. This is not the case for the zoning bylaws. Generally speaking, larger juris-
dictions’ bylaws have more pages. To mitigate longer documents having more absolute
terms, we can normalize each document’s vector of tf or tf-idf counts (the rows in the
dtm). This results in only the relative occurrence of the terms distinguishing between
documents.
There are two normalization methods considered here. The first divides each element in
the dtm by the L1 norm of the respective row, otherwise known as the Taxicab norm:
∥x∥ = ∑i |xi|. More common, however, is dividing each element by its row’s L2 norm,





Max. Document Frequency Often there are domain-specific terms that appear across
all documents that do not confer much information. For example, in the legislative
case, the word “section” appears in virtually all bylaws, but would not provide much
additional information. One way to filter out these cases is by setting the maximum
document frequency. This sets a threshold for the number of documents containing a
specific term, above which the term is removed entirely from the matrix. If the threshold
is 95%, for example, and and the word “section” appears in 99% of the documents, then
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it would be removed.
Min. Document Frequency The minimum document frequency is the inverse of the
maximum document frequency. This specifies the threshold of a term’s appearance
across documents below which it is removed. This generally throws out highly spe-
cific words, such as proper nouns. For example, the zoning bylaws of Belchertown,
Massachusetts will contain the word “Belchertown” often. This word will most likely
not appear in other bylaws (with the notable exception of neighbours). These words are
generally too specific to be useful in prediction exercises.
2.3 Methods
ml Methods
As there is little guidance from the literature, several different machine learning7 meth-
ods are evaluated. The goal for any estimator is to best predict the level of regulation in
a sample on which the model was not trained (out-of-sample prediction). 5-fold cross
validation8 is used both to evaluate the different models and select the best tuning pa-
rameters where necessary. With unsupervised models (ie the outcome variable is not
part of the estimation procedure) the entire sample is used to evaluate fit as there is no
risk of overfitting. The model is still estimated with 1/5 of the sample left out.
Penalized Linear Models
The first class of machine learning methods consist of simple extensions to ols. They
have the immediate advantage that they are estimable when the number of variables
(here: unique tokens) is larger than the number of observations. This is achieved by
penalizing the incorporation of (and magnitude of) additional parameters. This is why
they are often referred to as “shrinkage methods”.
Lasso Lasso is the first penalized linear model considered. The objective function being
minimized is similar to the one under ols with a penalization term included. Formally,
the coefficients are estimated as follows:
7The term “machine learning” is used quite broadly. Specifically, models that can deal with cases
where the number of variables are larger than the number of observations are considered.
8k-fold cross validation is when the sample is first split into k subsamples. Then the model is sub-
sequently estimated with one of the k subsamples left out. The out-of-sample prediction accuracy is
calculated on the left out subsample (usually the mean squared error or R2). The scores are averaged
across the k-folds to arrive at the overall score for the estimator.
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where λ is the parameter that controls the amount of shrinkage. Due to the non-linear
nature of the problem (caused by the absolute value penalizations), this estimator results
in some coefficients being exactly zero. The non-zero coefficients will be shrunk towards
zero.
The tuning parameter, λ, governs the degree of regularization (ie the penalty associated
with the number and magnitude of the coefficients). This parameter is chosen based on
5-fold cross validation.
Ridge The second linear model is the ridge regression. It is quite similar to lasso, only
instead of the L1 penalization, it is replaced with a L2 penalty. Concretely, the objective
function is:











The problem is now linear and an explicit solution exists as the penalization term is the
square of the estimated coefficients rather than their absolute values. All the coefficients
are now shrunk towards zero, but not set exactly to zero.
On account of how ridge is estimated, it is efficient to simultaneously conduct leave-one-
out cross validation to tune the parameter of λ. This is similar to k-fold cross validation,
only instead of leaving out a fraction n× 1/5 of the sample for each fold, one observation
is removed at a time and the model is estimated n times. The out-of-sample prediction
error is averaged across all n models to choose the optimum λ.
Elastic Net The last penalized linear model is the elastic net. It combines lasso and
ridge by setting the penalization term to a convex combination of the terms from the









with α ∈ [0, 1]. It is easy to see that when α = 0 we are back at lasso and with α = 1 at
ridge. Both the α and λ parameters are selected via 5-fold cross validation.
Decomposition Methods
The next class of ml techniques consists of decomposition methods, so called because
they normally deal with matrix factorization. The aim is to reduce the number of di-
mension of a matrix down to the most relevant (with the exact definition of relevance
depending on method being considered). These are generally unsupervised ml methods
(in that they do not aim directly to predict an outcome). The pca regression and par-
tial least squares methods are the exceptions, and may be considered semi-supervised
techniques.
Principal Components Analysis (pca) The first decomposition method is pca. It
summarizes a matrix (X) with a specified number of components (m) that explain the
most variation in the original data. Concretely, it finds m latent variables that take the
following form:
Zim = x′iϕm (2.4)
with the largest variation subject to∑pj=1 ϕ2jm = 1. The components after the first have
the additional constraint that they must be orthogonal to the components that came
before it. Of the m components, the one with the strongest correlation to the outcome
averaged across the five folds is chosen as the predictor.
pca Regression The pca regressionmethod is an extension to the baseline pca tomake
it semi-supervised. Once the m principal components are extracted, they are then used




γjZij + ui (2.5)
Different to the standard pca from above, all m components are included in the regres-
sion and therefore contribute to predicting the outcome. The exact number of compo-
nents is selected through cross validation.
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It is worth considering why the standard pca would ever be preferable to pca regression,
given the extra regression step that will result in in-sample predictions being weakly
better. The primary reason is overfitting: though the in-sample R2 will necessarily be
higher, it need not be for out-of-sample predictions.
Partial Least Squares (pls) pls is closely related to pca. Whereas pca seeks to maxi-
mize the variance of the estimated components, pls simultaneously looks for solutions
that have high variance and high correlation (with the outcome variable). Because pls
shares objects from ols (maximize correlation) and with pca (maximize variation), it
can be thought of as a half-way point between the two methods (hence, the label of
semi-supervised). In practice, the objective of maximizing variation dominates and the
results are closer to pca. Cross validation is used to choose the number of components.
As pls is not a true unsupervised learning technique, it is often referred to as a cross
decomposition technique. With this in mind, the results using pls will be evaluated
inline with supervised methods.
Singular Value Decomposition (svd) Virtually identical to pca,9 with the exception
that the input matrix does not need to be centred before computation (ie the variables do
not need to be demeaned). The number of singular values chosen corresponds directly
to the number of components to be extracted. This number is decided through cross
validation.
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (lda) The lda technique is a multinomial mixed-
membership model which assumes that the distribution of token counts arises from a
specified number of latent “topics”. A more comprehensive description of the model
can be found in the companion paper. Though placed under the category of “decom-
position methods”, lda has a statistical foundation and the process that is assumed to
generate the distribution of tokens is modelled explicitly. There are three main tuning
parameters for the model that need to be selected through cross validation. The first
is the number of latent topics. The other two are parameters that govern the priors on
the document-topic and topic-word distributions. The higher these two parameters are,
the more concentrated the probability mass of a document (topic) is on specific topics
(words).
9svd can be considered more of a matrix algebra technique than a machine learning method. In fact,
most computational implementations of pca use svd to derive the components.
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Unlike with pca, increasing the number of latent variables affects all estimated topics (eg
themodel estimatedwith two latent topicsmay be very different than one estimatedwith
three). For each fold of every model specification, the out-of-sample prediction score is
based on the latent variable that most strongly correlates to the response variable.
Decision Trees
The tree basedmethods begin by partitioning the predictor variable space into subspaces
and assigning themean of the observed outcome as the predicted value. The goal of these






(yi − ŷRj )2 (2.6)
where J is the total number of regions, Rj is the jth subspace of the predictors, and ŷRj is
the mean of the outcome variable in that subspace. Because it is computationally infea-
sible to consider every partition of the predictor space, most methods work sequentially.
At each potential split, every predictor (p) is considered individually and the best split
found. Of these p potential splits, the one that minimizes Equation 2.6 is chosen.
The standard method suffers from high variance and overfitting, resulting in poor
out-of-sample predictions. To alleviate these concerns, the methods considered here are
extensions of the standard decision tree. They built several trees and aggregate them
under different assumptions to smooth out the variability from the individual trees.
Bagging The first extension to the standard decision tree is bagging. It is based on
bootstrapping. Given B bootstrapped samples (with replacement), the bagging method
averages the prediction values across the B estimated trees. If f̂(xbi) is the decision tree







B is a tuning parameter that needs to be chosen via cross validation.
Random Forest The random forest method extends the bagging estimator by decorre-
lating the individual trees. One concern with bagging is that the first partitions in the
predictor space will be dominated by the best predictors. This results in the individual
trees, though from different samples, being very similar. Random forest overcomes this
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issue by randomly selecting a fraction of all p estimators at each split for considera-
tion. This ensures that some of the B trees will consider different, potentially relevant,
variables at each split.
Just as with bagging, the random forest estimator requires B to be specified by the
researcher. This is again decided through cross validation. The number of variables
considered at each split, m, must also be set. I set this equal to m ≈ √p, following
standard practice (Friedman et al., 2001).
Boosting Boosting is an iterative method that fits subsequent decision trees10 to the
residuals from the previous iteration. This “slow learning” method is meant to focus on
the unexplained variation at each loop. The residuals for iteration b can be expressed as
follows:




which are then used with the independent variables xi in the next decision tree to es-
timate the next predictor function, f̂b+1(xi). λ determines the rate of learning. Both B
and λ are chosen from cross validation.
Variable Selection
Predicting the level of regulation from zoning bylaws is useful for towns where surveys
have not yet been conducted. But it still leaves the question of what town character-
istics best describe strongly and weakly regulated towns unanswered. Several variable
selection methods are employed to highlight the features of a town that best distinguish
between the level of regulation among towns.
Univariate F-Test
The first method to test the relevance of specific variables is also the most straightfor-
ward. It conducts a series of pairwise univariate regressions between the set of town
variables and the chosen regulation index and calculates the F-statistic for the regressor.
The relevance of the regressors for prediction are determined by the magnitude of the
F-statistics.




Forward selection is an iterative procedure that sequentially selects the best predictor
among a set of candidates through K-fold cross validation given a scoring function. The
procedure is implemented here both with ols and lasso as estimators, though it is com-
patible with other methods. The general procedure is:
1. Denote the set of selected variables as P = {} and set of potential variables as
C = {xj}p1
2. (If lasso: select λ tuning parameter through 5-fold cross validation with all vari-
ables included)
3. Cycle through the set of candidate variables. For each xj ∈ C:
a) Fit the model (ols or lasso) through 5-fold cross validation on all the regres-
sors in P and xj . Calculate the out-of-sample (oos) R2 for each fold.
b) Average the oos score across folds
4. Select regressor with highest average score. Add to set of selected variables P and
remove from set of candidate variables C.
5. Repeat steps 3–4 until desired number of variables has been selected
Backward Selection
Backward selection operates under a similar logic to forward selection, only it starts
with a full model (ie all variables included) and sequentially removes the variables with
the lowest oos predictive power. The procedure is as follows:
1. Denote the set of all variables as C = {xj}p1
2. (If lasso: select λ tuning parameter through 5-fold cross validation with all vari-
ables included)
3. Cycle through the set of variables. For each xj ∈ C:
a) Fit the model (ols or lasso) through 5-fold cross validation on all the regres-
sors in C without xj . Calculate the out-of-sample (oos) R2 for each fold.
b) Average the oos score across folds
4. Remove the regressor with the lowest average score from the set of variables C.
5. Repeat steps 3–4 until desired number of variables has been selected
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2.4 Results
ml Methods for Measuring Regulation
The first question that is addressed is this: are machine learning methods suitable to
measure the level of regulation at the town level? Using different normalization proce-
dures for the document-term matrix (discussed in Section 2.2), and a selection of differ-
ent, relatively easy-to-implement ml methods (highlighted in Section 2.3), I first explore
what combination best predicts out-of-sample regulation using the Pioneer/Rappaport
Housing Regulation Database Index and the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation
Index as responses.11 The results from this exercise are shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3.
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0.06 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.10
0.01 0.18 0.16 0.07 0.13 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.06
0.06 0.13 0.09 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.10
0.06 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.09 -0.05 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.09
-0.00 0.06 -0.00 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.20
-0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.16
0.01 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.05
-0.01 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.11
0.04 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.21
0.05 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.10
0.03 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.16 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.06
0.02 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.10 0.09 0.13
0.09 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.15 0.07 0.06 0.07
0.05 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.12
0.03 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.09 0.08 0.13
0.02 0.17 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.12 0.08 0.13
0.06 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.02
0.03 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.08
0.01 0.16 0.01 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.07 0.06 0.08
0.02 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.10










Notes: tf Baseline: raw counts, unigrams, maximum document frequency 90%, minimum document fre-
quency 3%, L1 normalized. tf-idf Baseline: logarithmic counts, unigrams, maximum document frequency
90%, minimum document frequency 3%, L2 normalized. Name of normalization indicates change from
baseline. See Section 2.2 for details on document normalization.
Figure 2.2 shows the results with pRhRdi as the response variable. The vertical axis
indicates the dtm normalization method, and the horizontal axis specifies the ml tech-
nique. The cell elements refer to the averageR2 value from 5-fold cross validation. When
the ml method requires tuning parameters, these too are selected through 5-fold cross
11The nalpz is not considered as it is derived from the same text used to estimate these ml models.
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validation. The results displayed always use the best parameter combination. Results
for the latent Dirichlet allocation model are not shown for every normalization method
as it requires a dtm with only count elements.
Clear patterns emerge. First, the matrix decomposition methods result in relatively
better predictions. The lda models seems particularly good at deriving a predictive
measure of regulation, with singular value decomposition not much worse. Second, the
decision tree-based methods have somewhat middling performance. Third, of the pe-
nalized linear models ridge regression is the most promising. Lasso performs relatively
poorly, and elastic net is somewhere in between.
Turning to the normalization methods, dtms subject to the inverse document fre-
quency tend to perform better. Taking a logarithmic transformation of the term fre-
quency (the baseline) also performs better than under the count or binary case. The
clear exception to all of this is the basic count dtms with the lda model. The unigram
version (the baseline) performs slightly better in this case than when using bigrams or
3-grams.
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0.05 0.14 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.10 -0.08 -0.03 -0.12
0.01 0.09 0.06 0.07 -0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.08 -0.09 -0.01
0.05 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.11 0.11 -0.08 -0.04 -0.12
0.06 0.15 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.11 -0.09 -0.03 -0.09
0.00 0.15 0.00 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.08 -0.06 0.01 -0.05 0.19
-0.00 0.09 -0.00 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 -0.04 -0.00 -0.10 0.13
-0.00 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.09 -0.02 -0.00 0.02
-0.00 0.11 0.02 0.05 -0.00 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.00
0.09 0.16 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.15 -0.00 -0.01 0.06 0.19
0.08 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.12 -0.12 -0.06 -0.08
0.02 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.07 -0.10 -0.05 -0.02
0.14 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.09 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03
0.01 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.09 -0.08 -0.07 0.02
0.08 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.12 -0.10 -0.05 -0.05
0.14 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.09 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04
0.16 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.09 -0.04 -0.01 -0.08
-0.02 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.11 -0.05 0.01 -0.01
-0.03 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.01 -0.01 -0.02
0.13 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.00 -0.02 0.06
0.14 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.06 -0.11 -0.05 -0.09









Notes: tf Baseline: raw counts, unigrams, maximum document frequency 90%, minimum document fre-
quency 3%, L1 normalized. tf-idf Baseline: logarithmic counts, unigrams, maximum document frequency
90%, minimum document frequency 3%, L2 normalized. Name of normalization indicates change from
baseline. See Section 2.2 for details on document normalization.
Figure 2.3 shows the corresponding results with the wRluRi as the response variable.
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The first thing to note is that overall the wRluRi is more difficult to predict, no doubt
in part due to the lower sample size (79 vs. 187). Second, the decision tree models are
poor predictors. The oos R2 is often negative. This is probably owed to overfitting
on the small-sized samples. Third, the lda model again provides the best predictor of
regulation. Ridge regression is very consistent across dtm normalization methods and
also a decent prediction technique.
For researchers looking to derive measures of regulation from bylaws (at least for
zoning) two primary conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, the latent
Dirichlet allocation model does a decent job of uncovering a latent measure of regu-
lation. The advantage of this method is that it does not require responses to calibrate
the model. This is useful in situations where current measures or indices of regulation
do not exist. The disadvantage of this model is that the researcher must select the latent
category that best discriminates between strongly and weakly regulated localities. Sec-
ond, when existing measures of regulation exist and one wants to extrapolate to other
samples, ridge regression will preform well across a wide range of document-term ma-
trix formats.
Best Predictors of Regulation
Having established what techniques work for measuring regulation, I now turn to the
variable selection results. Given the variable selection procedures described in Sec-
tion 2.3, I report the ten most highly predictive variables for each index. I consider
both of the external indices of regulation, the pRhRdi and wRluRi, as well as the index
derived through natural language processing on the zoning bylaws, the nalpz. These
are shown in Table 2.2.
Each column specifies a different variable selection procedure. The three different
panels correspond to the three different indices of regulation. The rows convey the
ranking of the most predictive variables of the respective index. To ease interpretation,
the variables are colour-coded with accordance to their grouping in Table 2.1. Orange
highlights variables that belong to land use variables and blue demographic variables.
Looking across the different specifications, the land use variables are more often the best
predictors of regulation. This is especially true of variables that relate in one way or an-
other to the supply of developable land: the four variables that are found to be the most
predictive (being ranked first in at least one specification) are the share of undeveloped
or non-developed land, the fraction of forest cover, and the share of households consid-
ered to be rurally located. This is quite remarkable given that the indices are derived in
different ways and that several variable selection procedures are considered.
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Table 2.2: What Town-level Characteristics Predict Regulation?: Variable Selection
Procedures
ols lasso
Univariate F-Test Forward Selection Backward Selection Forward Selection Backward Selection
Panel A: nalpz
1 % Undevel. % Undevel. % Undevel. % Undevel. % Rural
2 % Non-devel. % Rural Pop. Den. Devel. % Rural Pop. Den. Devel.
3 % Forest Residential:devel. Pop. Den. Residential:devel. Home Value nbR
4 % Rural Dist. to Coast Home Value nbR Dist. to Coast Residential:devel.
5 % Residential Pop. Den. Devel. Residential:devel. Pop. Den. Devel. Dist. to Coast
6 % Other Urban Home Value nbR % Wetland Home Value nbR Industry:devel.
7 Pop. Den. Devel. Pop. Den. % Water % Forest % Owner Occ.
8 % Forest nbR % Owner Occ. nbR % Non-devel. Industry:devel. % Rural nbR
9 % Undevel. nbR Town Area % Vacant nbR % Owner Occ. % Aquifer
10 % Commercial % Non-devel. Town Area Pop. Den. Population
Panel B: pRhRdi
1 % Non-devel. % Non-devel. % Forest % Non-devel. % Rural
2 % Undevel. Comm.:devel. Agriculture Comm.:devel. Comm.:devel. nbR
3 % Residential Agriculture Pop. Den. Devel. Agriculture No. of hus
4 % Forest Comm.:devel. nbR Pop. Den. Comm.:devel. nbR Agriculture
5 % Commercial % Rural % Commercial nbR % Rural % College nbR
6 % Rural % Foreign % Residential nbR % Foreign % Foreign
7 Pop. Den. Devel. % College nbR Home Value nbR % College nbR Comm.:devel.
8 hu Den. Devel. % Residential nbR % Rural nbR No. of hus % Over 64 nbR
9 % Other Urban % Rural nbR % Over 64 nbR % Residential % Married
10 % Residential nbR % Over 64 nbR % Commercial % Over 64 nbR hu Den. nbR
Panel C: wRluRi
1 % Rural % Rural % Forest % Rural % Non-devel.
2 Comm.:devel. % Wetland Dist. to Coast % Wetland Dist. to Coast
3 % Non-devel. % Poverty Agriculture Comm.:devel. % Rural
4 Pop. Den. Devel. Dist. to Coast % Undevel. % Water % Wetland
5 % Other Urban % Non-devel. % Wetland % Foreign Population
6 Population % College hu Den. % Non-white Industry:devel. nbR
7 hu Den. Devel. hu Den. hu Den. Devel. lfpR % Undevel.
8 % Commercial Pop. Den. Devel. % Water No. of hus % Foreign
9 No. of hus nbR % Forest % Foreign Town Area % Water
10 % Forest % Commercial nbR No. of hus Agriculture % College
Notes: Each column specifies a different variable selection procedure (as described in Section 2.3). Each
panel refers to a different regulation index. The rows indicate the rank of the selected variables in terms of
predictive power. Orange coloured words are land use variables and blue coloured words are demographic
variables. nbR: neighbours. lfpR: labour force participation rate.
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Zooming in more on the best predictors, Figure 2.4 shows the number of times that
a variable is one of the top three most predictive across all specifications. For example,
the variable “share undeveloped” is a top three predictor three times for the wRluRi, six
times for the pRhRdi, and two times for the nalpz, for a total of twelve times. These
results highlight exactly how much more predictive land use characteristics are than
demographics. The share of the population that is foreign born, for example, is one of
the best demographic predictors among all demographic variables, but only makes two
top-three appearances and only for one index.
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Notes: The length of each bar indicates the number of times the respective variable was one of the best
three predictors for each variable selection-regulation index combination (column-panel combination
from Table 2.2).
These results speakmost in favour of historical patterns of land use and density being
the primary determinant of regulation today. Other prominent theories, particularly
home owners looking to maximize the value of their properties, or strategic sorting
based on demographic characteristics, cannot be explained by these facts. This does
not mean either of these two channels does not play a role, only that their effects are
overshadowed by the supply of buildable land and pre-existing land use patterns.
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Differential Trends in Demographics with Respect to Land Use
Regulation
Most analyses of land use regulations have looked the the consequences at a given point
in time: how do the attributes of localities with varying degrees of regulation look? I ex-
tend this by investigating how the demographic composition of towns in Massachusetts
has changed over time differentially with respect to the degree of land use regulation.
The main results of this exercise are shown in Figure 2.5.
The figure plots the average value of the respective demographic variable for towns
within quintiles of land use regulation as measured by the nalpz. Darker lines refer to
towns in the top quintile (most regulated) and light lines to those in the bottom quin-
tile (least regulated). It is apparent that there are important differences between towns
with respect to land use regulations, both initially, before these regulations were widely
adopted, and in the trends over time. Of standard demographic measures, the share
foreign, in poverty, and non-white show the most heterogeneity with respect to reg-
ulation (other demographic variables such as age do not, and are not reported here).
For example, in 1970 the difference between towns regarding the fraction of non-white
residents was negligible, and low everywhere in the state. However, after 1980, this
share increased significantly for towns in the bottom quintile of regulation and only
very slowly for the other quintiles. There is a similar pattern with the share of foreign
residents, though there were also initial differences. These patterns are no doubt driven
in part on account of less regulated towns being closer to Boston, which attracts more
immigrants. However, the overall population and number of housing units has remained
remarkably stable over the same time frame. This suggests that part of the difference is
due to sorting of residents between towns of varying levels of regulation.
Another important difference between the regulation quintiles is regarding the share
of population considered in poverty. While in most towns this share has changed very
little or decreased slightly, it has increased by over three percentage points for towns in
the lowest quintile of regulation. This highlights an important fact: the least regulated
quintile of towns, due to regulation or not, is very different from the other 4/5ths of towns.
Two other noticeable differences between the regulation quintiles concerns housing.
Housing units in towns in the bottom regulation quintile aremuch less likely to be owner
occupied. In these towns only about 55% of units are owner occupied, a fraction that
has been virtually unchanged over 40 years, while for other towns it averages between
65–70%. Another housing characteristic that varies between the quintiles is the share of
housing units that are vacant. There is a clear gradient between the quintiles, with more
regulated towns containing more vacant units. The gradient was apparent both before
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Figure 2.5: Demographic Trends Among Quintiles of Regulation
Population ('000)
% Vacant Units Housing Units ('000)
% Owner Occupied Units % Poverty
% Foreign % Nonwhite
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010






































Notes: Each subfigure plots the average value of the respective variable at the town level divided into
quintiles based on the Natural Language Processing Regulation Index. Data from decennial us Census,
1970–2010.
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and after the Massachusetts Zoning Act, with little variation over the decades. This sug-
gests two possible explanations. The first is that towns with a large stock of unoccupied
housing tend to regulate more strongly to deter more development to encourage use of
the existing housing. The second is that investors or developers with unsold units lobby
against further development to maintain the value of their already-built properties.
2.5 Conclusion
In spite of the variety, ubiquity, and impact of land use regulations, the causes and conse-
quences of them are still poorly understood. As regulation is often the biggest constraint
to new development, it is vital that we improve our knowledge of why these regulations
exist in the first place, and how exactly they impact the housing market and beyond.
This paper contributes to this challenge by answering two related questions: i) what
town attributes best predict strong regulation, and ii) how have differently regulated
towns varied over time. In addition this paper tests various machine learning methods
in their ability to predict an index of regulation restrictiveness using only the text from
zoning bylaws.
I find that the latent Dirichlet allocation model, an unsupervised mixture model,
performs the best in creating a predictor of regulation as benchmarked by survey-based
indices. Among supervised methods, ridge regression is also a good and robust choice.
Various feature selection procedures show that historical development (specifically the
lack thereof) is the best predictor of the current level of regulation. Furthermore, inves-
tigating demographic trends among towns of differing levels of regulation shows that
there were large baseline differences in the vacancy rate and share of housing units
owner occupied before localized land use regulation. However, some town-level demo-
graphics characteristics, the fraction of non-white residents in particular, has diverged
significantly since the use of widespread zoning.
Future research will need to incorporate these facts into a better understanding of
the origins of land use regulations. Specifically: why do historical land use patterns
best predict current zoning while certain demographic variables simultaneously vary
substantiallywith the degree of land use regulation? Another promising avenue is to dis-
sect the unidimensional measure of land use regulation used here to investigate whether
certain facets of zoning are more relevant for different outcomes. The subindices that






Experimental Evidence from Academies for University Students
in Uganda∗
Abstract: We disentangle the extent to which entrepreneurial success can be
attributed to skill formation and to selection. To study skill formation of nascent
entrepreneurs among Ugandan university students, we randomly accept applica-
tions to a business training program fostering an entrepreneurial mindset. Wemea-
sure labor market outcomes, business creation and success, and cognitive and non-
cognitive skills as key outcomes up to three years after program participation. To
better understand individual motivation for entrepreneurship, we experimentally
vary marketing messages to all interested students prior to their application deci-
sion, emphasizing either entrepreneurial profit or entrepreneurial freedom. Lastly,
we describe endogenous self-selection through non-experimental comparisons of
key outcomes among applicants and eligible students from the same population
who were aware of the entrepreneurship training program but did not express in-
terest.
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Vojtěch Bartoš, Kristina Czura, Michael Kaiser, and Timm
Opitz.
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3.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurship is key for economic development (Schumpeter, 1911). While most in-
dividuals in low-income countries are self-employed (e.g., 78.1 percent of the working
population in Uganda was self-employed in 2019), these are mainly small-scale busi-
nesses that are only remotely related to the Schumpeterian entrepreneurship that drives
economic growth (Porta and Shleifer, 2008; Hsieh and Olken, 2014). They typically lack
capital and entrepreneurial ability, preventing them from reaping the full benefits of
high-return investment opportunities (De Mel et al., 2012; Beaman et al., 2014; Bruhn
et al., 2018). While relieving credit constraints shows some improvement in terms of
business profits, it does not result in sustained business growth (Banerjee et al., 2015).
Interventions aimed at improving business practices and managerial capital have not
been shown to result in sustained increases in profits or employment (McKenzie and
Woodruff, 2014). More promising approaches focus on the role of the psychology of
entrepreneurship. Campos et al. (2017) show that training programs focusing on soft
skill concepts, such as personal initiative and the entrepreneurial mindset, outperform
programs teaching accounting, finance and marketing skills.1
Most business training studies target existing businesses—with the notable exception
of Klinger and Schündeln, 2011, Blattman et al., 2014, and Premand et al., 2016—but
neglect the importance of selection into entrepreneurship. Levine and Rubinstein (2017)
and Levine and Rubinstein (2018) provide evidence that successful entrepreneurs in the
USA are positively selected on human capital. Moreover, evidence from high-income
countries shows that cognitive and non-cognitive traits predict entrepreneurial success
(Andersen et al., 2014; Koudstaal et al., 2016; Levine and Rubinstein, 2017). Yet little
is known on whether non-cognitive traits are shaped by entrepreneurial activity, or
whether people select into entrepreneurship based on these traits. This distinction is
important for policy. If relevant non-cognitive traits are malleable, this would favour
programs aimed at developing an entrepreneurial mindset. If they are not, interventions
designed to identify high-potential entrepreneurs would be more promising.
We seek to disentangle the extent entrepreneurial success can be attributed to skill
formation and to selection. First, we causally identify the effects of a business training
program, which develops an entrepreneurial mindset, on business creation and business
performance. In our field experiment, training is randomly offered to university students
in Uganda who had expressed interest in entrepreneurship, a suitable sample positively
selected on human capital. Second, we study how selection into the entrepreneurship
1Entrepreneurial mindset is one’s ability to spot and benefit from opportunities that are encountered
in daily life. Personal initiative captures one’s desire to proactively tackle problems (Frese et al., 2007).
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training program varies by motives and personality traits. Using panel-data drawn from
the same population, we document how students interested in entrepreneurship differ
from those that are not with respect to socio-economic, cognitive and non-cognitive
factors, as well as labormarket outcomes, including self-employment. Third, we causally
identify what motives draw students to entrepreneurship training.
We partner with a Ugandan organization, StartHub Africa, that provides extra-
curricular entrepreneurship training academies at local leading universities. We track
three semesters of training academies (henceforth “waves”) conducted at eight to ten
universities with a combined enrollment of around 2,000 students in our study sample.2
Eachwave consists of a marketing campaign, an application phase, and an entrepreneur-
ship training academy. A wave begins with an untargeted marketing campaign to raise
general awareness of the program. Then, to be eligible for the program, students must
attend an information session that consists of short presentations that summarize the
training program. This is also where the application forms are distributed.
Our experimental design relies on two sources of exogenous variation. First, we ran-
domly vary the motivational message for becoming an entrepreneur that is marketed in
the information session video presentations: financial gains or creative freedom. This
allows us to causally identify the motivations of applicants. Second, among those who
applied, we randomly offer admission to the program to identify the effect of being of-
fered admission on business creation, survival and performance. We complement these
analyses by documenting patterns of entrepreneurial self-selection by comparing ap-
plicants to those who were aware of the training program but did not express interest
along several repeated measures of socio-economic indicators, personality traits and
preferences.3 The data collection effort includes surveys at different points in the self-
selection and application process, as well as surveys administered both before and after
the entrepreneurship training academies (Figure 3.1).
This study relates to four strands of literature. First, we contribute to the litera-
ture on entrepreneurship and business training in low-income countries by studying
a unique sample of highly-educated, high-potential individuals (see Levine and Rubin-
stein (2017) and Levine and Rubinstein (2018)) who aspire to be entrepreneurs. Despite
extensive research on business training interventions, there is a paucity of evidence on
the effects of training on high-skilled youths. Interventions in low-income countries
typically provide middle-aged, incumbent micro-entrepreneurs with education on busi-
2Two waves have been conducted to date. We plan to include one more wave. We will discuss the
feasibility of this extension and base our power calculations both on the status quo and the planned
implementation.
3We elicit data on the Big-5 personality traits, grit, personal initiative and aspirations. Further, we
gather measurements of time and risk preference as well as individuals’ degree of loss aversion.
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ness skills and managerial capital, which have not been found to result in sustained
increases in revenue, profits or employment (Bruhn and Zia, 2013; Hsieh and Olken,
2014; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2014; McKenzie, 2017; Bruhn et al., 2018; Rigol et al.,
2018). This population, however, may lack the necessary skills for becoming success-
ful entrepreneurs (Bjorvatn and Tungodden, 2010; Hurst and Pugsley, 2011; Levine and
Rubinstein, 2018; Carlson and Rink, 2019) or may be unwilling or unable to change the
way they run their businesses (Burmeister and Schade, 2007). With respect to our target
population, the most closely related study is Premand et al. (2016) who analyze the in-
ception of an official entrepreneurship track at universities in Tunisia. They document
modest increases of one to four percent in self-employment rates but no effect on overall
employment.4 Our setting differs from theirs in that we study an extra-curricular pro-
gram that is more likely to only attract the genuine subpopulation of those interested in
pursuing entrepreneurship.
Second, we contribute to the literature on the entrepreneurial mindset. The en-
trepreneurship training program we study is based on a curriculum that aims to foster
an entrepreneurial mindset and personal initiative. Campos et al. (2017) show that this
type of training results in larger increases of profits than a traditional business training
program. Ubfal et al. (2019) find transient, short-term effects of this type of training on
micro-entrepreneurs in Jamaica. We complement this burgeoning literature by offer-
ing further evidence on the merits of non-traditional training programs and enhance it
by focusing on nascent entrepreneurs who have been found to benefit from traditional
training programs (see Klinger and Schündeln, 2011).
Third, we contribute to the literature on selection into entrepreneurship and pre-
dictors of entrepreneurial success. Levine and Rubinstein (2017) show that success-
ful entrepreneurs select along both cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions. Evidence
from high-income countries suggests that cognitive and non-cognitive traits are im-
portant predictors of entrepreneurial success (Andersen et al., 2014; Koudstaal et al.,
2016; Levine and Rubinstein, 2017). For example, entrepreneurs are generally more
risk-tolerant (Bouchouicha and Vieider, 2019) and display more overconfidence (Åste-
bro et al., 2007; Herz et al., 2014). Evidence is scarce on whether non-cognitive traits
are shaped by entrepreneurial activity or whether people select into entrepreneurship
based on these traits. On one hand, an established view suggests that preferences are
relatively stable (Schildberg-Hörisch, 2018). There is however recent evidence that per-
sonality traits, such as grit, may be malleable –– at least among young adolescents (Alan
4This speaks to substitution from wage employment to self-employment, and does not imply overall
employment effects. Alaref et al. (2020) present results from a medium term follow-up and show that any
effects were short lived: four years after the program, there are no differences in self-employment and
wage employment rates between the treatment and control groups.
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et al., 2019). We extend this literature by documenting personality traits, preferences,
and beliefs before individuals select into entrepreneurship, how these differ by inter-
est in entrepreneurship, and by identifying how entrepreneurship training affects these
characteristics.
Fourth, we speak to the motivations of becoming an entrepreneur, and whether se-
lection patterns differ by motivation. A sparse literature using observational data from
the USA stresses that non-pecuniary benefits, such as being one’s own boss or having
flexible working hours, play a first-order role for business creation decisions and that
these independence-oriented workers are willing to forgo higher earnings from wage-
employment (Hamilton, 2000; Hurst and Pugsley, 2011; Hurst and Pugsley, 2015). Guz-
man et al. (2020) and Ganguli et al. (2018) confirm the importance of motives and differ-
ential responses to monetary and non-pecuniary motives resulting in selection patterns
into entrepreneurship competitions in randomized field experiments in the USA and the
UK, respectively.5 We complement this recent literature by identifying the differential
selection decisions made by high-skilled youth in a low-income country using random
variation in the salience of different motives for entrepreneurship.
3.2 Research design
Background
StartHub Africa (SHA) conducts the academy at local universities during the academic
semester. There is one academy per university which has a target class size of 40 stu-
dents that spans nineweekswith one three-hour session eachweek. The academy covers
all stages of training for nascent entrepreneurs: developing a business idea, creating a
prototype, and implementing the idea. In the curriculum developed by SHA, manage-
ment skills, such as cost accounting, and basic principles of finance and marketing are
included, but emphasis is placed on developing participants’ personal initiative to foster
their entrepreneurial mindset. In this respect the training program is similar to the pro-
gram studied by Campos et al. (2017). Lecturers are encouraged to create an interactive
atmosphere, and the standardized materials SHA provides to the instructors require ac-
tive input from the participants. Finally, the curriculum contains a number of practical
exercises outside of the classroom. For instance, students are taught basic principles of
market research, then brainstorm product ideas and spend the rest of the session ven-
turing out on campus to assess people’s reaction to their product ideas. The training
5Ashraf et al. (2020) vary the salience of career incentives in a recruitment drive for public health
workers in Zambia, and also show that the salience of motives affects selection patterns, and later, per-
formance on the job.
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is taught by university lecturers or respected entrepreneurs from the local community
that have been extensively trained and are continuously supported by SHA.
The academy is preceded by a marketing and application phase which spans the first
three weeks of the semester. During the marketing phase, SHA creates awareness of
the program using posters and flyers across campus, and in short pitches in classrooms
and at campus events. Students are informed that attending an information session is
a prerequisite for applying. Six to twelve of these 30-minute sessions are held per day
over two or three days in a central location at each university. The information sessions
provide detailed information on the academy’s content, the expectations of the partic-
ipants, in particular the time commitment necessary to complete the academy, success
stories from previous participants, and the possibility to ask questions to SHA staff. To
harmonize the information sessions as much as possible, the same SHA staff hold the
information sessions throughout each day. Moreover, the presentations are video-based
and contain the same structure: motivation for the academy, details, deliverables and
requirements of the academy, and success stories from alumni. After the information
session, students could pick up an application form in person, fill it out (in 10 to 15
minutes) and return it either to the team conducting information session, or to a well-
know place on campus indicated on the application form. Application forms were only
available to participants of the information sessions.
Experimental design
We exploit two sources of exogenous, experimental variation. First, in the entrepreneur-
ship training experiment, admission to the academy is randomly offered to a subset of
applicants. We use this variation to estimate the causal effect of being offered admission
to the academy on entrepreneurial activity and economic outcomes. We also investigate
effects on cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Second, to understand in more detail the
characteristics and motivations of these young entrepreneurs, we add a second layer of
exogenous variation: In the selection experiment, we randomly vary whether marketing
for the academy emphasizes financial independence or creative freedom as motivation
for becoming an entrepreneur. This variation allows us to identify how motivation im-
pacts the application decision and to study heterogeneous effects based on individual
characteristics. Figure 3.1 presents the experimental design. Finally, using a sample
drawn from the same population, we document endogenous self-selection by compar-
ing eligible students who did not express interest in the academy to applicants. We also
investigate how key outcomes from the entrepreneurship training experiment evolve dif-
ferentially over time between students who did not express interest to those who applied
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Figure 3.1: Experimental design and data collection
Notes. Different phases of the experimental design and self-selection decisions is marked in grey, exogenous
experimental variation is marked in orange, and data collection is marked in blue.
but did not receive training.
We first discuss the selection experiment and the complementary observational ex-
amination of self-selection, and then the entrepreneurship training experiment because
this follows the chronological journey of a student from hearing about the training to
submitting an application and possibly being offered admission. Nonetheless, the main
research question draws on hypotheses about the entrepreneurship training experiment.
The sample selection procedure will be detailed in Section 3.3.
Understanding selection and motives
Thefirst layer of experimental variation is induced by randomly exposing clusters of stu-
dents to different marketing messages during the information sessions. In the selection
experiment, the content of two motivational video presentations is randomly varied be-
tween emphasizing i) that entrepreneurship offers the possibility of achieving financial
independence, and ii) that entrepreneurship offers the freedom to be creative. For this,
the respective motives are varied in four of the twelve overall slides reiterating the ben-
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efits of becoming an entrepreneur and in the corresponding voice-over of these slides.6
Everything else is kept constant. Support staff ascertained that no student listened to
two information sessions by either staying in the room for the next session or entering
early during an ongoing session. This exogenous variation allows us to cleanly identify
how the pool of applicants differs across these two messages.
To analyze selection into the academy, we compare students who are interested in
entrepreneurship, indicated by applying to the academy, with those who are not inter-
ested in entrepreneurship indicated by being aware of the entrepreneurship academy
and not attending an information session. We refer to this latter group as the non-
interested subpopulation. In other words, conditional on having been exposed to themar-
keting phase, we investigate what drives certain individuals to opt-in to the academy.
Entrepreneurship training experiment
The entrepreneurship training experiment allows for causally estimating the effect of the
academy on individuals’ self-employment probability, as well as on labor market out-
comes and personality traits. Having participated in an information session, students
decide whether to apply to the academy. A random sample, stratified by year and field of
study, is then drawn from the set of all applications and offered admission to the training
program — the treatment group. The remainder is placed into the control group.
Hypotheses
Grounded in the results of previous work, there are several hypotheses we seek to test.
The first set of hypotheses concerns the effects of entrepreneurship training on economic
and business outcomes and inputs. First, as shown by Klinger and Schündeln (2011) for
a traditional entrepreneurship training program, we hypothesize that participating in
the entrepreneurship academy fosters business creation. Yet, as our entire sample con-
sists of highly-educated students that are all interested in entrepreneurship, we may not
find significant differences between treatment and control groups at the extensive mar-
gin. Therefore, we further hypothesize that participation in the academy will improve
business performance, captured by indicators such as monthly sales and profits, mea-
sures of capital and labor input, and measures of general economic self-sufficiency. One
particular dimension we are interested in is labor input, and whether treated subjects
create jobs through the businesses they create. The hypotheses are summarized in Ta-
6In Appendix Section C2 we present in detail how information sessions differed across the two mar-
keting themes.
RESEARCH DESIGN 109
ble 3.1, Family 1.1. Positive findings for these hypotheses would provide evidence for
entrepreneurial activity being teachable.
Second, we seek to identify channels through which the entrepreneurship training
effects the primary outcomes of business creation and performance. Campos et al. (2017)
find that a personal initiative training program can deliver lasting improvements for
small business owners and they identified several channels: application of successful
business practices, increased personal initiative, increased capital and labor inputs, sub-
stantial innovative activity (e.g., in the form of new products originating from own ideas)
and product differentiation. We therefore hypothesize that participation in the academy
leads to implementing more successful business practices, improved financial profes-
sionalization, marketing activities, product and process innovation, and better access to
business networks. The hypotheses are summarized in Table 3.1, Family 1.2, Hypotheses
1 to 6. Finding effects along these dimensions would lend evidence to the most effec-
tive channels through which entrepreneurship training impacts the economic outcomes
listed in Family 1.1.
Moreover, as laid out before, there is evidence that entrepreneurs are positively se-
lected on cognitive and non-cognitive traits. Little is known, however, about whether
non-cognitive traits may be shaped beyond adolescence. We therefore test hypothe-
ses that investigate whether participating in the academy shapes non-cognitive traits.
These hypotheses are summarized in Table 3.1, Family 1.2, Hypotheses 7 and 8. These
hypotheses allow us to test whether — and to what extend — non-cognitive traits are
malleable through participation in entrepreneurship training.
The second set of hypotheses concerns selection into entrepreneurship. First, indi-
viduals may have different motives for desiring to be an entrepreneur. Guzman et al.,
2020 study entrepreneurs and find that women and individuals located in more altruis-
tic cultures are motivated more by social-impact messages than money, whereas men
and those in less altruistic cultures are motivated more by money than potential social-
impact. Ganguli et al., 2018 document a crowd-out between extrinsic, cash-based and
intrinsic, social motives for social entrepreneurs. While extrinsic motivational messages
affect effort in applications for a start-up grant, it reduces the pool of applicants at the
same time. Further, business success was less likely: social entrepreneurs motivated
by extrinsic messages worked fewer hours per week, created fewer employment oppor-
tunities, and profited less from their venture. We therefore test which marketing mes-
sage attracts more applicants: whether monetary motives or the promise of independent
work better draws young, highly-educated individuals to entrepreneurship. We also in-
vestigate the types of individuals that are drawn to the different marketing messages.
We consider measures of average cognitive ability, over-confidence and entrepreneurial
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self-assessment. These hypotheses are summarized in Table 3.1, Family 2.1, Hypothe-
ses 1 to 4. These hypotheses test whether stressing different motivations for becoming
an entrepreneur lead to differential application patterns, both in terms of the quantity
of applications and the attributes of the applicants themselves. Finding differences be-
tween the two messages would also speak to how different motivations to undertake en-
trepreneurship training are correlated with certain individual characteristics, and how
such motivations shape the composition of applicants.
Further, we document selection into entrepreneurship (as proxied by selection into
the academy) by comparing those that applied to the academy to those that were exposed
to the marketing campaign but did not apply for the program (non-interested subpopu-
lation). The outcomes of interest are listed under Hypothesis Families 2.2.1 and 2.2.2,
and mirror those in Hypothesis Families 1.1 and 1.2 from the primary outcomes of the
entrepreneurship training experiment. Comparing baseline characteristics and outcomes
between the two groups allows us to identify the dimensions on which individuals se-
lect into entrepreneurship. Those and additional measures are investigated at endline to
document how the non-interested subpopulation evolves over time compared to those
that applied to the training and were not admitted (control group).
The outcome variables and their measurement are detailed in Section 3.3, while the
empirical analysis is detailed in Section 3.4. Our results will inform to what extent teach-
ing entrepreneurial skills and selection are important aspects for entrepreneurship. This
is interesting from an academic perspective as it addresses fundamental questions on
skill formation and its potential repercussions for entrepreneurship. It is also of utmost
importance for policy: If entrepreneurial skills can indeed be formed, we offer an eval-
uation of a cost-effective, relatively easy to implement, and scalable intervention for
high-potential, well-educated individuals. We can also document whether the nascent
entrepreneurs originate from high-skilled individuals that would otherwise be unem-
ployed or whether they are substituting away from formal-employment. If selection
is found as relatively more important for entrepreneurial success, our study would in-
form policy makers that identifying high-potential entrepreneurs is of first-order impor-
tance (see McKenzie (2017) and Rigol et al. (2018) who seek to identify high-potential en-
trepreneurs, and Shane (2009) who warns about dragging people into risky, non-growth
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Time frame
The proposed project consists of three waves of entrepreneurship training academies.
Each wave consists of the implementation of the entrepreneurship academies, the ex-
perimental variation introduced in both the entrepreneurship training experiment and
the selection experiment, and the data collection before and after the intervention. As
detailed below, there will be a baseline survey, an implementation check survey (one to
two months after the intervention), a midline survey (six months later) and two endline
surveys. The Endline Survey I takes place 12 months after the intervention, the Endline
Survey II 24 months after the intervention of the last wave.
The first wave started in September 2019, and the second wave started in January
2020. The third wave is scheduled for September 2020. The Endline Survey I will take
place in February 2021 (Wave I), July 2021 (Wave II), and February 2022 (Wave III). The
Endline Survey II is scheduled for February 2023 for all three waves. We expect to finish
the analysis in the summer of 2023. Table 3.2 sets out the detailed time line for all steps
in all waves. The implementation of Wave I andWave II is already in progress, while the
data collection for the midline survey (Wave I) and the implementation check survey
(Wave II) in 2020 is scheduled. Later data collection and the implementation of Wave III
is planned.
Due to the current Covid-19 crisis, we may not be able to implement Wave III as
planned in September 2020, but have to postpone it to the spring semester 2021. In this
case, all of the following dates will be postponed by around six months. In the worst
possible case, we may not be able to implement Wave III at all. Although we deem
this highly unlikely, we are conservative in the statistical power calculations below and
account for a worst-case scenario with only the two already implemented waves and a
base-case scenario with all three planned waves. The Covid-19 crisis will not have any
effect on the scheduled data collection as only the endline survey will be conducted as
an in-person survey, all other surveys are conducted via telephone.
Treatment assignment and statistical power
Selection experiment
Each information session presenter was provided with a randomly drawn marketing
theme — financial independence or creative freedom — for the first session of the day.
This was randomly chosen by the research team using a fair coin. The themes for the
remaining sessions were then alternated by the presenter.
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Table 3.2: Timeline
Stage/Instrument Sample Status Date
Piloting 3 academies, 380 applicants Completed March-May 2018
Wave I 10 academies
Marketing / information sessions / short surveys n = 1019 Completed Aug.- Sept. 2019
Application data / Baseline survey napp = 713, nbase = 672 Completed Aug.- Sept. 2019
Enterpreneurship academy n = 414 Completed Aug. 2019 - Jan. 2020
Implementation check survey n = 625 Completed Jan. - Feb. 2020
Midline survey Scheduled Sep. - Oct. 2020
Endline survey I&II Planned Jan. - Feb. 2021 & Jan. - Feb. 2023
Wave II 8 academies
Marketing / information sessions / short surveys n = 760 Completed Feb. - March 2020
Application data / Baseline survey napp = 584, nbase = 562 Completed Feb. - March 2020
Enterpreneurship academy n = 313 In process Feb. - July 2020
Student screening survey n = 926 Completed Feb. - March 2020
Student population survey I In process May- June 2020
Implementation check Scheduled July - Aug. 2020
Midline survey Planned Jan. - Feb. 2021
Endline survey I&II Planned July- Aug. 2021 & Jan. - Feb. 2023
Student population survey II Planned Jan. - Feb. 2023
Wave III 9 academies
Marketing / information sessions/ short surveys Planned Aug.- Sept. 2020
Application data Planned Aug.- Sept. 2020
Enterpreneurship academy Planned Aug. 2020 - Jan. 2021
Student screening survey Planned Sep. - Oct. 2020
Student population survey I Planned Oct. - Dec. 2020
Implementation check Planned Jan. - Feb. 2021
Midline survey Planned July - Aug. 2021
Endline survey I&II Planned Jan. - Feb. 2022 & Jan. - Feb. 2023
Student population survey II Planned Jan. - Feb. 2023
Notes. Midline survey of Wave I is scheduled for September and October 2020 due to time lags in the disbursement of research funds that have
been fully secured in June 2020. Wave III is planned for the fall semester 2020/2021. Due to Covid-19, Wave III may have to be postponed to the
spring semester 2021. All following dates will be postponed by around six months in this case. In the worst-case scenario of no possibility to
implement Wave III, endline survey II will be conducted in July and August 2022 for Wave I and II.
Entrepreneurship training experiment
The randomization procedure offered admission to the training program to individuals
with complete applications. Within each training cohort (i.e., university-semester), the
target was to offer admission to 40 students, an optimal classroom size determined by
SHA.7 We targeted a control group of equal size; however, the group sizes were con-
strained by the number of applications received.
Thus the treatment and control group sizes were a function of the number of appli-
cants. Specifically, if there were over 120 applications, we picked 45 students at random
and offered admission, assigned 75 to the control group and omitted the remaining stu-
dents from the study.8 We anticipated low demand in some training cohorts and chose
7SHA allowed for deviations from the optimal size within a range of between 30 to 45 students. In
case of excess (insufficient) interest, the classes were larger (smaller).
8This is done due to capacity and resource constraints. In practice, it is rare to receive over 120
applications for an academy.
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to over-sample the control group when possible; in case of low demand, having a suf-
ficiently sized treatment group took priority. When we received between 85 and 120
applications, 45 students were randomized into the treatment group, and the rest was
assigned to the control group. In case of 80 to 85 applications, we assigned 40 stu-
dents to control and offered treatment to the remaining ones. Finally, if there were less
than 80 applications we offered treatment to nT = min[napplications, 40], and assigned
napplications − nT to control.9
Having chosen the experimental group sizes, we implemented the following ran-
domization algorithmwhich stratifies along two dimensions. First, we grouped students
according to how many years they had studied their current degree. This is top coded at
three years as this is the modal number of years students require to complete a Bachelor
degree.10 The rationale for this is that students who are close to graduation are more
likely to move into (self-) employment in the near future. Second, the algorithm ascer-
tains that the share of business students (students who study business, management,
finance, marketing or related fields) is balanced between treatment and control within
each year of study. Students’ prior knowledge about business and entrepreneurship
concepts may interact with the training content and business students’ responses to the
training program would systematically differ vis-à-vis non-business students.
We form six cells based on the program of study: business-related (two dimensions:
yes or no), and years into the program (three dimensions: one, two or three years). We
first use both cells for third-year students, and within each assign an equal number to
either treatment or control. This ensures that all applications from third-year students
are used.11 We then applied the same procedure to second-year students. If not all
applications from second-year students were necessary to complete target group sizes,
we chose a subset at random. Finally, if group sizes were still not exhausted, we included
(a random subset of) first-year students.12 The exact same procedure will be used in
Wave III.
Our calculations show both the worst-case scenario, in which we cannot implement
9Note that the second term can be zero if less than 40 applications are received.
10Most applicants are Bachelor students (≈ 87 percent) and those that are not are almost exclusively
enrolled in “certificate” and “diploma” programs, which can either be a preparatory or supplementary
degree. These usually take two years and can precede or follow a Bachelor degree.
11In theory, it would be possible to receive applications from third-year students in excess of the ex-
perimental group sizes. In such cases, we would have randomly picked the respective number. In practice
this was never the cases.
12As an example, suppose there are 80 third year applicants; 56 in business-related degrees, 24 in non-
business related degrees. The procedure allocates 28 of the business students to each of treatment and
control; similarly, 12 of the non-business students would be in each of treatment and control. Overall,
there would be 40 students in treatment and 40 in control, but the shares of business and non-business
students would be equal across the groups.
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the planned third wave at all, and the base-case scenario, in which we proceed with our
project as planned or with some delays. To benchmark the statistical power of detecting
effects of the training program on business success, we are conservative and present
minimum detectable effect sizes based on the actual training cohort sizes from the first
two waves of training conducted in the fall of 2019 and the spring of 2020 as the worst-
case scenario. We further provide power calculations for various scenarios of attrition
and non-compliance given the realized sample size.
During the first two waves we worked with 18 cohorts, meaning 18 university-by-
semester blocks. There are 727 and 497 students in the treatment and control groups
respectively. This corresponds to an average treatment group size and control group
size of 40.4 and 27.6, respectively, and 68 students per cohort in total.
To incorporate myriad factors such as attrition, non-compliance, varying treatment
and control group sizes into the power calculations, we perform simulations. We specify
a data generating process and set the magnitude of our treatment effect to be equal to
a pre-specified percentage of the standard deviation of a generic outcome; this can be
interpreted as an effect size in percentage terms. This maps well into our strategy to deal
with concerns from testing multiple hypotheses which rests on constructing normalized
indices of our outcome variables with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.13
For the simulations, we estimate the primary specification (see Equation (3.1)) in a
simulated sample and conduct a two-sided t-test of the null hypothesis of a zero effect
of the treatment using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity for infer-
ence. For the simulated sample, we set the number of cohorts, rates for attrition, non-
compliance, and percent of sample treated as specified in the next paragraph. Then we
vary the sample size per cohort starting from four, going until 122 in steps of four.14 We
draw 1,000 simulation samples per sample size considered. Across all simulated samples,
we calculate the share of rejected null hypotheses at α = 0.05 which is the measure of
simulated power.
The simulation results are shown in Figure 3.2. Panel a presents the base-case sce-
nario based on three waves of academies (left panel) and the worst-case scenario based
on the two waves of academies that have been implemented already. We set the follow-
ing parameters for our benchmark simulations: attrition rate of 5 percent, corresponding
to twice the actually observed attrition in the implementation check of the first wave in
fall 2019; a non-compliance rate of 25 percent as calculated based on the attendance data
13In Section 3.2, we detail the procedure. In short, combining several measures into one index measure
reduces the number of hypotheses to be tested. Rather than testing one hypothesis per variable, general
conclusions are drawn by testing a hypothesis regarding the index.
14The lower sample sizes are not realistic, though they help to visualize the trend in power with respect
to cohort size.
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Figure 3.2: Statistical power simulations
Ideal power (80%)
Ave. # of students (68)
Ideal power (80%)
Ave. # of students (68)
Base-case scenario (3 waves) Worst-case scenario (2 waves)















Effect size    15 % 20 % 25 %
(a) Effect size in base (3 waves) and worst-case scenario (2 waves)
Ideal power (80%)














Attrition    5 % 10 % 15 %
(b) Worst-case scenario and attrition
Ideal power (80%)














Non-compliance    25 % 30 % 35 %
(c) Worst-case scenario and non-compliance
Notes: The simulations in Panel (a) have the following specifications: attrition rate is five percent, non-
compliance is 25 percent, within-cohort correlation is 10 percent and the treatment probability is 59 per-
cent. Statistical power to detect an effect of 15 percent, 20 percent or 25 percent for different average
cohort sizes is presented. Cohort size is the sum of treatment and control group individuals. The right
hand panel reports the worst-case scenario (two waves) while the left hand panel illustrates calculations
for the base-case scenario (three waves). The worst-case simulations vary the attrition rate in Panel (b)
and the non-compliance rate in Panel (c) for an effect size of 20 percent.
for the first wave in fall 2019; and a correlation within training cohorts of 10 percent,
corresponding to a generously upward rounded measure from pilot data. The right half
of panel a indicates that the design is sufficiently powerful (76 percent) to detect an ef-
fect of 20 percent (or 0.2 of a standard deviation) even in the worst-case scenario which
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seems to be a typically observed change (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2014).15 In the base-
case scenario in the left half of panel a, our design would be well-powered to detect an
effect size of 20 percent (89 percent power). If the effect size is actually only 15 percent
of our standardized variable, the statistical power of our design reduces to 66 percent.
In panel b and c of Figure 3.2, we take the worst-case scenario and calculate the
power to detect a 20 percent effect considering even more severe scenarios of attrition
and non-compliance, holding the other parameters constant.16 Panel b reports that attri-
tion rates of 10 percent and 15 percent would only have a marginal effect on the power
of the design. Panel c shows that non-compliance rates of 30 percent and 35 percent
decrease statistical power to detect an effect of 20 percent to 71 percent and 60 per-
cent, respectively. Overall, our design is well-powered for the base-case scenario with
three waves. The conservative, worst-case scenario still yields better power than previ-
ous studies despite being below the generally accepted appropriate target of 80 percent
power (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2014).
3.3 Data
Data collection and processing
Measuring treatment effects at two levels and describing selection into entrepreneur-
ship requires a multitude of surveys. Figure 3.1 details our data collection efforts, and to
which subpopulation surveys are administered. We make all survey instruments avail-
able through attachments to the pre-registration in the AEA registry #4502.17
Selection into entrepreneurship
The highest level of self-section occurs when individuals select into being interested in
entrepreneurship training and attend an information session (see top of the pyramid
in Figure 3.1). From this subpopulation, we collect the following data during the in-
15Our study is not only well-powered to detect typical effect sizes, it also improves on existing studies.
McKenzie and Woodruff (2014) notes that in most studies the power to detect an increase of 25 or even 50
percent in profits or revenues is well below generally accepted levels of power of above 80 percent.
16In results not reported, we can also demonstrate that a correlation of 0.15 within training cohorts
has only a negligible effect on the minimum detectable effect.
17To ascertain data integrity and safety, and to ensure survey respondents’ privacy, we collect, manage
and store data in the following way: First, the interview data is collected by experienced local enumer-
ators. Prior to each data collection effort, PIs personally conduct extensive multi-day workshops with
the enumerators. Data is collected using Kobo toolbox, and its Android-based mobile device app. Data
is stored on secure drives provided by the University of Munich digital infrastructure. When data is col-
lected using pen and paper, data is digitized also using Kobo toolbox in a timely manner and physical
records are safely kept at the University of Munich to ensure privacy thereafter.
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formation session: pen and paper based short surveys eliciting contact details, field of
study, measures of cognitive ability using four Raven matrices, student’s assessment of
how many of these they believed they completed correctly and their assessment of their
own entrepreneurial potential on a scale from one through ten.18 To reach the non-
interested subpopulation we track those classes where the training academy was adver-
tised using short pitches. We classify all students of such a class as having been exposed
to marketing. We return to the same classrooms a few weeks later and distribute stu-
dent population screening surveys. These surveys mimic short surveys conducted during
information sessions and also elicit students’ awareness of entrepreneurship training
programs. This allows us to identify students who were aware of the academy based
on whether they have heard about our training program or about any entrepreneur-
ship training program at their university.19 The pool of students who are aware of a
training program but did not apply constitutes the sampling frame for the student popu-
lation survey. We then randomly sample 80 students per university, and survey them at
two points in time. First, we conduct a phone survey mimicking the baseline survey con-
ducted with academy applicants, which allows us to describe predictors of selection into
entrepreneurship (Student Population Survey I ). Second, we repeat this in Student Pop-
ulation Survey II to analyze how the subpopulation of non-interested students evolved
over time relative to those who expressed in training but were not admitted—the control
group. There is no experimental variation at either stage of this comparison.
Selection experiment
Attending information sessions is a necessary requirement for students to be able to ap-
ply to the training program since the exogenous variation of the marketing messages in
the selection experiment is implemented in the information sessions. At the end of an in-
formation session, interested students can pick up a paper-based application form. Thus,
application form data is only available for the subset of those interested in the training
who actually submit a (complete) application form. Application forms contain contact
details, demographic information, questions about motivations for and experience with
entrepreneurship. We also include questions on students’ expected future wage income,
as well as expected earnings from entrepreneurship. With the experimental variation of
the marketing messages we identify how selection into applying for entrepreneurship
training varies with the stressed motives.
18A short and standardized illustration on how Raven matrices work in general and how students
ought to indicate their answers on the short surveys was provided.
19Most universities do not offer alternative entrepreneurship training programs. Thus, it is reasonable
to assume that students who were aware of a general academy were aware of our academy despite being
unable to exactly recall the name of the program.
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Entrepreneurship training experiment
To causally identify the effect of being offered entrepreneurship training, admission to
the training program is offered on a random basis among those who apply. We gather
pre-treatment data by conducting a baseline survey prior to individuals being informed
about their admissions decisions. After the entrepreneurship training academy, we con-
duct an implementation check survey (around one to twomonths after the academy ends)
and amidline survey (around six month later) with the treatment and control groups. Fi-
nally, we carry out two endline surveys: Endline Survey I will be conducted 12 months
after each cohort is finishedwith their training; Endline Survey II surveys the entire sam-
ple around two years after the last round of academies. This survey will be conducted
simultaneously for all cohorts and allows us to look at how medium to long-term effects
evolve.
While the baseline, implementation check andmidline survey are conducted over the
phone, the endline surveys will be conducted in person. As detailed below, the surveys
elicit information on socio-economic characteristics and main outcome variables, such
as prior and ongoing wage and self-employment, preferences measures (risk and time
preferences, degree of loss aversion), and non-cognitive traits (Big-5, grit, aspirations
and personal initiative). Financial compensation for participation in the endline surveys
helps to minimize attrition.
Key outcomes
We use the collected data to construct outcome measures for our five families of hy-
potheses, as laid out in Section 3.2. To test hypotheses we follow the approach by Kling
et al. (2007) and aggregate variables into indices to test each main hypothesis (see Ta-
ble 3.1) when possible. This reduces the number of tests conducted within each family.
For instance, rather than testing for effects across ten business practices, we define an
index using adherence to those ten practices and only conduct one hypothesis test. This
hypothesis test in turn is part of a family of hypothesis tests. While we focus on indices
of outcome measures here to address multiple hypothesis testing, we will also look at
individual outcome variables during the analysis. We will clearly mark which results
are accounting for multiple hypothesis testing and which are not.
Testing primary Hypothesis Families 1.1 and 2.1 will allow us to draw general con-
clusions about the entrepreneurship training experiment. Testing hypotheses within
Hypothesis Family 1.2 is informative about the mechanisms through which the train-
ing program works. Hypotheses 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 set out to analyze dimensions which
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correlate with entrepreneurial aspirations and success by comparing applicants to the
non-interested subpopulation.20
To create a summary index from several continuous variables we calculate the un-
weighted average of those variables’ z-scores. Z-scores are constructed using the control
group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation. Thus, each compo-
nent of the index has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one for the control
group. To create an index of a set of binary variables we calculate their mean; that is,
the fraction of “successes” across all component variables. If required, variables that are
used to construct an index are reversed so that meaning is consistent.21 In Appendix
C1 we describe which variables are used to construct the indices in Table 3.1. The pre-
analysis plan details the construction of the specific indices.
Hypothesis Family 1.1 consists of four indices: i) business creation (extensive mar-
gin), ii) business success (revenue, profits), iii) labor (employees) and capital (assets, in-
ventory) input, and iv), an index of economic self-sufficiency which aggregates earnings
from self-employment, wage employment and other sources.
Hypotheses Family 1.2 consists of six primary indices: i) business practices (we draw
on an abbreviated version of the 22-item questionnaire used in McKenzie and Woodruff
(2016), and retain ten elements of the original questionnaire (see Appendix C1), ii) finan-
cial professionalization (contains among others, knowledge and usage of financing in-
struments, indicators of business registration and licensing), iii) marketing practices, iv)
capacity to innovate, v) business networks, and vi) development of an “entrepreneurial
mindset” (a composite index constructed from measures of personal initiative, aspira-
tions and entrepreneurial future and self-efficacy (Frese et al., 2007; Bernard and Taffesse,
2014; Campos et al., 2017; Streicher et al., 2019)). For the last two hypothesis families,
non-cognitive traits, such as the Big-5 personality traits or grit (Rammstedt and John,
2007; Duckworth and Quinn, 2009), and time and risk preferences, as well as one’s de-
gree of loss aversion (Fehr and Goette, 2007; Falk et al., 2018), we create indices where
there is a natural grouping (e.g., risk and subjective risk preferences), and investigate
sub-indices in other cases (e.g., Big-5 indices).
Hypotheses Family 2.1 is the essence of the selection study and consists of four hy-
potheses: i) the relative effectiveness of the two randomly chosen marketing messages
in terms of attracting applications, ii) whether applicants differ in their cognitive ability
(proxied by performance on Raven matrices), iii) whether applicants exhibit differences
20We can compare the non-interested subpopulation to the full set of applicants using baseline data
(pre-intervention). Using endline data, we compare the non-interested subpopulation to the control group
(post-intervention).
21For example, all variables used to create the “Innovation” index are arranged so that a larger number
indicates more innovative.
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in over-confidence, and iv) whether applicants self-assess their entrepreneurial poten-
tial differently. We construct a measure of over-confidence by comparing individuals’
observed and subjective (self-reported) performance on the Raven matrices (Moore and
Healy, 2008; Åstebro et al., 2014).
There are two families of hypotheses which we use to study correlates of en-
trepreneurial aspirations and success in the wider population, Families 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.
They mirror the hypotheses from Families 1.1 and 1.2 and therefore mimic the baseline
and endline. These two families of hypotheses describe patterns through which students
select into being interested in entrepreneurship training. We non-experimentally study
baseline and endline differences between students who were interested in entrepreneur-
ship training, and students who were not. First, the baseline comparison sheds light on
how the subpopulation that applied to the training program differs from the general
student population at large. Second, by comparing those that did not express interest
(non-interested subpopulation) to interested students who were not offered admission to
the training (control group) at endline, we can observe how those groups evolved over
time.
Variation from intended sample size
The final sample size depends on the number of applicants and their response rate. To
ensure that potentially interested students know about the academy and come to infor-
mation sessions, we closely monitor the marketing campaign. To reduce attrition (i.e.,
non response) of the applicants over time, we conduct multiple rounds of follow-up
surveys to establish frequent contact and trust.
Changing phone numbers represent the highest threat to maintaining contact with
the surveyees. Therefore, in addition to students’ own phone number(s), we inquire
into contact details from a next-of-kin, their classroom coordinator and ask for an email
address. In subsequent surveys, respondents are asked to verify or update this informa-
tion. We achieved a response rate of 97.1 percent in the implementation check of the
first wave.
We may use social media groups of the academies as an additional source of infor-
mation in the future.22 If those groups retain additional information, attrition could be
treatment-specific. We try to account for this by documenting whether the data used to
contact surveyees would have been available for both treatment and control. Further,
22Trainers typically create WhatsApp groups to stay in touch with their class members, share materi-
als, and give updates about scheduling and locations.
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when testing whether attrition is treatment-specific we will be conservative and test for
attrition using 10 percent as threshold for statistical significance.
Should treatment status predict attrition, we will additionally provide treatment ef-
fect bounds using two approaches recently proposed in the literature. First, the proce-
dure proposed by Lee (2009) quantifies the distribution of those who were induced to
“staying in the sample” by treatment and estimates the best and worst-case scenarios.
Second, we construct treatment effect bounds using the method suggested by Behaghel
et al. (2015). This approach uses the number of attempts (e.g., phone calls) made to reach
a person as instrument in a Heckman-type selection model.
Randomization balance
At this point, implementation of the intervention of the first twowaves is completed. We
have data available for all participants of the information sessionwhere we implemented
the selection experiment using randomly chosenmarketingmessages across bothwaves.
Additionally, we have collected baseline data from applicants and randomized admission
offers across both waves (see Figure 3.1).
In Table 3.3, we conduct balance checks using the baseline data and compare those
individuals who were offered admission (treatment) to those who were not (control)
in the entrepreneurship training experiment. Columns 1 and 3 report the unconditional
means for the treatment and control group. In column 5, we regress the respective
variable on a treatment indicator, controlling for training cohort fixed-effects, and report
the estimated treatment effect (regression-adjusted difference). Using heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors, we then conduct a two-sided t-test of whether the treatment
effect is equal to zero, and report the p-value in column 6. Overall, Table 3.3 suggests
that randomization was successful; from 49 tests we conduct, only one difference is
statistically significant at the five percent level. Specifically, treatment subjects report
higher time preference scores which we attribute to random sampling variation.
For the selection experiment, we only have the short-surveys of participants at the
information sessions as baseline data. The elicited characteristics (gender, field and year
of study) were balanced across both randomly assigned marketing themes.
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Table 3.3: Balance in entrepreneurship training sample
Treatment Control Reg. Adj.
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Diff. p-value N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
General
Profit marketing theme (d) 0.44 0.50 0.41 0.41 0.01 0.83 1215
Male student (d) 0.52 0.50 0.58 0.58 −0.02 0.48 1215
Employment
Working for a wage during the semester (d) 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.21 1214
Employer is company (d) 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.33 1214
Compensation per month in UGX (ths) 39.37 184.51 35.40 35.40 6.35 0.65 1214
Hours per week working 3.71 13.88 2.42 2.42 1.01 0.19 1214
Business
Ever owned a business (d) 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.25 0.01 0.73 1214
Currently owning a business (d) 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.19 0.01 0.62 1214
Founder/Co-founder of business (d) 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.24 0.00 0.98 1214
Number of partners in business [*] 0.38 1.82 0.29 0.29 0.10 0.39 547
Business officially registered (d) [*] 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.71 546
Business has local trading license (d) [*] 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.05 −0.02 0.13 536
Length of existence of business 0.57 1.74 0.53 0.53 0.04 0.74 1214
Length of work at business in months 0.56 1.72 0.48 0.48 0.07 0.53 1214
Number of full-time employees 0.71 11.25 0.40 0.40 0.48 0.43 1214
Number of part-time employees 0.20 1.20 0.20 0.20 −0.01 0.93 1214
Hours per week working at business 7.71 18.58 6.12 6.12 0.19 0.85 1209
Profit per month at business in UGX (ths) 174.32 689.43 147.19 147.19 31.29 0.43 1214
Number of additional businesses owned [*] 0.06 0.27 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.52 547
Networks
Personal contacts for business advice 0.70 0.46 0.73 0.73 −0.01 0.71 1210
Number of contacts in family and friends 2.74 3.30 2.86 2.86 −0.02 0.91 1206
Number of contacts outside family and friends 0.80 1.83 1.03 1.03 −0.23 0.12 1210
Contacts can help discussing business ideas (d) 0.67 0.47 0.72 0.72 −0.02 0.51 1202
Contacts helped discussing business ideas in the past (d) 0.40 0.49 0.43 0.43 −0.02 0.42 1202
Contacts can help collecting payments (d) 0.38 0.49 0.41 0.41 −0.02 0.48 1142
Contacts helped collecting payments in the past (d) 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.13 −0.01 0.55 1142
Contacts can help with sharing tools, inputs, employees (d) 0.37 0.48 0.39 0.39 −0.03 0.37 1126
Contacts helped with sharing tools, inputs, employees in the past (d) 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.82 1126
Contacts can help with purchasing inputs, stocks (d) 0.36 0.48 0.38 0.38 −0.02 0.51 1129
Contacts helped with purchasing inputs, stocks in the past (d) 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.84 1129
Funding
Ever took loan to fund business idea (d) 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.97 1213
Number of known funding initiatives (out of 7) 1.38 1.16 1.41 1.41 0.01 0.88 1172
Non-Cognitive
Big-5: extraversion 0.88 1.44 0.84 0.84 0.13 0.13 1210
Big-5: agreeableness 1.56 1.27 1.44 1.44 0.03 0.75 1212
Big-5: conscientiousness 1.99 1.22 1.90 1.90 0.00 0.95 1211
Big-5: neuroticism −1.15 1.35 −1.13 −1.13 −0.07 0.40 1212
Big-5: openness 7.55 1.27 7.50 7.50 0.04 0.56 1213
Grit score (1-5) 3.57 0.44 3.58 3.58 −0.03 0.32 1203
Personal initiative score (1-5) 4.02 0.41 4.01 4.01 0.00 0.99 1208
Stress score (0-16) 6.20 2.25 6.02 6.02 0.11 0.42 1200
Preferences
Risk preference: scale (1-5) 4.07 0.79 4.06 4.06 −0.03 0.54 1212
Risk preference: final number (1-32) 15.53 11.79 16.09 16.09 0.46 0.52 1213
Loss aversion: Final number (0-6) 4.68 2.02 4.57 4.57 0.16 0.20 1213
Time preference: scale (1-5) 4.03 0.90 3.96 3.96 0.06 0.28 1212
Time preference: final number (1-32) 11.58 12.36 9.79 9.79 1.42 0.05 1213
Entrepreneurial Self-Assessment
Confidence in ability to start own company (1-5) 4.24 0.66 4.24 4.24 −0.03 0.46 1213
Confidence in ability to pursue self-employed career (1-5) 4.30 0.59 4.22 4.22 0.05 0.16 1213
Confidence in ability to manage challenges of an entrepreneur (1-5) 4.17 0.61 4.17 4.17 −0.03 0.39 1213
Confidence in ability to work in own business one year from now (1-5) 3.90 0.90 3.86 3.86 0.00 0.96 1200
Notes. Columns 1 and 3 report the unconditional mean, columns 2 and 4 the standard deviation for the treatment, who was randomly offered
admission to the training program, and control group, respectively. Column 5 reports the regression adjusted mean β̂1 estimated using yi,u =
β0 + β1treati,u + αu + εi,u where αu is training-cohort fixed effect. Column 6 displays the p-value from a two-sided t-test of H0 : β1 = 0
using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The last column shows the number of non-missing observations. (d) denotes an indicator variable.
Variables marked with a [*] are those that were only measured in the second wave.
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3.4 Analysis
OLS will be used if the outcome measure is continuous. We will report results from both
logit andOLS regressions for binary outcomes, with the logit specification being our pre-
ferred. Inference about treatment effects will be based on two-sided t-tests obtained from
using (cluster-)robust standard errors. We precisely state how standard errors are calcu-
lated when discussing the empirical specifications for estimating treatment effects. We
separately discuss the empirical specifications for the entrepreneurship training study
and the selection study. The p-values that govern our conclusions will take into account
multiple hypotheses testing by being adjusted to control for the family-wise error rate
(FWER). We detail the procedure in Section 3.4.
Entrepreneurship training experiment
In the entrepreneurship training experiment, we identify the Intention-to-Treat (ITT) ef-
fect of being offered admission to the entrepreneurship training. We separately estimate
the coefficient of interest β1,r for short-term (r = 2, Endline I) and long-term effects
(r = 3, Endline II) according to Equation (3.1):
yi,u,r = β0,r + β1,rtreati,u + αu + stratai,u + εi,u,r (3.1)
where yi,u,r is outcome (measured by an index) for individual i, training cohort u ∈
{1, ..., K}, and survey round r. The indicator variable treati,u is equal to one if individ-
ual (applicant) i in training cohort u was randomly offered admission, and zero other-
wise. Since randomization of admission offers was stratified by field of study and year
of study, we include an indicator variable for every combination of the two variables.23
Since the probability of being assigned to treatment differs across training cohorts, and
is a function of the number of applicants, we include a training cohort fixed effect αu.
Equation (3.1) is our preferred specification, and results from it will be reported first
in the analysis. Put differently, estimates of β1 from Equation (3.1) will be used to address
the questions and hypotheses posed earlier. The following specifications are intended
to provide more precise estimates in order to help us better gauge the magnitude of the
estimated effects.
To improve the precision of β̂1 we run a second set of specifications which includes
a set of pre-treatment predictors. We follow the recommendation in Duflo et al. (2020)
and use a variable selection approach. The double post-lasso estimation proposed by
23This results in five indicators included in the regressions, with one reference category omitted. These
randomization cells refer to every combination of field of study (business and non-business) and year of
study (first, second, and third).
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Belloni et al. (2014) selects a low-dimensional set of predictors which are then included
in the estimation. Themethod uses two separate Lasso regressions; one model to predict
treatment assignment, another model to predict the outcome, and each model returns
a set of variables to be included. Denote the union of this (as of now unknown) set of
covariates by Xi,u,r=0. We further include the baseline value of the dependent variable
yi,u,r=0 whenever available.
yi,u,r = β0 + β1,rtreati,u + β2yi,u,r=0 + X ′i,u,r=0γ + stratai,u + αu + εi,u,r (3.2)
McKenzie (2012) discusses the benefits of a design that uses several post-treatment
surveys to obtain more precise treatment effect estimates. Variables central to the anal-
ysis, such as profits and revenues, are likely to exhibit little auto-correlation. In this set-
ting, statistical power in ANCOVA specifications is increased by pooling post-treatment
observations. Section 3.3 describes that we conduct one midline follow up in addition to
two endline surveys, resulting in three (r ∈ {1, 2, 3}) post-treatment surveys. Pooling
those rounds, we estimate
yi,u,r = δr + β1treati,u + β2yi,u,r=0 + αu + εi,u,r (3.3)
where δr is a survey round fixed effect, and r = 0 indexes the baseline.
Effect heterogeneity
We are interested in analyzing heterogeneity in the ITT-effects along four independent,
preregistered dimensions. First, we explore whether effects differ by an individual’s field
of study. Students in a business-related degree may have a higher ex ante likelihood of
starting (successful) businesses due to higher entrepreneurial intentions or a different
skill set (e.g., Solesvik, 2013; Bae et al., 2014). Second, we test whether effects differ by an
individual’s year in their degree. Students closer to graduation are more likely to move
into (self-)employment in the near future. Thus, we test whether effects differ between
students in their final (third year) and the remaining students. Third, we assess whether
effects are different for students who report having sufficient financial means at base-
line. Capital constraints have frequently been cited as the major obstacle to business
growth in developing countries, and individuals who already possess the required funds
may stand to benefit in a more immediate way (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2014). Fourth,
we analyze differential effects by gender (Shinnar et al., 2014). Additional exploratory
heterogeneity analyses (e.g., along self-reported motives and randomly assigned mar-
keting themes, economic preferences or personality traits) will be clearly indicated as
such.
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Inference
Inference about the estimates in Equations (3.1) and (3.2) will be based on conventional
heteroskedastic-robust Eicker-Huber-White standard errors. In case of Equation (3.3)
standard errors will be clustered at the individual level since we use up to three obser-
vations per individual. Randomization of admission offers occurs at the individual level,
and thus these standard errors are appropriate.
Selection into entrepreneurship
We describe and analyze selection at two steps before being (randomly) offered admis-
sion to the training program. In the selection experiment, random assignment to market-
ing messages during information sessions provides us with orthogonal variation which
we exploit to study selection into applying for the training program along two salient
motivations. Specifically, we use the following specification to analyze the differential
effect of exposure to a specific marketing messages on a student’s propensity to apply
(Hypothesis 1 of Hypothesis Family 2.1):
appliedi,u = β0 + β1treat_profiti,u + αu + W ′i,uδ + εi,u. (3.4)
Indices are defined as above; applied is an indicator equal to one if an individual sub-
mits an application for the training program, and zero otherwise; treat_profit is an
indicator equal to one if an individual participated in an information session randomly
emphasizing financial independence, and equal to zero if theme was creative freedom.
The vector Wi,u is included to increase the precision of estimates and it contains an in-
dividual’s gender as well as indicators for years in the current degree (defined as above).
Hypotheses 2 through 4 of Family 2.1.1 capture the idea that selection patterns may
differ relative to the underlying motivation for entrepreneurship. Denote a dimen-
sion of hypothesized heterogeneity in selection (cognitive ability, over-confidence, en-
trepreneurial self-assessment, see Hypotheses 2 through 4 of Family 2.1.1 in Table 3.1)
with Zi; we then estimate the following specification to test for different selection pat-
terns:
appliedi,t = β0 + β1treat_profiti,u + β2Zi,t + γZi,t ∗ treat_profiti,u
+ αu + Wi,uδ + εi,t. (3.5)
Conclusions about differential selection will be based on assessing whether the esti-
mated coefficients of our heterogeneity analyses are statistically significantly different
from zero (H0 : γ = 0).
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Effect heterogeneity
We do not anticipate to have sufficient power to study whether effects are heterogenous
by individuals’ field of study. However, we do intend to conduct exploratory analyses to
assess whether the marketing messages induce differences in the composition of busi-
ness and non-business students. In this case, we will follow Casey et al. (2012) and label
the regressions as unregistered and exploratory.
Inference
The selection experiment is a clustered design in which all students participating in a
given information session are exposed either to the financial independence or the cre-
ative freedom marketing message. Thus, standard errors should be clustered at the ses-
sion level (Abadie et al., 2020); the level at which treatment varies. However, due to
administrative issues, for some individuals we are unable to observe the exact session
an individual attended and cannot cluster at this appropriate level. We attempt to over-
come this by conservatively clustering at the training cohort level which is the next
highest level. In the worst-case scenario of two waves, there are only 18 training co-
horts and standard cluster-robust inference may over-reject. We thus pursue the wild
bootstrap adjustment proposed by Cameron et al., 2008 to calculate standard errors and
conduct inference.
Non-experimentally describing selection
Finally, we document selection into entrepreneurship by comparing those who were
informed about the training program but did not attend an information session (non-
interested subpopulation), to those who applied to the training program using baseline
data. In addition, we document trends in how the non-interested subpopulation evolves
over time relative to the subpopulation that expressed interest in the training. We do
so by comparing them to those who applied but were not admitted—the control group—
using Endline I (r = 2) data. Both comparisons are based on estimating the following
specification.
yi,u,r = β0 + β1appliedi,u + αu + εi,u,r. (3.6)
Indices are defined as above and we examine them at the baseline (r = 0), and again at
the Endline I (r = 2). appliedi,u is an indicator equal to one if an individual applied to
the training, and zero otherwise. There is no experimental variation at this stage and
therefore β̂1 does not measure a causal effect, but is merely informative of a correla-
tion. We calculate heteroskedasticity-robust Eicker-Huber-White standard errors. For
completeness, we also show results for individual index components.
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Data processing
First, to establish that our results, especially those involving monetary outcomes, are
not driven by extreme observations, we will report results with and without winsoriz-
ing outcomes at the 99th percentile. Should a variable lack a natural lower bound (i.e.,
revenues are bound at zero, while profits are unbounded), we also winsorize at 1st per-
centile.
Second, distributions of variables such as revenue and profits are likely be skewed
to the right. We apply the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to this data which is
defined as f(x) = log(x+
√
x2 + 1) (Burbidge et al., 1988). Note that this transformation
is also defined for x = 0 and retains the interpretation of the classic linear-logarithmic
regression model for all values of x — except for very small values.
Third, in order to limit noise caused by variables with minimal variation, questions
for which 95 percent of observations have the same value within the relevant sample
will be omitted from the analysis and will not be included in any indicators or hypoth-
esis tests. In the event that omission decisions result in the exclusion of all constituent
variables for an indicator, the indicator will be not be calculated. We explicitly exclude
variables in Hypothesis 2 of Family 1.2 for “financial professionalization”: Indicators,
such as equity investment or business registrations are likely to be rare events and are
insightful despite having little variation.
Fourth, whenever a survey’s skip logic was triggered by a “yes” or “no” answer, we
code the subsequent questions in the logical fashion.24 Note that we account for the fact
that people answer “don’t know” or “don’t want to answer”; We only impute the logical
value if an explicit “yes” or “no” answer triggered the skip logic.
Section 3.3 describes how we construct indices to reduce the number of hypotheses
tests. Note that the index value is missing if there is one or more missing values in the
component variables (e.g., if a person answers ”don’t know” to one of the questions). We
address this problem by providing two estimates in addition to the estimate based on the
actually observed number of non-missing cases. First, we impute missing values using
the mean value for the entire population, and then generate the index. For robustness,
we also provide benchmarks for imputing minimum and maximum values for the entire
population. Second, we implement an Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) estimator in
which each non-missing index value is weighted by the inverse probability of having
data observed (Seaman andWhite, 2013). We model the incidence of observing an index
value using a logit model with complete baseline characteristics (sex, employment status,
24For instance, if somebody does not know any entrepreneurs, then the number of friends and family
members who are entrepreneurs is zero — although the skip logic would have result in this being amissing
value.
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self-employment; see Table 3.3), and use the predicted probability.
Fifth, in order to compare monetary values across time, we adjust values using Con-
sumer Price Index data published by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics.
Multiple hypotheses testing
We construct several indices within each family of outcomes as detailed in Section 3.3
and Appendix C1. We employ two approaches to control the FWER, that is, controlling
the probability of a false positive within each family. First, we implement the approach
used by Aker et al., 2016 who use a traditional Bonferroni-type adjustment but account
for correlations across variables used to test hypotheses.25 Theirmethod nests the classic
Bonferroni adjustment when outcomes are uncorrelated. Second, we also employ the
method outlined by Barsbai et al. (2020) who develop a regression-adjusted version of
List et al. (2019). This is a bootstrap-based stepwise procedure designed to control the
FWER in settings with multiple hypotheses.
Thus, for each hypothesis across our five families we obtain two p-values which
control the FWER, on top of standard p-values. The p-values that correct for multiple
hypothesis testing are of interest for researchers with no priors on the specific hypothe-
ses we test. Our preferred procedure is the one by Barsbai et al., 2020 and our main
conclusions will be based on being able to reject null hypotheses using those p-values.
We report p-values using the procedure by Aker et al., 2016 for comprehensiveness.
Test for reporting errors being treatment independent
In business training interventions whose overall effectiveness is — among others —
judged through financial outcomes and adherence to “good” management practices, re-
porting errors may not be independent of treatment assignment. Individuals who have
gone through the training programmay be better at accurately judging profits and sales.
Alternatively, they may intentionally overstate profits (to suggest the training was help-
ful) or positively report on business practices because they are more likely to knowwhat
the “correct” answer is (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2016).
To address this concern, we construct a measure of sales minus profits which should
equal costs and thus be weakly larger than zero. Should it be lower than zero, it likely
signals a reporting error as costs cannot be negative. We then test whether treatment
assignment predicts the incidence and magnitude of observed reporting errors. In a
second step, we calculate implied revenue per customer, and compare the implied prices
25In our cases, we employ the correlation between index measures within each family.
130 IDENTIFYING AND TEACHING HIGH-GROWTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP
of the goods and services across treatment and control and cross check with market
prices.26
Conditional on detecting statistically significant treatment differences in reporting
errors, we will conduct detailed in-person audits with a randomly selected subset of 100
treatment and 100 control group subjects. The audits will take place shortly after the
endline data collection in the spirit of McKenzie (2017). We focus on business experience
and business performance. This allows us to establish bounds of reporting errors for
each of the variables studied (difference between endline self-reports and the audit data,
separately by treatment and control groups). We will present the bounded results as
robustness checks.
26We are aware of the possibility that new businesses may create goods and services of higher qual-
ity which command above-market prices. Nonetheless, implied prices should be largely comparable to
market prices, assuming they are free of reporting errors.
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Appendix C1 Construction of outcome indices
Table 3.1 provides an overview of the hypotheses. In the following, we detail which
variables are used to construct those indices. Note that we spell out winsorization and
transformation in Section 3.4, the creation of indexes based on z-scores in Section 3.3.
1. Entrepreneurship training study
1.1. Economic outcomes (four hypotheses)
1 Business creation
• Business exists (yes/no)




3 Capital and labor input
• Value of physical assets
• Value of inventory
• Capital investment over past 3 months
• Number of full-time employees
• Number of part-time employees
• Number of partners in business
4 Economic self-sufficiency
• Earnings from self-employment (monthly profits)
• Earnings from wage employment
• Earnings from other sources
1.2 Business and personal input (eight hypotheses)
1 Business practices
• Share of business practices employed
2 Financial professionalization
• Taken out a loan (yes/no)
• Size of loan
• Business registration
• Local trade licenses
• Knowledge about funding initiatives
• Actual funding from initiatives
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• Received equity investment
• Banking account
• Emergency borrowing
• Business banking account
• Hours of consulting services
3 Marketing
• Number of marketing channels used
4 Innovation
• Introduction of a new product (yes/no)
• Number of new products
• Main new product is a new product line (yes/no)
• Product improvement (yes/no)
• Product new to neighborhood (yes/no)
• Origin of idea (own idea vs. inspired vs. purchased/others idea)
• Process improvement (yes/no)
• Introduced a new method for pricing (yes/no)
• Website with functioning URL (yes/no)
5 Networks
• Number of contacts in friends and family
• Number of contacts in ”other”
• Scope of potential advice
• Scope of advice used




• Entrepreneurial self-efficacy (general and task-specific separately)
• Entrepreneurial future





• Subjective risk preferences
• Loss aversion
• Time preferences
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• Subjective time preferences
2. Selection study
2.1 Selection into entrepreneurship among those with interest (four hypotheses)
1 Submitted application
2 Cognitive ability





• Believes about becoming a successful entrepreneur,
• Subjective rank of entrepreneurial ability,
2.2.1 Economic outcomes (non-experimental) [identical to 1.1]
2.2.2 Business and personal input (non-experimental) [identical to 1.2]
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Appendix C2 Marketing themes
Section 3.2 describes how our design allows us to study selection into entrepreneurship.
In order to apply to the entrepreneurship training program, students ought to attend
information sessions where application forms can be obtained. We randomly vary the
content of those information sessions by emphasizing either that entrepreneurship of-
fers the possibility of achieving financial independence, or that entrepreneurship offers
the freedom to be creative. Information sessions take approximately 15-20 minutes and
the content is presented by a member of our partner organization. In each session, a
presenter went through 12 presentation slides and two videos.
The videos constituted the main source of variation in the presentation. This guar-
anteed that students across sessions are exposed to the identical content. The first video
differed in both visual and audio content. It was was 3 minutes 57 seconds in the profit
condition, and 3 minutes 38 seconds in the creative freedom condition. The difference
stems from the voice over being longer in the former. The second video only differed
in audio content, and took 1 minute 53 seconds in both treatment conditions. Videos
were embedded in the presentations to reduce technological complexity. The first video
was presented on slide seven, while the second video was presented on the last slide. In
between, slide nine presented different content.
In Figure C.1 we show examples of different content across the two treatments. In
panels a and b, we show a still frame of the first video’s first slide. Two of three state-
ments differ, and the voice over emphasized the differences between the two treatments.
Note that not entire presentation was kept in this black and white layout. In panels c
and d we show the first frame of the second video. Again, the voice over emphasized
the differences. Finally, we show the slide in which the presentations further differed
in panels e and f.
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(a) First video, profit (b) First video, creative freedom
(c) Second video, profit (d) Second video, creative freedom
(e) Slide nine, profit (f) Slide nine, creative freedom
Figure C.1: Example for treatment variation in information sessions
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